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the term reduction of backlog, 
asked for the nature of the back-
problem, causation, what's log problem, the extent of the 
causing the problem, what steps 
what legislative efforts should 
are being taken to tackle the problem, 
undertaken, and I'll try to address 
each of those within e 
re to of problem, court conges 
and delay the number one judie ry in the United 
States today. A horrendous number of cases are being tried. A hor-
rendous number of cases await tr for over one year. An unreason-
ably large and unnecessarily large number of cases are awaiting trial 
per judicial pos ion. The t lag between at issue and trial. The 
second, third and fourth times that a case called up for trial and 
then continued to a new trial. That's the nature of the problem. The 
extent of the problem: throughout the State of California there are 
over 150,000 cases at the Superior Court level at issue awaiting trial. 
Ha of those, 75,000 cases, have been at sue for over one year. The 
time lag between at issue and tr varies from five months to nearly 
50 months. The number of cases at issue awaiting trial per judicial 
position varies from 50 cases per judie ion to 300 cases per 
judicial position and,in one court, 600 per judicial position. The 
inflow into the system, which is of at issues filed each 
month is, county by county and court court, so infinitessimally 
different so as not to be a substantial varying factor, with a few 
exceptions. The range of new cases coming into the system is 16 to 
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going to have to continue to have creative approaches and not simply 
wait and see whether or not this works. 
JUDGE WATT: About waiting for additional judges. This 
approach, you see, doesn't cost another dime of money. This approach 
doesn't call for as much as changing a comma in the Constitution or 
any statute or any rule of court. Working within the system. Assembly-
roan Berman do you have a question? 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: Look at Pomona. There are 15 judges out 
there and you've made this 1ncredible change. 
JUDGE WATT: I'm going to give the credit where it belongs 
and that is to Art Bolanado and Dave Eagleson for saying go ahead. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: I'm just trying to understand what is 
happening. All right, the notion of going from 40 to 140 trial setting 
conference notices is, that's not going to take a lot of judicial time. 
JUDGE WATT: Exactly. That's the very point. It's a clerical 
operation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: But then they shell out. I mean I 
assume is there a standard time which a notice goes out and sets the 
date. You don't get anything by sending out the notices much earl 
but just having a longer time until that conference occurs. 
JUDGE WATT: In Pomona, he's got all of the cases set now 
through April, so he's got all the cases presently awaiting trial on 
the trial calendar and the new cases coming in are being set within 
rules of the court which is no less than 60 nor more than 90 days super-
imposed on top of it. By mid June you'll be totally current in the 
Pomona courts. I'm going to just say two more things and then I'll 
stop because I'm over my time. The Court of Pericles was astounded when 
a young scientist of that day had the temerity to suggest that the moon 
might possibly be as immense as the whole mainland of Greece. I'm sug-
gesting that it's larger. I'm saying that it can be done, that it 
being done, that it has been done. The decision making process in our 
society today is such that it varies tremendously and with all due re-
spect to you all, if we compare the decision making process on the 
merits of a (inaudible) .as it is done when those respectfully say in 
the Legislature,in the executive branch, in the private sector, or in 
the court system, are we not really looking at the decision making 
process in the court system being at a very substantially higher level. 
If we talk about taking matters and chunks out of the judicial system 
we are ensuring a lower quality of justice. To say we should at this 
point reverse that process and put those matters into the judicial 
process would be the disaster that we're talking about if you move the 
number of cases up on a no continuance policy without settlement. We 
have to work out and change the internal mechanics so that the judicial 
process can handle the workload and handle more and thus place the 
total system in a position of having a higher quality of justice. It 
can be done. I would be pleased to work with any county in this state 
or any court in this state at any time. The Legislature can make a 
tremendous contribution by each of you encouraging your courts to allow 
help to come and it can be done and it can be done within a reasonably 
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short time. If there are further questions I would be glaa to 
otherwise I recognize and appreciate that I've run 
time. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Judge Watt, I 
One is that I think the Legislature 
pact on a lot of this simply by 
face and inability to respond with 
loads and trying to eliminate the backlog. There 
of adopting new leg lative procedures or by 
we imagine pressures are going to be very 
future. I'm interested though your input and 
of the Judicial Counsil as well as individual j 
to look at this a comprehensive way, and to look 
aches that you mi~ht utilize, again whether it 
ment conferences. To try to make sure that 
that is expedient and one certainly that rna 
have spoken about, so I certainly appreicate your 
as many others have done, salute you for your 
seeing that some progress is made in dealing 
problem that is almost like a tumor. It kind of 
become a 
and festers un-
til somebody looks at it and tries to cut some 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: There's something to 
Werner Erhard, the fellow who founded EST and then 
project. I went to a lecture, a four hour lecture on 
So 
in the world and he said well it's for everybody to want to 
in the world. In other words, I don't quite unders the 
for why this is happening, other than some relig 
the judges working with it are going through to 
that they weren't doing before. 
JUDGE WATT: Assemblyman Berman, I'd be ad to 
only pause is that I might be broaching on somebody else's 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Maybe as people go on we can get some 
action. 
JUDGE WATT: I would be glad to go into that 
I wanted to do is show you what has been done, the rough 
step is a whole subject in itself. If I may repeat to a minor extent 
it's the exposure of the case to trial with the assurance that 
will be a court available, that there will be no continuance, and a 
meaningful settlement program that makes the difference. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: The consequences of what you're 
is that if the purpose of certain things we do is to shorten the 
log, creating new judges, promoting aribtration, thinking about consol 
dation or unification of the courts, all this. None of this is s 
ficant to, it's just having people follow a different routine 
they .•. 
JUDGE WATT: Let's take the example you talk of, unif 
What I'm saying is, deal with the subject of unification on the 
for the improvement of administrative justice and not as a means 











ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: Funny, my colleagues have talked about 
what little power you have left us. 
JUDGE TROTTER: We don't have enough time to debate that. But 
in all seriousness, I strongly believe that. Judge Watt is a rabid 
believer in his program and I am a in it to a certain extent. 
But I think we have to recognize, and this is where I think we have to 
talk about state intervention, that di areas of this state have 
different needs, even though we can say that each judge in the superior 
court of the State of California has "X" nubmer of cases or there are 
"X" number of cases per judicial position. I think we would be less 
than honest if we didn't recognize that in the central district of Los 
Angeles County the cases that each judge has are sometimes much more 
time consuming and complex than the judge in Yolo County may have. 
IBM v Ford may be'one case and that may take 10 judicial years and those 
cases all seem to gravitate to the urban courts. The urban courts are 
the ones that have the severe problems. I'm a firm believer that there 
are many things that we can do. Judge Watt's ideas are all sound, but 
I daresay that there is not an urban court that is not doing them al-
ready. We in Orange County, and I am with some pride of authorship 
the architect of our plan, have reduced our time to trial, we've 
cut it in half. The way we did it isn't significant. That's not what 
I'm here to tell you. What I'm here to suggest to you each county 
has its own peculiar problems that have to be recognized. Whether Los 
Angeles County needs an influx of judges on a temporary basis on assign-
ment from those counties that are current, or they should have the 
ability to send their cases to other areas that are more current, I 
don't know the answer to that. That is a peculiar problem. It is a 
state problem and the litigation, the heaviest litigation in the state 
gravitates towards the largest urban areas, Los Angeles and San Fran-
cisco, and to a lesser but still significant extent, Orange County. 
We have made, in my opinion, dramatic strides, but we have 
used something that you gave us to do that and the thing that I think 
was the most significant piece of legislation to help court congestion 
was the arbitration bill. I strongly urge that we not let that sunset, 
that we increase the limits to $25,000 for the entire state, not just 
the two counties, and that when we consider the rent-a-judge problem 
that we not confuse judicial arbitration with rent-a-judge nor have the 
adverse inferences that come from the rent-a-judge affect the judicial 
arbitration program. 
The criticism for the rent-a-judge program is that only the 
wealthy can benefit from it. In judicial arbitration there is no cost 
to the litigant. It is equally applied. I understand the trial lawyers' 
position, having been a trial lawyer for more than 20 years before being 
a judge, that philosophically to take any case away from the jury systein 
is not the right approach. Once you can overcome that philosophical 
argument, there is no practical argument against arbitration. It bene-
fits everybody. And in Orange County we have re~lly utilized that bill 
to 4elp us break a tremendous backlog. 
ASSEMBLYMAN D. STIRLING: Yes, Judge Trotter, recognizing the 
limitations in that the parties could choose to go to court after ar-
bitration, do you have any ideas as to how many of the cases that have 
gone through arbitration in your court at any given period of time have 
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bit differently, but I think just as effectively, which again 
out that there is more than one way to solve the problem. But all 
resolutions tend to be rather simplistic, and all of the ideas to 
the problems tend to be very --merely adding judges I don't think has 
solved the problem. Whether we haven't added enough is something 
for someone else to debate, I don't know. But I think that all o 
problems of congestion, if you look at them carefully, result and 
from urban counties. The addressing of these problems has to be ad-
dressed in that context. Again, not to single out the colossus to 
north of Orange County, but they have the most unique problems 
say that a plan that might be efficient in Orange County, or Butte 
County or Yolo County would be efficient in Los Angeles Central 
miss the point of the problem. Those things have to be 
they have to be a9dressed in a logical manner by the people who are 
faced with the problem, and I would suggest that we look at very 
carefully. 
There are many, many stop gap measures. I don't know if 
want to hear some. All can come from the court itself by means of 
court rule without legislation. Whether you have a special trial 
We opted for a civil trial panel in Orange County and we only had 
judges on that panel. Those five judges tried 50 percent more j 
trials than the entire court did last year. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I don't think we necessarily need to tal 
about rigid procedures and the ones that certainly don't recognize 
individual differences in a particular county as opposed to another 
but should we talk about standards, we should talk about some 
make sure that something is done to implement speedier trials, to 
nate backlogs, those kinds of things, as opposed to sitting back and 
saying, "Well, you know if it takes five years it just takes five 
If we try something and it doesn't work, so what," that kind of 
How do we get some kind of accountability in the courts other 
simply by saying, "Well I hope you guys will be accountable and I 
you guys will do your job, but if you don't, well, that's the way 
is." 
JUDGE TROTTER: I don't know if I can answer that. I don t 
know if anybody can. I can make a couple of suggestions and I 
that the arbitration bill has been treated badly. I think that is a 
goldmine that we have not yet really begun to benefit from. I th 
that the attitude of certain courts concerning the arbitration 11 
has left it in a position of less success than it should enjoy. I 
think increasing the limits of the arbitration bill will have a dra-
matic effect, but again, there are attendant problems to that, but 
that is one problem. 
There are many peripheral things that can be done. I per-
sonally believe that a prejudgment interest bill would be significant. 
That's not going to end court congestion, but it-certainly is a tool 
an arsenal that can be used. I think the real bottom line analysis has 
to be accepted that urban counties are different and they have to be 
treated differently. They have to be given whatever special help 
need to solve their problems. There are only two counties, if you 
consider them urban, that are anywhere near current in their backlog. 













of the siphon 
a delicate, 
the best of all 
, ear court 
involvement so that the pace of the litigation is not determined by 
the lawyers but is determined by the court, will definitely cause the 
cases to be disposed of more readily, quickly and expeditiously. But, 
when there is a backlog of the extent that now exists, that's fantasy. 
We have to rate the backlog so that we can then have enough judicial 
time to manage. I don't know whether they can both be done at the same 
time or not. I don't have an answer to that. In our county we took 
the judicial time to manage the cases and we didn't try very many cases 
during the time that we were managing. But because of that we now have 
the ability to try more cases and we have reduced our time lag, we've 
cut it in half. 
ASSEMBLYMAN D. STIRLING: Let me just inquire. Do you have 
any figures on the categories of the types of cases that make up the 
civil calendar, tne filings, PI ..• 
JUDGE TROTTER: Well, most of the cases are personal injury 
cases. The percentage in our county may vary, but the great majority 
of cases that are filed, other than domestic that are civil, are per-
sonal injury cases. There is a significant number of cases that are 
business oriented, maybe 20 percent business litigation. Very few 
condemnation, and a very, very small percentage of anything else. 
ASSEMBLYMAN D. STIRLING: Is there any kind of grouping of 
those cases that can be taken out of the normal civil court system and 
put into a specialized system? 
JUDGE TROTTER: Yes and no. I view civil cases as two types: 
the ordinary run-of-the-mill case and the complex large case. Urban 
counties have an inordinate number of the complex, difficult cases. 
That's the problem. If you were to track cases by whatever determina-
tion, time, expense, value, you would find that 80 to 85 percent or 
maybe even 90 percent of the cases fall into the run-of-the-mill cate-
gory. The other cases are the ones that clog the courts because they 
are not the ordinary ones. Those 80 to 90 percent of the cases settle 
at a much much higher rate than the complex, difficult, unusual cases 
do. 
Judge Watt's statistics on settlement I agree with for the 85 
percent. That's not true for the other 10 or 15 percent. And those 
are the cases that you find in the urban courts. The asbestosis cases 
of Los Angeles County a perfect example. 
ASSEMBLYMAN D. STIRLING: But I bet that when David Eagleson 
comes up here to test1fy, the breakdown of percentages of PI cases that 
are in the court system would be pretty similar to the ones that are 
in other areas. And those are run-of-the-mill cases with a few ex-
ceptions that are particularly and more significant and more compli-
cated. Would the same basic thing be true even if in the urban areas 
they have more complex type cases? The breakdown is going to be mostly 
PI cases. 
JUDGE TROTTER: There are no shipyards in Butte County, so 
there's no asbestos1s cases in Butte County. There is no heavy manu-
facturing in some of the other counties, so they don't have complex 
products liability cases. Those cases don't exist in other than 
-13-










of that situat 
Do you feel the 
under the Cons , to set 
way you are tal about, that is, 
ability to the court and at 
mends, very s 
because of poli cons 
Pardon? What d be wrong 
increasing as much as $100,000? 
JUDGE TROTTER: Well 
rights therea 
if 
would that make? 
u have novo 
JUDGE TROTTER: You And that the 
that the rs make. , once you say that a 
gant's right to jury trial the value of the case, have 
you not compromised the bas I can say yes to that and I can 
say no to that. Yes have in In prac ity, no you 
haven't, because of the very reason you just said. If we don't do some-
thing, we're going to lose the whole system. The trial lawyer's answer 
to that, and I don't mean to speak for the lawyers, but having 
been one, and I sympathize with the pos because I believe in 
the jury system, we should look for remedies. isn't 
a remedy. I I that of lower level, and 
with inflation everyday, lower level civil 
disputes should be tration. If they can't be or if 
is resolved unsat tori , st 1 have that right to come back. 
So I think that you face ... (Inaudible) ... would be 100 percent 
trial de novo instead of the 30 percent. Everybody would come back. 
Or I shouldn't say that. But I think Assemblyman Berman's -- the 
higher the level, the the number of people who are going to 
come back into court. I think you'll see that. But you know, arb 
tration, if you really look at it, exists in our soc in many forms. 
There is not a private health care provider that doesn't have an 
arbitration provision their contract. 
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a less than urban 
PJ is 
of 
on the 't work. 
he apparently has become 
Now it's true that's not 
one of people singing loudest in 
will work in every 
I really do bel 
and (b) I do 
an urban area, I believe kind 
Have I said enough? Probably too much. 
where there is (a) a 
it can be 
not 
ASSEMBLYMAN 11, the frus part 
no doubt re you s or s and numerous others, 
we as well, if the experts don't know what the fix or can't g 
some specifics, in other words 's a matter of attitude, it's a matte 
of dedication, I mean, I understand that, who supposed to have the 
answers. We have no answers. That all well and good for awh e, 
but at some point we've got to some answers. I'm trying to just 
something concrete that will come out hearing that we will 
be able to say at least we have construct steps that we can move 
forward with. 
MR. GAMPELL: , and I suspect if pose 
the same question to Judge would answer the same way. Some 
judges work at this level. do very dedicated work at that 
level. Some judges do less dedicated work at is level. The PJ can 
do nothing about it. He does the best he can with the resources he 
has. Judge Schauer, and I suspect Judge Eagleson, will agree that 
have the right number of judges for the continuing workload. That if 
in some way the backlog could be gotten rid of, they're in great shape. 
So, there are some things that I there is no immediate answer to. 
But I do believe that with new techniques that Judge Eagleson has 
duced in Los Angeles, that that backlog can be substantially eliminated 
And I really don't think that there will be a need for any massive 
change. I would like to see explored, maybe I'll be laughed out 
of the room, this idea of taking the big cases and sending them to 
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I understand , on the results of judicial 
use of telephone around the and their study in-
dicates that all of the judges who use telephone conferencing regard 
as a means of reducing the and cost of civil litigation. 
Court time is thought to several ways, ily by short-
length of the 1 z 
the judge's abil to o cases faster 
status calls to 1 A note on exac how would work 
mechanically. That something which the bill would leave up to the 
ial Counc the that the of court processes 
and how th be really to the j 
who and request 
that there be procedures are 
so a matter Los es 
has some inkling 's j diction when 
tr s to use the tem. There al substant body 
of experience with telephone conferenc courts now 
permit trial s to be handled entirely In law and 
motion matters there has been a procedure in Torrance Branch of the 
Los Angeles Superior Court under the supervision of Judge Goebel since 
1977 as part of the economic litigation ect which Judge Epstein as 
tand 1 s Fresno Court, 
in 1980 under lowed telephone ing. 
Ira Brown in San Francisco who handles all the law and motion matters 
there has been telephone conferencing since July of this year 
and Ms. McGuire will to scr that in some il. 
I 
Francisco Bar Assoc 
perience. San Francisco 
handles about 60 to 90 matters on 
to take it off experimental status 
his routine. 
letter from Mr. Fre of the San 
briefly Judge Brown's ex-
view because Judge Brown 
every morning. He wants 
a permanent part of 
Usage of the system has been quite light up until now. Mr. 
Friese in his letter explains that he thinks that may be due to the 
amount of public they have to get this early period. 
In jurisdictions other than California, there has been very 
extensive experimentation. I'm sure Mr. Janofsky will be able to com-
ment upon that so I won't try to into it in any detail. I can tell 
you, though, there is signif experience with telephone con-
ferencing courts, among other places Colorado, Maine and 
Wisconsin, Federal courts in Marylamd, the eastern district of New 
York, Pennsylvania, Wyoming and San Francisco. The ABA Journal in 
September 1981 quoted a Superior Court Judge from Atlantic City who I 
think summed the situation up. Telephone hearings, he said, are not 
an experiment any longer. We believe that it's time for telephonic 
appearance procedures to move into the mainstream in California also 
and so we urge passage of As Bill 1209. 
MR. LARRY FELDMAN: rman, my name is Larry Feldman 
and I am Chairman of the Court Committee of the LA County 
Bar. Our committee has the use of telephone and even before 
the bill was written had done a survey to determine the acceptance of 
telephone usage on motions. And was a basic feeling of the committee 
we 
iver legal 
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telephone system the courtroom to do that. In San Francisco, 
Brown has the open court and 
to accommodate with a system that 
allow anyone court to hear 
what was going on as well as by tele-
phone. To that end we have lized a combination protable con-
ference unit that has three microphones that can l parts of 
the courtroom plus a loudspeaker that allows all sides of 
the telephone conversation. All we had to do was install a special 
jack on the court clerk's telephone and portqble conference 
plugged in whenever there is a tel conference. The monthly 
rate for the telephone conference lf about $25.00 and the 
tallation charge is $100. That's on the most recent rate case that 
we've had. So that would be cost to the courtroom. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The don't anything special? 
2 -
MS. McGUIRE: No, the attorneys do not need anything special. 
If the hearings were held in chambers, as they are in some other places, 
then sometim~s you simply use a speaker phone -- but the portable one 
appears to be the most cost effective and easily used equipment. The 
other portion of it then is setting up the conference call and we have 
done it in two ways. Although, what was done was to establish a system 
which would allow the telephone company conference call operator to be 
the manpower used to hold the calls, as opposed to the courtroom them-
selves. And some of those are some of the things that we are still deal-
ing with because we haven't had that heavy a volume. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Any estimate of cost? 
MS. McGUIRE: Yes, a three minute conference call within that 
is three links, two attorneys and the court, in the San Francisco Bay 
Area would be $3.95 for the first three minutes and $.95 for each addi-
tional minute. The cost starts when the judge calls roll on that par-
ticular motion. The costs do not start when the operator rings the 
two attorneys or the one attorney into "q" and of course I'm saying 
three people, you could have as many as you want involved in the con-
ference call. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Same cost? 
MS. McGUIRE: No, there is an additional cost as you add links 
to the call. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How much? 
MS. McGUIRE: One dollar and fifty cents for each link, but 
I think that is only up to $3.00 a link, or at least that's the way 
in the file. There are three rate steps in California so that if an 
attorney in Los Angeles or San Diego wishes to appe&r by telephone as 
one of the links of the conference call then the charge for the first 
three minutes goes to a maximum of $10.85 at this moment. And then you 
know additional timing charges are of course involved. But the costs 
are still somewhat minimal for whatever sue you want to have. 
As an example, I conducted a staff meeting of my own by tele-
phone from my home in Santa Clara County and had nine people all over 
the state participating in the call. The call lasted for an hour and 
15 minutes instead of my paying plane fare to bring all my employees 
to San Francisco, the cost of that conference call was $225. So, you 
know, it is an incredible saving. 
MR. BATES: I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the attorneys who 
are request:fng the telephone appearance also are the ones who are bear-
ing those costs rather than it being a cost to the Court. 
MS. McGUIRE: Yes, that's right. Thank you, Bill. The 
Court is not charged. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So the court costs would actually be the 
cost of the equipment, $25.00 a month. 
MS. McGUIRE: That's correct. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: answers the question. 
MR. FELDMAN: I'm not sure that it does. It's hard for me 
to believe that it would only cost $25.00 a month to set up the system 
for every courtroom 8th floor of the LA Superior Court and I am 
almost sure and could comment on , that 
operator who s the normal cal that size of a court is not 
going to be to deal 150 calendar matters set a day and line 
up all those lawyers to be present. I that's just unrealistic. 
You know, I don't have any numbers just seems unrealistic to me 
to believe. All I'm say that we should look at it. I 
think this no reason not to 




to do a little more 
MR. FELDMAN: I think we out what it's going to 
cost the taxpayers to put in such a system and maybe we should have the 
lawyers in general the litigants bear the kind of cost if it is a 
high cost, because the run those 1 igants are going 
to benefit th 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Ms. , are you aware of any other 
hidden cos cos that perhaps may not be as definite? 
MS. McGUIRE: No, one of Judge Brown's standards after be-
ginning o was that is not to any undue burden on h 
people and as such 
ference call days 
I have had one of my employees oversee the con-
they have them set up and particularly now 
the light usage, 
conference calls with 
Judge Brown's c who is able to set up the 
the con operator. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But they've only had eight ... 
MS. McGUIRE: Well no, we have had eight days. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Okay. Let's now call on Mr. 
Filosa. Hello, how are you? 
MR. TONY FILOSA: Fine, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand that you have a comment on 
both bills that are before the Committee today. 
MR. FILOSA: I'll be very brief. My name is Tony Filosa, 
I'm the Clerk/Administrative Officer of the Municipal Court in Beverly 
Hills and I also cha the legislative committee for the municipal 
court clerks association in California. 
I'm here mainly to address myself to AB 1946 and AB 1209. The 
Association is not concerned with the merits of the legislation as 
much as it is with resources to implement legislation and any clerical 
efficiency that is attendant thereto. 
As for AB 1209, Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that there 
may be more study on this bill. Our only comment on it is that when 
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we talk about resources, we're concerned with who 
telephone. 
going to man the 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We have same concern that Mr. Feldman 
indicated and that you think perhaps it's go to be a 1 more 
work than Ms. McGuire thought. 
MR. FILOSA: I think so. We moved away from telephonic pro-
cedures over the past few years to cut down on personnel in the court 
because of Proposit 13. We use a deal of recordings down 
the courthouse for general information, procedures, third party infor-
mation to the public. This bill would reestablish telephonic 
and our concern would be, of course, personnel neccessary to man the 
telephones and also the communication problem that developed when 
take matters as important as appearances and pleas or what have 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Could it be done on a pay as you go basis, 
in other words that there would be some estimate ut ization, and 
the court costs would be assessed to those attorneys who wanted to 
utilize the procedure as opposed to coming down and wasting gas and 
more time. 
MR. FILOSA: That certainly would be one so to the 
problem. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That would sat fy your concern then to 
the cost? 
MR. FILOSA: As to the cost, of course 
costs as far as your telephonic installation 
defray 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm talking about adding the cost of a 
clerk to field the calls. If you knew there was going to be an es 
mate of 100 utilizations a day that would require half a clerk ... 
MR. FILOSA: That would sat fy our concerns as long as we 
knew we had some resource where we could hire another individual. 
Certainly they would have to in courts that deal with a large civil 
volume. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I see. 
MR. FILOSA: May I address myself to AB 1946? In that par-
ticular bill the intent is to handle publ assistance appeals via 
small claims. Is that correct? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. FILOSA: Inasmuch as small claims court is an entity unto 
itself, with special forms, special fees, and whe~e the appearance 
procedures are all different and there are no attorneys present, we 
would suggest that if it's necessary to transfer this type of appeal 
to the municipal court, that it can.'t be handled in a similar nature as 
labor code appeals are presently handled. That , if they are within 
the jurisdiction of the municipal court they are transferred over on 
appeal basis rather than putting them into the small claims network. 
It's a specialized area that we feel it would be difficult to fit it 
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into that small claims court. It would be far easier to put it into 
the present system that we have now. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So you think this legislation is ill 
advised? 
MR. FILOSA: Yes, I do. We feel that it could be handled 
within the municipal court and within our jurisdiction provided it is 
within our jurisdictional limit. One of the questions we have on it is 
that when the labor appeals were transferred to municipal court they 
were done so without fee. We would wonder why this would be access 
at the appellate level which is what this amounts to, without some 
type of fee being paid or something. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, one of the ideas of course is cost. 
That not just the courts but the overall system would benefit by more 
expedient hearing, one that didn't involve all the complications of 
the regualr court. I guess our concern is not the court costs but the 
overall costs of hearing these matters. 
MR. FILOSA: Well in this area I can't speak to how involved 
they are, they certainly are a specific area of the law that maybe 
small claims court should not be involved in. It may be more in line 
for it to be within the municipal court. But again that's more of a 
judicial determination. My concern is mainly if you're going tobring 
an action into the municipal court there should be some fee for it. 
It shouldn't be a free ride. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. Filosa, thank you very much. 
Judge Eagleson. Good morning, how are you? 
JUDGE DAVID EAGLESON: I wanted to comment about your bill. 
I really feel that the approach that you have should be reversed. What 
you do here is allow the party or the party's attorney to elect to 
appear at any of the telephone conferences. You're putting the control 
of the calendar in the attorneys' hands and I think that the gist of 
what you've heard this morning suggests that perhaps the emphasis should 
be on the court running the calendar and running the administration of 
justice rather than counsel. For example, currently, in our county at 
least, trial setting is a perfunctory kind of hearing, the lawyers do 
not have to show. They can stipulate to not appear or file a declar-
ation of appearance. They already have a way out without having to 
come to court. We intend to change that radically as of January 4 by 
ordering every litigant to appear at a trial setting conference 
where we make orders that have a faint resemblance to the rule 9 
orders that were made in the federal court in the central district 
of California in Los Angeles here, setting forth specific obligations 
and responsibilities of counsel with respect to getting ready 
for trial. At that particular time we also intend to give them 
a trial date and a mandatory settlement conference date so 
their attendance is absolutely essential if that hearing is 
going to mean anything. The arbitration status conference that you 
referred to, again, in Orange County with Judge Trotter, is very mean-
ingful, where at that point in time the lawyers are given another date 
at which to appear and they of course have got to check with their cal-
endars and make sure that they can appear on the date that is given. 
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them all whether $500 
now. I have sat here 
,on in this county. 
subjects, but I'd be 
seems to be a focus 
pr areas of the 
as to what you 
think about Los Angeles. We heard for example that the urban county 
factor was what Judge Trotter indicated was partially responsible, the 
complexity of the trials in Los Angeles as opposed to Butte County. What 
do you see as the problem and what do you see as the solution? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: It's a 1 £-serving perhaps and per-
haps it would be construed as a copout, to suggest there is a cultural 
difference between what goes on in Los Angeles and San Diego counties 
and Orange County as opposed to what goes on in, for example, Butte 
County, there is a difference in the way lawyers practice law and in 
the kinds of cases ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN D. STIRLING: What's that mean? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: I think we have a very aggressive, imagina-
tive, active, ambitious group of plaintiff lawyers in Los Angeles 
County. I don't say that critically but in terms of the imagination 
they bring to trial lawsuits, their use of expert witnesses, if they 
can possibly find an expert to back up what they say, they bring in 
experts, both prosecution and defense. In the old days you used to 
try a case with one plaintiff's doctor and one defense lawyer and one 
defense doctor. I don't think that's done anymore. 
ASSEMBLYMAN D. STIRLING: Is that because the attorneys try 
to get away with more or the jduges permit more? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: I wouldn't put it that way. 
ASSEMBLYMAN D. STIRLING: I put it that way. 
JUDGE EAGLESON: I think they are much more imaginative, much 
more aggressive than they used to be. 
ASSEMBLYMAN D. STIRLING: You mean if their offer of evidence 
is not accepted they will threaten to appeal so that the judge has got 
to go along with it? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: No, it used to be if you had a $100,000 case 
you were in the big leagues. We pick up our statistics now on our jury 
trials, it's hard to find a case, if it's a plaintiff's verdict, for 
less than $100,000. So when you have a quadraplegic or you have some-
one with asbestosis, whatever, the potential recovery is substantially 
higher -- a million dollar verdict doesn't scare a jury anymore. Not 
any more. The imagination and the horizons of the public are now very 
much up in the air. Consequently, as a lawyer you are never completely 
satisfied in your heart of hearts that you've done all that you can to 
prepare your case. But where you know you have a case where the poten-
tial is six or seven figures you spend more time on the case, you bring 
more expert witnesses to bear on whatever issues are involved and this 
certainly leads to a protracted kind of litigation. The average case, 
listen to this, the average case in this county, in the central civil, 
ls 14 trial days. Five years ago it was 6.4 days. 
ASSEMBLYMAN D. STIRLING: And that's because the jury's aware-
ness of larger values on life ... 
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whether defendants win cases. I agree with somebody up here a moment 
ago who said unless somebody does something this system is going to 
collapse, and the insurance companies should sit up and take notice 
and the plaintiff's lawyers should sit up and take notice. I may not 
be around to see the collapse, may last as long as I have left to 
go, but it won't be around somewhere future unless things 
only objective evidence you're on what's good for the system 
is coming from informed members of the judie who have these stories. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: When you say turn back the courts to the 
judges, can you be specific? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Yes, I'll give you an example. Mr. Stirl 
filed a complaint in Federal court and I guess he didn't do something 
within three months and the judge sent out a notice to show cause why 
the case shouldn't be dismissed. We can't do that. We can't do any-
1 thing to any lawyer for two years. Because the only time that you can 
move a case out of the system, short of trying it that , is notice to 
show cause to enter a dismissal and it's what we call a two year sta-
tute,CCP Section 583(a). And then the appellate courts have made the 
rationale or excusal from that dismissal so liberal that it's practical 
a useless tool. We are going to implement it, so you'll be happy to 
hear this. We're going to use that device for other reasons that I'll 
explain to you sometime, but it doesn't bear on this. It is not an 
effective tool. If you would take a look or you would have your staff 
take a look at Rule 9 of the federal rules here in Los Angeles County 
and see what they're telling you. I can also provide you with the trial 
practice rules in the City of Pittsburgh where they get to trial within 
eight months from the time the cases are ready. You'll see what I mean 
by the court control of the calendar. That's the first thing you have. 
ASSEMBLYMAN D. STIRLING: Are you saying that the trial court 
level judiciary would support some kind of a mechanism, that the Leg-
islature can deal without infringing on the separation of powers problem. 
JUDGE EAGLESON: The Legislature of course has promulgated 
rules and statutes that tell us what we can do and what we can't do. 
I'm saying that if you will take a look at Rule 9 you will find that we 
don't have the tools. You can put meaningful responsibility and capac-
ity for movement back into the system if you will promulagate some of 
the ideas and concepts such as are within the federal rules. That's 
the first thing. 
The second thing is that we've got to provide even handed 
disincentives to continue litigating beyond a reasonable point. Hypo-
thetically, if an insurance company,for example, knows that it's going 
to have to pay off because the plaintiff was really injured and the 
liability is clear, it is not right to not pay off as early as that 
determination should be made. On the other hand, it is not right for 
a plaintiff to linger around and insist either if he has a phony claim 
and his lawyer and the defense lawyer are reasonably convinced that his 
claim will not be successful at the time of trial. There have to be 
some kind of disincentives, cutting evenly across the board, and getting 
both sides, to dissuade continuation of suits that are not bona fide. 
The whole concept of law, conceptually,is built on bona fides. And I 
submit that it is an ideal concept that doesn't work in the real 
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JUDGE EAGLESON: more pressure, there's no 
question about it, but you raise a interesting point. I think 
that having practiced law as a sole practitioner, so I know what dead-
lines are all about, you do take too much business. And if you had 
more pressure, I hate to say it, but if you had more pressure on you 
file doesn't The who the fee 
door is going to get your attention. Once you do what you have to do 
and the next fee that comes s the case that gets your 
attention. It's just the way it is. And we've done something about 
that. There was a 11 not long ago to put us in a position to cut 
attorneys' fees if they didn't get their estates sold within a certain 
length of time. Very salutary. I we have to stop worrying about 
counsel. We have to start worrying about the ic in the system. 
The public is ent to more than just a 1 and a promise when some-
gets around to That cuts on both s 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Good point. That's Any other 
questions? Thank you, Judge Eagleson. Thank you much. Judge Saeta 
of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Chairman California Judges 
Association Civil Law and Procedure Committee. Welcome. 
JUDGE PHILIP M. SAETA: Thank you. I am appearing on behalf 
of the CJA because the civil procedure section's position on your 1209 
was adopted by the board and I didn't know the positions of the 
people, but I was interested in what Mr. Feldman had to say because 
basically we came independently to the same conclusion. Maybe I could 
take you back just a little bit. The 8th floor in LA Superior Court 
has a telephone system for the (inaudible) rooms so that any person 
can call in at 4:00 on the day before the hearing and by means of a 
three minute belt can hear what the tentative ruling is for the next 
day. That program was established by Judge Goebel and he's just one 
of the five judges on the floor. And by using that for a year or so, 
by getting the equipment and finding out what costs were and seeing 
what the use was, the service it was providing; it was then extended to 
the other courtrooms that were doing law and motion so now you can, 
out making an appearance, come in and do it. I would suggest the same 
kind of approach is worth it in Los Angeles, and maybe in a court like 
Judge Brown's which is a very large court for law and motion. It could 
be done on a phase-in basis to see how the equipment was used and to see 
what the utilization is, and then work out the bugs and then put it in. 
One of the thrusts of CJA's position is to make it mandatory for one 
court. For example, we could take one of the five departments in Los 
Angeles and say in this court it will be, at the judge's discretion, 
mandatory for this type of case that you use the telephone system rather 
than not. That way you could get a mass of cases and get some exper-
ience. A typical calendar in a heavy law and motion court would be 
typical of the ones here in Los Angeles and would be typical of Judge 
Brown, would be to have 20 or 30 matters that actually go. Hearings on 
those matters, there might be 30 or 40 set, but they disappear, taken 
off calendar, there's continuances, some kind of ~uling, but if you have 
20 or 30 cases, the mechanics of getting the calls lined up, and in most 
cases there are just two sides of lawyers. The mechanics of setting up 
30 cases or 20 cases and 40 to 60 lawyers are more than you could 
reasonably handle in the busy law and motion court. Assuming some people 
would want to come in and the court is busy with those appearances and 
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heavy summary judgment motion which is opposed is not the kind a judge 
would really want to do on the phone. But you could do demurrers and 
summary judgments on the phone. I don't see any inherent difference be-
tween an attorney withdrawal and a summary judgment, and a demurrer and 
a motion to amend or anything like that. The preference ought to be to 
the out of county lawyer in terms of use of this kind of a system. Be-
cause that's where the transportation expense is, but I would phase 
in because the committee thinks it is a good idea. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Any other questions? Thank you. 
I'd like to call up Judge Epstein and Mr. Janofsky, please. 
MR. LEONARD JANOFSKY: Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, 
my name is Leonard Janofsky, and currently I am serving as the chairman 
of the ABA Action Commission to Reduce Court Cost and Delay. I'm going 
to make my comments brief here because I know time is running out on 
you and I will focus a little more on what is going on around the rest 
of the country. 
I might say this preliminarily: The action commission was 
formed by the American Bar Association because of our concern about 
the twin evils of delay and the high cost of litigation and I'm not 
goint to say anything about delay because we've heard a lot about 
here. I will say this, that this is not a problem unique to Cali 
or to Los Angeles. In all of the major cities of the United States, 
certainly in all cities over 500,000, with some very rare exceptions, 
the matter of delay is a very serious problem and there are a number of 
other cities which have five year delays just as we have here in Los 
Angeles. The average in those cities is about three years. 
The area of greatest concern to the Action Commission is the 
matter of litigation costs. Our survey has indicated that, and I think 
the census supports us, 87 percent of American families have a dollar 
income of less than $25,000 a year. The Action Commission feels that 
unless you have a case which can be handled properly on a contingent 
fee basis or which is covered by insurance, that those people who con-
stitute the average Americans, simply can't afford to litigate in our 
system the way it operates today. And that's the reason that we have 
been working on trying to experiment with ways and means of directly 
attacking the way we try cases, in addition to supporting an alternate 
approach which is that of finding alternate mechanisms for the handling 
of dispute resolution. That is moving cases outside of the court. 
Now the Action Commission has focused to date during the two 
years of its existence on three areas. First on what is called econom-
ical litigation, we have a project going in Kentucky, the project here 
in California that Judge Epstein is going to speak to you about, and 
we have a project going in Colorado. We are going to develop several 
others. 
The second area we have been concerned about is expediting 
appeals. We have several projects going now and in one of them we have 
been able to reduce the appeal time from the average of two years to 
seven months. I won't go into the detail on that with you now. I 
want to say just a few words if I may about what is going around the 
country in this matter of tele-conferences. Now there are well over 
-35-
15 states throughout the United States where courts are already using 
tele-conferences in some form or another. Indeed it's being used in 
many of the federal courts. The federal courts in Baltimore, the fed-
eral court in Newark, New Jersey, the federal courts in Philadelphia, 
the federal courts in the eastern district of New York, the federal 
court Cheyenne, Wyoming, and the federal court in the northern dis-
trict of California in San Francisco, are utilizing some form or 
another tele-conferences. Indeed, there are three states, New Mexico, 
Washington and Virginia, where tele-conferencing is used in connection 
with motions and matters of that type in connection with appeals, not 
ly in the trial courts. 
Now a short time ago the Action Commission, working together 
with the Institute of Court Management conducted a survey of 43 judges 
located in 31 different courts in 15 states throughout the country. And 
that survey gives some indication of the types of matters being con-
sidered through the technology of tele-conferences. The matters that 
are most involved relate to motion hearings, demurrers, pretrial con-
ferneces, the scheduling and setting of trial dates. There are other 
types of civil matters where tele-conferencing is used, such as rulings 
on depositions in connection with expert witness testimony, for example 
in child custody and insanity hearings. Some courts have even experi-
mented with it in respect to temporary restraining orders and indeed 
there are some courts which are using it in connection with criminal 
cases. One of the major examples of that is in the courts of Denver, 
Colorado. 
The litigation section of the American Bar Association con-
sists of 35,000 lawyers. They are now working with us on this and their 
counsel feels that as far as this is concerned that we've passed the 
experimental stage and they're going to develop a program aththe meet-
ing this February to try to educate the 35,000 lawyers in that section 
to what tele-conferencing is all about in order to get the support of 
that group. 
Mention was made here of the question of cost. And that is 
certainly a legitimate matter to look into. I would say that, based 
upon our investigation, the cost is a matter that ought to be able to 
be handled. I recognize that in Department 81, the law and motion de-
partment of Los Angeles, there is a tremendous volume of cases that 
have some unique problems, not only in cost but also in the matter of 
personnel. But overall I think that the evidence will show that the 
matter of costs can be handled. 
Let me just make one comment here. One of the pilot programs 
that we have been involved in is the one headed by Judge Peckham who 
is the chief judge of the northern district of California in the fed-
eral courts and he has some statistics. In the course of his experi-
ment, where he conducted 122 telephone conferences in 86 cases, and in 
those matters there were 241 attorneys that participated, 194 of them 
were from the Bay Area and 47 of them were from out of town, perhaps 
down here in Los Angeles. His figures show that the cost for those 
matters going the normal route would have been $35,730. He says that 
his figures show that using the telephone procedure, that the client 
cost was $7,230. So we hope that California will go forward in this 
area. I'm not going to get into this matter of the mechanics of it, 
that is something that you all can work out. But, Judge Eagleson was 
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I want to talk a little about our economic litigation program. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: One more thing on that point before you go 
on. Do you see any particular pitfalls like lining up of ls, other 
types of cost factors? 
JUDGE EPSTEIN: The telephone 
law and motion of the economic litigat 
heavy load. The number will range from a few to 
20. And that's usually a handleable number. The 
today get a time for tomorrow and will be on the 
submitted. I recognize there are problems, c 
have a very high volume. But I certainly agree 
that this is the direction to go. The economics 
litigants and counsel that I really have trouble 
argument not to move in this direction. The 
Judge Goebel established was really an outgrowth 
that I do 
Md 
the 
tion program which he was in charge of during s t Torrance. One 
of the things about that program was that it does encourage some innova-
tive spinoffs and this has been one. I'll just say s about the basic 
need and the basic problem, seconding what Mr. Jano has discussed 
here. 
We are in real danger of creating a system civil 
courts are simply not available to most people. All the people for 
the courts. Their taxes go to support us all. And yet we have a system, 
if we don't have it now we're in danger of creating it, where except for 
special fund cases, insurance, and certain isolated classes 
dissolution, probate, etc., dispute resolution is simply not lable 
in courts because it is too expensive. If that is not remedied I think 
we have a very unstable and unhealthy situation for the publ as well 
as the Bar and I suggest that the solution is not simply to take great 
gobs of cases and remove them to some other system of dispute resolution, 
leaving the courts only for the rich. It was those thoughts and related 
thoughts that led your colleagues a few years ago to establish this pro-
gram on an experimental basis. The idea was to reduce the cost of liti-
gation in four ways. Simplifying the pleadings, reducing motions, re-
ducing discovery, and streamlining the trial. And the program has had 
some success and it has had some failures. It's an experiment. I think 
one of the things you do with an e~periment is to assess what works and 
what does not and there's certainly no disgrace in recognizing things 
that don't work and scrapping them instead of attempting to persist in 
error. And I hope in the future that that is the direction we will all 
go. The reduction of motion aspect of the program I think has been 
eminently successful. There are no special demurrers in the economic 
litigation program. Motions to strike are severely curtailed. And be-
cause of the limitations on discovery the number of discovery motions 
that come out are similarly reduced. That unquestionably saves a lot 
of money. I don't know if anyone has attempted to quantify just how 
much, but if you compare what we do with the normal law and motion 
calendar the results are apparent. 
The limitation on discovery deserves a little bit more in a 
moment, but I'll just say that that's where the money is and to the ex-
tent that there has been substantial savings, and studies that have 
been held on this indicate that there have been, that's principally 
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are. The streaml has been a total 
statute has no impact are going to 
way that they have always pled s somebody tells them that 
cannot. The Legislature adopted a statute a couple of years ago 
at that I ink 1 effect. It 
Waters on the 1 
of have s 
back to where you buy and rent 
s in a case replevin, actually it's going to s 
attorneys and courts a good 
HARRIS: 
seminars on 
JUDGE EPSTEIN: Good. The 
of gauge. 
so few gone to 
to test. Most cases that come to a 
ference, I handle the mandatories for the 
cases that get there, 93.88 
so do go to 
of up 
so we real 
years you whether 
of the Bar has 
of ' court we have had 
is really very 1 
settlement con-
ELP program in Torrance, 
further. The remaining s 
small number of those 
experience 
much effect. 
though, all the c 
are tried under 
're are under these s 
procedures. colleagues on that court 
all of e effect on 
tr And one r who work that court has 
interesting comment. He told me relaxed rules about 
and the rest of have tended to make a sloppy lawyer when 
anywhere else when the s rules are enforced. My sug-
gestion is that what we ought to do this program, or any 
the Legis might choose to establish, is to take those 
features which are proven to have some value, modify them as 
use those and scrap the rest of them are marginal value or j 
don't work. There have been a couple of major problems with the 
program and I want to, in all candor, tell you what I believe 
The most serious problem we have had has been incident to 
experimental nature of the program itself. It exists in Los Angeles 
Municipal Court, that's one of 24 ipal court districts in 
and in one branch of the superior court. There are almost no 
who confine their civil practice to one or the other of those two 
or both, with the exception of attorneys who specialize in unlawful 
tainer downtown and by misadventure unlawful detainers were exempted 
from the program. The result is that it is a trap for the unwary 
lawyers have certainly been trapped this. If .you go to a 
court that is strange to you, you probably figure you'd better see 
day they hear law and motion and expect to find a few other wr 
that are unusual. But you don't expect to find that the federal rul 
of civil procedure are operating this one branch and nowhere 
in California. That's almost the sort of thing that we have had, 
spite of a massive effort in judie ion in which the Bar, 
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courts, CEB and CJA, the local bars have been involved. Nevertheless, 
the number of lawyers and the mass of litigation is so vast is just 
hard to get this information through. I think that e t has been 
unfortunate and it has probably resulted in a confus that the total 
cost of the experiment just about equalled the total That would 
not be true if you didn't have this spec f , if you had 
a program that was statewide or at least reg 
If it were statewide, then obvious that 
The second problem has to do with rules 
program was established on very bold, far-reaching 
times happens with this sort of an experiment. It was 
too bold. Some of the things just didn't work. There 
witness and evidence statement, which I've wr 
terial that I'll make available to you, that 
other aspects of it that were too severe, 1 
municipal court, for example. That didn't work well. 
Finally, there is a substantial number of 
that the only way to try a case is to do it first cab 
discovery that is available and not leave any stone 
viously a program that limits the discovery tools 
go down too well with an attorney who has that 
to consider is a legislative policy matter that 
off. It is very expensive to try a case that way 
that not all cases justify it. 
What I think we need is to learn from that exper 




lines, permits a reasonable amount of discovery for cases, possi-
bly deposition, possibly a limited number of some combination of inter-
rogatories, request to produce and request for admissions, with an es-
cape valve for that unusual rare case where something more is required. 
I think that something of that kind could be done, and done on a wide 
basis so that everyone would be operating under the same rules, at 
least at the municipal court level. That would solve a good deal of 
the problems that have beset the program up to now. Whether it should 
be adopted in the superior court presents a more complicated question 
on which views will probably differ more widely than on municipal court. 
The Judicial Council has monitored this program and has been sensi-
tive to changes as they have been requested. The Legislature had the 
wisdom in establishing the program to give the Council authority to 
change the rules during the program on the basis of evidence that indi-
cated that some adjustment was needed. That has happened three times 
and each time it has happened the Judicial Council has acted at the 
erliest possible legal date to modify the rule. It is monitoring the 
program. There is now a committee under the auspices of the Los 
Angeles County Bar Association that is examining the program which I 
expect will shortly be making recommendations to the Board of Trustees 
of the County Bar and that way, if they feel something should be done, 
I hope we'll be talking to you. I'd be pleased to answer any questions 
about this. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: How would you suggest that there be 
an arbitrary limit placed upon depositions, ... 
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JUDGE EPSTEIN: I'm not speaking for any committee at th 
point, I'm just expressing a personal view, one way to do it would be 
to say that you have a right to one deposition, as a matter of right 
you can have one deposition of the party, employee, officer of the pa 
that you are suing. You may also have up to a limited number of re-
quests, say 25, requests for admissions, demands to produce, or 
rogatories. The rule now says absolutely no interrogatories at all. 
My own view is that is uneconomical. There are times when a few wel 
written interrogatories can save a lot of money and it is much more 
expensive to have to do it in a more elaborate fashion. But the 
ence I've had in seeing these cases and from discussions I've had 
lawyers who try them, I think it is a rare case where the maximum 
covery is now over $15,000, indeed where it's not over $25,000, 
a rare case where that combination will not give the litigant 
preparation. And ·when that rare case does come along there ought to 
be some provisions for the court to permit further discovery. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: You wouldn't suggest then that we 
such a change on a statewide basis to propose further experimentation? 
I'm not sure whether Fresno has this ... 
JUDGE EPSTEIN: Yes, Fresno does have the program and 
Fresno the municipal court is not quite countywide, there are some 
justice courts in Fresno. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Basically, most people practicing 
that region are subjected to the same ... 
JUDGE EPSTEIN: That's right, and I'm not in a position to 
speak for how well the Fresno program has worked, but I do suggest 
that if you do this on a spotty basis, if it is done in County one 
and not next door in County two, it creates a situation that invites 
the sort of problems that we've had. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: I guess my question was was it 
to choose Los Angeles County as the site of this experiment as opposed 
to those counties ... 
JUDGE EPSTEIN: I guess the question is whether it ought to 
be done as an experiment, or whether we ought to try to take what we' 
learned and ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Are we ready to propose it on a 
statewide basis? 
JUDGE EPSTEIN: Well, I think there is enough information 
availab~e so that the policy judgments can now be made. I don't 
think that extending the program in the courts where it now exists or 
applying it to Los Angeles County as an experiment, I doubt that that's 
going to produce a great deal more information than has already ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: The only recommendation I've heard has 
been from the board of trustees of the LA County Bar Association. Are 
we anticipating a report from the Judicial Council with (inaudible). 
JUDGE EPSTEIN: There is a monitoring committee of the Judie 
Council that is studying the matter and is planning, as I understand 
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very applicable to Fresno because 
is just that. I that there 
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we can rely 
rs that 
they have a good 
if court has 
s common types 
The other suggestion that I'd 
a formulation of some short, patterned 
of cases. The up to $15,000 personal 
comes to mind. So that we can have a 
the theory of your case, what is the 
(inaudible) to rely on. If we have a 
that could be put out as a matter of 
ury case the first one that 
statement of some sort, what is 
of , you 
by those responses, again on court order. I am 
I've handled it months at a time. Now we're 
But I don't think that would be a severe 




more are called for 
law and motion judge, 
it around some. 
on a law and motion 
be more in, I am 
relying somewhat on intertia. I think inertia is what causes the mind-
less proliferation of interrogatories out of machinery that call for 
the very stringent rules in the first place. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Judge LaRue, would we expect a big outcry 
from the Bar for such form interrogatories ... 
JUDGE LaRUE: Well, I think the attorneys who are in Fresno 
and who have dealt with our experiment would be glad to have some. What 
they need protection from is this mindless repetition of questions that 
are so burdensome, but I would assume that if such forms were made that 
they would be made carefully and by someone who has in mind the fact 
that the system is going to collapse from the weight of the paper. But 
I think some inte~rogatories would be useful, certainly they would be 
cheaper than depositions in the ordinary case. I think in short that 
a little more information could be given to the litigants. I might 
say that I see that depositions are being taken in our cases simply by 
agreement. It isn't that we're not having depositions. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Is the Judicial Council beginning to pre-
pare those form interrogatories? 
JUDGE LaRUE: They haven't asked us about it, but I certainly 
would approve of that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you have any questions? Thank you very 
much, Judge, we appreciate your comments. Mr. Kranz, please. 
MR. THOMAS KRANZ: Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, 
I shall be brief. I believe that members of the Committee and counsel 
have copies of our prepared remarks today and we'd like to briefly 
describe the nature of our commission, the Economy and Efficiency Com-
mission. There are 21 members appointed by the five Los Angeles County 
Supervisors. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are you all lawyers? 
MR. KRANZ: No. I'm glad you brought that point out. The 
chairman of the commission and myself were the only practicing lawyers 
on our 21 member commission. During the past eight months we have had 
many public and private research (inaudible) who participated in our 
public hearings, and I would like to state that one of the commission 
members was very critical of the entire judicial system and our 15 
recommendations that we have made to the board of supervisors which 
were recently adopted about a month ago, we feel are just a preliminary 
step in the entire process of really seriously evaluating the judicial 
system in this state. We do not as lay people attempt to even begin 
to suggest how the system can be made more efficient in the long run. 
What we have tried to do is present first steps for generating some 
degree of reasonable fees, not so that the litigants themselves are 
going to have to pay for everything because we don't want to see that. 
We still feel that access to the court system is one of the most sacred 
traditions of the entire system of government that we have. In the 
sessions that we had with mayors of cities and members of labor unions, 
professors, people from the business community, who supposedly reflected 
the alleged liberal and conservative members of the board of supervisors, 
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there was a unanimous attitude among all the commission members and 
we would hope that in addition to our testimony today that the remarks 
summary of our full report would be included in our remarks today. 
We'll just briefly state that we obviously support the concept 
of telephone conferences as we recommend the need for increased court~ 
room technology. We would, however, emphasize that we favor local dis-
cretion where the local court, local district, local muni or local 
superior court system could better work out their own framework and 
guidelines for telephone conferences rather than having an entire state-
wide design of rules that could be cumbersome and really defeat the 
purpose of cost effectiveness. 
Secondly, we totally support the pilot programs of the eco-
nomic litigation project that are currently in use here in Torrance. 
I know that the Committee wishes to conclude at one, but I would be 
happy to answer questions if any members have them. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How long has the commission been in existence? 
MR. KRANZ: Well, the economy and efficiency commission has 
been in existence well over ten years. The task force on court con-
gestion was appointed last February by at that time Chairman Edelman 
and,I might add,in response to numerous complaints that all five board 
members had been receiving about the judicial system here in our county. 
Really, one motion by at that time supervisor Baxter Ward in November 
of last year set up a blue ribbon commission. Supervisor Dana, re-
cently elected last November also wanted a motion. Bo.th our commission 
which is designed to advise the supervisors on the issue of cost and 
government effectiveness and the judicial procedures commission which 
is entirely of lawyers and judges, were asked by the board to look into 
the problem of delay and congestion. We are a task force of the full 
commission that meets each month. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: It is ongoing? 
MR. KRANZ: That is right. The task force is part which was 
created for this specific purpose, but the commission is an ongoing 
commission. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. We'll probably be in 
touch with you. I hope you will continue to forward ideas to us as we 
try to figure out what we're going to do about this problem. That con-
cludes the hearing unless anyone else who is not on the agenda has any 
remarks he would like to have added. In which case he can certainly 
have them put into the record. Otherwise we condlude. Thank you. 
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COMMITTEE SECRETARY ELIHU M. HARRIS 
TELEPHONEo 19161 445·7622 
CHAIRMAN 
December 8, 1981 
TO: Members of the Assembly Judiciary Committee 
FROM: Rubin R. Lopez and Ray LeBov 
RE: Hearing on Trial Court Efficiency 
On December 10, 1981, the Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
will hold an interim hearing in Los Angeles on Trial Court 
Efficiency. The hearing is scheduled to begin at 10:00 a.m. 
in the Auditorium of the State Building at 107 S. Broadway, 
Los Angeles, California. 
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with back-
ground and material regarding many of the relevant issues 
that will arise at the hearing. Efforts to reduce court 
delay, cost and congestion have taken many forms. Over the 
past several years, courts have used a wide range of activities 
and varying approaches to solve the problem of court delay. 
The Institute for Civil Justice (The Rand Corporation) re-
cently published a national inventory of efforts instituted 
by courts aimed at reducing or eliminating pretrial delay. 
A copy of this national inventory will be available at the 
hearing. 
This hearing will focus on specific proposals and experi-
ments designed to improve the operation of California's 
trial courts. Two legislative proposals, AB 1946 (Konnyu) 
and AB 1209 (Harris), will be discussed. AB 1946 would 
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change the judicial forum for 
hearing determinations concerning 
AB 1209 would permit attorneys to 
certain court matters by telephone 
The Committee will also receive tes 
of the methods being used by our state' 
improve court management practice. F 
will hear testimony from individuals 
fornia's Economical Litigation Projec 
signed to try simplified pleadings and 
and trial procedures in order to 
in civil litigation. 
AB 1946 
Existing law provides for review 
decisions by the Director of Social 
of Health Services with respect to 
determinations. 
As heard by the Assembly Judie ry 
1981, AB 1946 provided that such 
small claims court when the amount 
that court's monetary jurisdiction 
small claims jurisdiction upper 1 
1982, the small claims upper 1 
cut attorneys' costs, reduce 
a goodly portion of the publ 
that are given to recipients 
AB 1946 was opposed by various 
argued that, since parties cannot 
small claims court, the di 
an individual claimant and whoever 
ment in the small claims court hear 
unfair disadvantage to the 
also pointed out that small cla c 
appropriate forum for the resolution 
entitlement issues involved 
Assemblyman Konnyu has informed 
to amend AB 1946 to provide that j 
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At the hearing, the Committee will hear 
of telephone conferencing in several 
plemented it on a limited bas (inc 
Municipal Court and the Torrance Branch 
Superior Court). A representative of 
Company will also testify about the 
stallation, cost, and related technical 
The California Economical Litigation Project 
In 1976, legislation was enacted which 
lishment of California's Economical 
(see the attached copy of Code of c 
Proponents of the experimental project 
cost of litigation discouraged litigants 
small amounts of money from using the jud 
sue valid claims and meritorious de 
under the ELP were aimed at reducing court 
trial and trial stages of litigation. 
The program began in January 1, 1978 
superior and two municipal courts. The 
plementation and authority to make 
operation, notwithstanding other provis 
left to the Judicial Council (see the a 
fornia Rules of Court 1701-1809.) The 
Southwest District of the Los Angeles 
the Fresno Superior Court, the Los 
the Fresno Municipal Court as the s 
Except for certain special proceedings 
actions), all cases filed in ELP munic 
to the program's special rules and 
courts,some special proceedings,such as 
Uniform Parentage Act cases, commitment 
involving an amount in controversy 
eluded. In addition, provisions are 
drawal of a case from the project 
As originally enacted, the project was 
however, in 1980 the duration of the 
for two years to permit additional 
ELP sought to reduce the cost of 1 
changes in four areas of civil prac 
to: simplify pleadings and eliminate 
use of certain pretrial motions; limit 
trial procedures. 
(a) Simplified Pleadings: ELP 
to be limited, simple,and 
pleadings permitted are the 
















Nb pleading need be verified. 
pleadings are to be short 
the date, place and 
transaction upon wh 
showing that the 
[Rule 1715 (a), 1815 (a)]. 
amended both before and at 
proof. 





s may be 
conform to 
Motions: ELP rules permit mo to 
dis~iss because the cross-complaint 
does not give a ch relief 
can be granted. Motions to str are permitted 
if they seek to strike: (1) a cause of action of 
a multi-court complaint, (2) a for relief 
not supported by the all the complaint 
and {3} an affirmative does not 
state facts constituting Motions for 
a further bill of particulars ted. 
Discovery: Limitations 
cases is perhaps the most 
the experiment. ELP rules 
covery is to be permitted 
Depositions to perpetuate tes 
for bills of particular are 
certain matters such as a 
are permitted because they are 






"discovery". Each party 
statement listing all persons it 
for admissions 
technically 
to le a 
11 call as 
witnesses and describing 
introduce. Also, the 
documentary evidence 
Failure to file the 
in exclusion of 
There are two 
to supp the list 
cal and (2) 
peachment. 




study. The first is 
personal injury or 

















, at least in these 
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two courts, a very low 
abuse. However, the ELP s 
even in this type of case more 
of serious 
shows that 
takes place than is actua needed. The 
ELP rules have signi reduced the 
amount of discovery tak place in the 
cases subject to these Although 
the reduction in discovery ac in the 
average case is not great, the potential 
cost savings, in relation to the typical 
claims, is quite signif 
However, the study went on to s "The one 
discouraging note, however, is the tion 
that little if any of the savings have been or 
will be passed on to the cl In fact, de-
fendant's counsel indicate that the cost of ob-
taining information through other devices, as 
well as the preparation of the contention state-
ment, may cause them to raise the fees." 
(d) Trial Procedures: In ELP cases several changes in 
methods of conducting a trial are permitted: trial 
briefs cannot be required; the judge may interrogate 
parties and witnesses; testimony is per-
mitted; the trial judge the order of 
evidence; all relevant non-pr evidence 
may be admitted; electronic of proceedings 
may be permitted; no findings of facts or conclu-
sions of law are required. In 
jury cases are handled 
cases, with three 
evidence is limited to 
evidentiary statement (2 vo 
by the judge (3) peremptory chal 
In municipal court, ELP jury cases 
non-ELP cases except non- is 
limited as noted above. 
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EXHIBIT B 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1981-82 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1209 
Introduced Assemblyman Harris 
March 19, 1981 
An act to amend Section 575 of, and to add Section 1006.5 
to, the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to civil procedure. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 1209, as introduced, Harris. Civil procedure. 
Under existing law, the Judicial Council may promulgate 
rules governing pretrial conferences. Under existing law, an 
appearance by a party or attorney at a conference, or a 
hearing of a demurrer, an order to show cause, or a motion, 
is generally made in person. 
This bill would provide that the Judicial Council may 
promulgate rules governing pretrial, trial setting, and 
arbitration conferences, and would require those rules to 
include provisions allowing a party or attorney to appear by 
telephone, unless the conference is combined with a 
settlement conference. 
The would also 
appear by telephone at a 
show cause, or a motion 
domestic relations 
received. The Judicial 
necessary to secure uniform 
Those rules could also govern 
or proceedings. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
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COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
1.n''"'"'J. Chairman 
BILL 
BILL: AB 1209 
. 
AUTHOR: Harris 
SUBJECT: Civil procedure: te 
OBJECTIVE: 
Th bill is intended to 
proceedings by permitting a 
by telephone rather than in 
BILL DESCRIPTION: 
Under existing law, an 
at a conference, or a hearing 
show cause, or a motion is 
This b 1 would provide that 
appear by telephone at any 
hearings in domest 
oral testimony will 
1 would promulgate 
application of th 
SOURCE: 
State Bar of Californ 
SUPPORT: 
forn Taxpayers Assoc 
OPPOSITION: 





an order to 
(CONTINUED) 
RL 
AB 1209 -2- HEARING DATE: 4/29/81 
COMMENT: 
1. The Judicial Council is currently studying the use 
of appearance by telephone and is expected to report 
its findings later this year. Also, the Superior 
Court of San Francisco will soon institute a program 
similar to what this bill proposes. Therefore, the 
author indicates that he will ask that this bill be 
referred to interim study so that the Committee may 
have the opportunity to learn the results of the 


















































8 10962. The applicant 
9 county, within one 
10 director's final decision, 
11 superior court, uu.•>AvJ. 
12 the of Civil Procedure, ........ """'" 
13 proceedings 
14 involved the case. 
15 exclusive remedy 
16 or county for 
17 director shall be the 
18 Immediately upon being """" .. """' 
19 a copy of the petition on 
20 judicial review and 
21 intervene in the proceedings. 
22 No filing fee shall be 
23 pursuant this section. 
24 court shall be entitled to a ........ ~~f-""'""""" 
25 hearing on the petition. 
26 case of any petition for 
27 therefrom. The applicant or 
28 reasonable attorney's 
29 decision in his favor. 
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CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1981-82 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1946 
Introduced by Assemblyman Konnyu 
March 31, 1981 
An act to amend, add, and repeal Section 10962 of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code, relating public assistance 
appeals, and making an appropriation therefor. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 1946, as introduced, Konnyu. Public assistance 
appeals. 
Existing law provides for review 
decisions by the Director of Social 
public assistance. 
court of 
with respect to 
This bill would, until January 1, 1988, for review of 
such decision in the small claims court with respect to 
petitions involving amounts within the monetary jurisdiction 
of small claims court, and require as to claims 
deemed denied by the director which amounts within 
the monetary jurisdiction of small '"'""'AULC> 
Article XIII B of the California 
2231 of the Revenue and Taxation 
reimburse local agencies and school 
mandated by the state. The statutory 
the manner for paying this 
statute mandating these costs to vV'UUUU 
pay for the costs in the initial fiscal 
This bill would appropriate an sum to the 
Controller for allocation and accordance 
with Section 2231 of the Revenue and Taxation Code to local 
agencies and school districts for costs by the state 
and incurred by them pursuant to 





State-mandated local program: yes. 
The people of the State of California enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. Section 10962 of the Welfare and 
2 Institutions Code is amended to read: 
3 10962. The applicant or recipient or the affected 
4 county, within one year after receiving notice of the 
5 director's final decision, may file a petition with the 
6 superior court, under the provisions of Section 1094.5 of 
7 the Code of Civil Procedure, praying for a review of the 
8 entire proceedings in the matter, upon questions of law 
9 involved in the case, provided that the amount at issue 
10 exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of small claims court. 
11 Petitions for amounts within the monetary jurisdiction of 
12 small claims court shall be filed solely with the small 
13 claims court pursuant to Chapter SA (commencing with 
14 Section 116) of Part 1 of Title 1 of the Code of Civil 
15 Procedure. All requests within the monetary jurisdiction 
16 of small claims court which are deemed denied pursuant 1 
17 to the provisions of Section 10960, shall automatically be 
18 appealed by the county department to small claims court 
19 within 30 days. Such review, if granted, shall be the 
20 exclusive remedy available to the applicant or recipient 
21 or county for review of the director's decision. Decisions 
22 of the small claims court shall be final and not subject to 
23 further review. The director shall be the sole respondent 
24 in such proceedings in superior court. Immediately upon 
25 being served in superior court the director shall serve a 
26 copy of the petition on the other party entitled to judicial 
27 review and such party shall have the right to intervene 
28 in the proceedings. 
29 No filing fee shall be required for of a petition 
30 pursuant to this section. Any such petition to the superior 
31 court shall be entitled to a preference in setting a date for 
32 hearing on the petition. No bond shall required in the 
33 case of any petition for review, nor in any appeal 
34 therefrom. The applicant or recipient shall be entitled to 
35 reasonable attorney's fees and costs in superior court, if 
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decision in his favor. 
SEC. 3. Section 2 
January l, 1988. 
SEC. 4. The sum 
hereby appropriated 
Controller for allocation 
with Section 2231 of 
local agencies and 
costs mandated 
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HEARING DATE: 4/29/81 
This bill is intended to expedite the judicial review 
of appeals of public assistance determinations by pro-
viding for mandatory small claims court review of claims 
within that court's monetary jurisdiction. 
BILL DESCRIPTION: 
Existing law provides for review in the superior court 
of decisions by the Director of Social Services or the 
Director of Health Services with respect to public 
assistance programs. 
This bill would provide that the review shall be in 
small claims court when the amo·mt in question is within 






Western Center on Law and Poverty 
California Rural Legal Assistance 





1. The bill's 
all reviews are 
superior courts 
small claims. 11 
speed justice, cut 
-2-
periods, and el 
assistance grants as 
recipients during an 
Court an appropriate 
complex issues re 
assistance benefits? 
2. Opponents of the bill 
cannot be represented 




Department of Social 
a claimant may authorize a 
him or her at the 
anomalous to permit 
but to then prohibit 
3. The State Department of 
this bill would add 18 
requirements at an annual 
4 9/81 
TELECO~~UNICATIONS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
(By August J. Goebel, Judge of the Superior Court 
Los Angeles, California) 
Our judicial decision making process is dependent upon oral or 
written communication. Historically judges rode circuit to bring justice 
closer to the citizens to communicate with them; but lawyer·s travel to 
the courthouse to communicate with judges.· Presently it is more common 
to see the lawye.rs traveling to the courthouse. 
Is it necessary in every instance for lawyers to spend their time 
and-effort ·to travel to a courthouse in order to orally communicate 
~ith·a judge? Lawyers effectively communicate w~th a judge by means 
of 1·lriting. Is it necessary . that all oral communication be face to 
face, or can this communication be carried out as effectively by means 
of more modern methods of communication and at lesser costs to e 
litigants? 
There are ways to eliminate face to face oral communication 
. 
yet maintain effective communication. The purp9se of this paper 
describe the results of four years of experimentation by the a h 
the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. It s 
submitted that any reductions in the cost of communication among 
and judges will result in a reduction in the high cost of liti ion 
LOCATION. JURISDICTION A!ID NATURE OF YrlE COURT 
Some background information is necessary for the reader to be ab 
to evaluate the conditions under which the experiment has been conducted. 
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the City of sno and 
s or Court of Fresno Co an t 




from is co. 
a 
on .. 
There have been 3,600 cases filed in the Economic Litigation Pilot 
Project in the 2e months it has been in existence. Although trial d es 
have been available for the past 21 months, only 32 cases have proceeded 
to trial. 1,620 cases have been disposed of other than by trial. There 
. 
are 1,950 cases remaining in the project. 
The floor of the-monetary jurisdiction of the Superior Cou:rt was 
$5,000.00 until July 1, 1979, when the upper limits of the Munic 
Court's jurisdiction was raised to $15,000.00; thereby increasing the 
floor of the Superior Court's jurisdiction to ~15,000.00. The ceiling 
of the Economic Litigation Pilot Project is $25,000.00 in Torrance. 
Prior to July 1, 1979, filings in the Economic Litigation Pilot ect 
in To~rance avera~ed 150 cases per month. Approximately 72% of those 
cases were peisonal injury cases, 24% arose out of contract, and 4~ we 
miscellaneous. Since the increase of the l~unicipal·Courtrs jurisd tion, 
filings have been reduced to approximately 75 cases per month. 
The author h.::.s supervised ·the Pilot. Project in Torrance since 
eption; handling all proceedings in all cases law and motion, 
s ting conferences, voluntary and mandatory settlement conferences 
but oth~r judc~s have heard the tYials. During this period the 
has carried a regular trial schedule, being assigned normal jury 
non-jury civil trials, all purpose ~ases (complex litigation), and 
Coordinated Cases (multi-county cases consolidated before one. judge in 
one county for all proceedings). A usual court day involves hearing 
one or two settlement conferences from 8:30 or 9:00 to 10:00 a.m. Monday 
±hrough Thursday; Pilot Project law. and motion proceedings from 9:00 
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il 9:30 or 10:00 a.m. on Friday; and civil trials from 10:00 to 
·15 p.m. Monday throu&h Friday.~ 
TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT USED 
Unt~l approximately Jul~ of 1979, a standard five-button telephone 
~as used in cc=·.junction with a Telephonic Equipment Corpar ation KTS-500 
:all diverte! for bridging or conferencing multiple party calls. ~bile 
system worked~ it was not as efficient as is afforded by the Bell 
3ystem Com~Key 416 speakerphone presently in use. 
There are four separate telephone lines avaiiable for our use. 
not have the Touch-A-Natic adjunct to the Corn-Key 416, although 
it ti~es it would be helpful. 
The principal instr~~ent is placed on the·authorts desk in chambers. 
ondary instruments are placed on the clerk's desk and the bailiff's 
esk in the courtroom. Cost of installation was approximately $500.00 
the added monthly charge is approximately $70.00. 
le this system works \':ell~ specially designed equipment 
orating the follo\'ling i-;ould provide. greater .5/. ·-
(1) A micro cassette wire-to-wire recorder (with beeper) to 
ability for making a tape recording of the proceedings when necess 
The writer has been a Superior Court ju8ge .for B years; being assigned 
to a felony trial department for 2 years, 20 months in law and discover 
departments in the Central Civil District in Los Angeles, and the · 
balance in a civil trial department in Los Angeles as well as Torrance. 
2.-; p 'h . t ld b 11 d 
11Le f' fl er aps ~ cou e ca e a ga- one. 
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(2) Five separate lines_,. with volume or po.,.ler boost for each 
to avoid reduction in volume when five lines are conferenced; 
(3) An external plug-in clip-on microphone and earpiece; 
(4) A "hold" capability for each line_,. so one or more lines co 
be placed on hold_,. thereby permitting conversation between the judge 
and one la· .. iyer during a settlement conference_,. without breaking the 
conferen~e call; 
(5) The replacement of voice actuated transceivers used in the 
Co~-Key 416 for one person can overpower another with these transceivers; 
( 6) A built-in calculator6/ for use in sett-lement conferences; 
(7) A built-in timer; and 
(8) A Touch-A-Hatic adjunct, or memory re-dialing capability .. 
One factor cannot be overemphasized: if a telephone system is 
be effective, the equipment used must be high quality equipment permi 
cor~QDication without annoying problems. 
EXAl.fPLES :;F PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH TELECOl~fUNICATION 
HAS BEEN EFFECTiv~LY USED 
While the telephone has been used in three.principal areas_,. we 
used it for many other proceedings. Some of these prc~eedings are 
' . 
follows: 
In 1977_,. in a non~jury case involving an action by taxpayers to 
stop construction of a juvenile facility in north Los Ange s 
plaintiffs' lawyers were unable to arrange for an expert witness (an 
6/ For example_,. similar to that o.ffered by_the."Superphone. 11 
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) to come to Los Angeles from Conn 
s. The parties stipulated that t 
ephone; that the oath ( t 
deemed taken in compliance with our s 
rsonal appearance of the witness 
on cr0ss-examination; and would 
oral testimony. Plaintiffs paid 
installed in the courtroom and pa 
Los Angeles to Corillecticut. The 
se proceedings the same as any 
a witness not subject to subpoena 
, was able to be ~ffe~tively 
Th~s was a pro-Bono case for p 
a family lavl dissolution case where t 
ion as to a division of assets 
the wife was ill with the flu at d 
By stipulation vle conducted 
ed the wife to communicate by means 
was concluded that day, avo 
in court by both lawyers PS well 
lications for ex parte orders 
re telephone notice of the appearanc 
for an order shorteni~g time has b 
, and l">'here one lawyer has not been 









her office and conducted that hearing by te one. 
In one case an elderly lady fell at Los e A 
i debarking an airplane. At the time of e s t 
renee she was again hospitalized in Ft. i .J A as . 
.... obtained permission for her not to i, s .J s s s 
be available by telephone. At the time the mand se 
erenre we settled the case with the lawyers. en p ..!-
'"' 
on the record, made an explanatic;1 to the plaintiff and 
her consent, all by telephone. 
I 
had one continued hearing of a mand se c e 
one party v:as in Lancaster, California ( e 
) , his .lawyer was in Burbank (:;.bout 30 miles d tant), an er 
, 
\<laS in the San Francisco area and his r 1-ias s 
avoided a return to court for all by conduct t second s ss 
atory settlement conference over the te1ep e.. The case 
another case a judge whose courtroom 
arne to chambers and used the speakerphone 
e record. The mother-guardian ad litem 
d the conference call. In that instance us 
cently we were trying a case where s rs s 0 
ties. The Court of Appeal issued a writ. the case 
e t 1.. ·The six la1·1yers and the author vJere c cate w h 
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clerk of the Court of Appeal from chambers by means of the speaker-· 
one ~~d obtain.the specific terms of the order immediately • 
. 
In each and all of the instances recited above, the court reporter 
was able. to make the usual verbatim record by positioning himself near 
speakerphone. Those examples are representative of many uses that 
an be made of telecommunications to reduce costs of litigation. 
USING TELEC0!·1lv!UNICATIONS IN TRIAL SETTD~G CONFERENCES 
Our usual procedure in the Los Angeles Superior Court for setting 
es for trial is to have the lawyers appear in the clerk's office in 
er to select dates for the mandatory settlement conference 211d for 
1. In the Economic Litigation Pilot Project this \'ias to be hand d 
the court clerk. 
We adopted rules, which are set for~h verbatim on the At-Issue 
um, that these trial setting conferences will be conducted each 
morning by telephone. The court clerk makes all his calls while 
. 
trial judge is conducting a mandatory settlement conference. We 
und that this procedure Horlr...s b~st where the parties are 
ented by a large law firm having a trial setting clerk, and that 
helpful if the lawyers designate their office file number on the 
Issue !·5emorandum tha.t is filed. 
USING TELECOl8-rui~ICATIONS IJ{ LAH AND 1'·10TION HEARINGS 
The Economic·Litigation Pilot Project rules provide that all argument 
the lavl and motion matters is to be heard by telephone except (1) where 
one party is appearing in propria persona, (2) .where there are more than 
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four lawyers of record~ or (3) where it is s urnma. judgment motion. 
The following is an explanation of the ration of a civil 
discovery department in Los Angeles County Superior Court. 
For many years judges have prepared "tentative rulings 11 for 1 cas 
after considering the moving and responding papers in each case. ese 
tentative rulings were made available to lawyers at ~:30 a.m. the 
of the hearing_, \·Jhich hearing \-tas scheduled for 9:00 a.m. Cust 
the lawyer favored by. the ruling is expected 'to submit on the 
ruiin..,; " . 6• The other lawyer will argue his or her 'position; and 
court desires_, the la;·:y;;r for -:he party favored by the .~entative r 
will reply. In probably 90 to 95% of the cases, the judge does not 
change his or her tentative ruling •. No court reporter pres 
these hearings unless specifically requested by one of the parties. 
In 1975 in the Central District the author caused a cont 
loop telephone tape recording device to be installed in h5s d 
. 
so that all tentative rulings (without detail) could be placed on 
by his lal-t clerk and made available to lawyers at 4:30 p.m. on 
e before the hearing.B/ 
Despite this rule_, in one of the Ford gastank exp ion 
not an Economic Litigation Pilot Project cc.se -- the three 
specifi~ally requested that argument be heard by telephone on 
for summary judgment~ in one instance, and in another to quash 
poena re deposition served on Henry Ford II. Ultimately the ca 
settled during a t~lephone conference, although there had been 
to face settlement proceedings prior thereto. . . 
That procedure has been expanded so that all law and motion 





The objective in installing this equipment was to enable lawyers 
. 
learn of the tentative ruling in their case at an earlier time, thereby 
them a greater opportunity to consider submitting on the tentative 
ruling without a court appearance. The only serious complaint about 
is procedure expressed by lawyers was that the length of the tape 
(3 minutes) did not permit recording the r·,asons for the ruling, and 
that it was not made available early enough to permit them to contact 
opposing lawyer in many instances to arrange for a submission on the 
tentative ruling. 
In the Economic Litigation Pilot Project we sought to overcome 
ese objections in three vlays: 
First, the tentat.i.ve ruling is made available on v!ednesday in 
most instances; 
condly, the court clerk calls the attorneys and reads the f 
ruling to the attorney or the attorn 's secretary.2/ 
ells them the time to expect the call on the day of 
states that if they are not available to receive the call, they wi 
' 
deemed to have waived argument. 
irdly, the clerk tells the attorneys will be expected 
telephone. HOi'>' ever, if laHyers insist on a personal earanc 
permit it. In those ins~ances, they argue in chambers while the er 
r argues by telephone. He have found we make many converts to 
The court clerk v1ould probably add, ncounsel, you know, this is 
one case wherf the judge will not change h t 
itiay, u so ~s to obtain more submissions on 
-72- . 
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ocedure when the lawyer in chambers sees how easy it is to argue 
telephone. 
We have found that in more than one-half of the cases, the 
have submitted on the tentative ruling. We usually average from t 
o five matters act~ally heard on a Friday morning. 
On Friday morning the court clerk places the tPlephone calls 
e first case a fs::H minutes prior to 9:00 a.m.. w11en he has all 
on the line., he Vlill place them on "hold," and bring the file to 
ambers.lO/ 
~~t the time of the hearing_, the "script 11 goes something 
"Jud12:e: Good morning, counsel. Will you please state your 
I . . fl ea~ance so ffiay recogn2ze your vo2ce. 
[The laHyers do so.] 
"Judge: Are you familiar with the tentative ruling?" .. 
[Both usually indicate they are.] 
"Judge: I assu:ne counsel for Moving Party ( the 
1:Jilling to submit on the tentative. Before I hear from counsel 
ding Party, I would state that I am most roncerned with (s 
e reasons for the tentative ruling]. 11 
[Argument and reply argument.] 
Customarily a student law clerk is in chambers. He or she is 




"Judge_: The tentative ruling will stand. The. motion is granted 
. 
as prayed, etc." 
"Is notice waived?" 
[Both counsel "yes."] 
While this argument is being heard, the court clerk \<till cornmence 
making calls on the next case if sufficient lines are available. He 
can usually estimate rather accurately how long each hearing \·lill last. 
IHPORTANCE OF THE CLER_I( 
Enough empha~is cannot be placed on tbe importance of the court 
clerk. He or she is the key to effective use of telecommunications. 
I 
The court clerk must be willing to try somet'·:ing nev1, must have good 
rap?ort with counsel and be respected by counsel, and must be capable 
. 
o~ convincing lawyers to try something new. 
BEN.r:PITS ANTI DISADVPJITAGES TO LITIGANTS Al\lu L.~WYERS 
It is apparent the greatest benefit to ~awyers jn ~sing tele-
communication results from the saving of travel time; time that is 
erwise wasted in the sense that the lawyer must bill his client for 
1 time or absorb it -- an injustice to both. A lav;yer also b 
from the convenience of scheduling, particularly if the courthouse is 
located some distance from the place of the other appointment or 
appearance.11/ The principal disadvantage, as stated by lawyers, is 
that they "cannot get the adrenalin flov1ing" vlhile making a telephone 
argument and they cannot read the judge's facial reaction to their 
11/ During the gasoline crunch; there were many requests from lawyers 
to handle matters by the telephone. 
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argument or the argument of opposing counsel. How much adrenalin is 
needed> for example, for a five minute argument to compel attendance of 
a party at an independent medical examination? The heavy motions r 
expected to be argued in court where they can get their adrenalin f 
The reaction of probably 90% of the lawyers has been favorab 
positive to the use of communications in other than complex motions. 
BENEFITS AND DISAD"'.'.!'..NTAGES TO THE COURT 
The author has conducted probably 400 hearings of one kind or 
another by t~lephone. It appears the principal benefit derived 
court from use of telecommunication-is that it avoids many appearances 
laHyers in cases. That, of course, saves court time. It also 
eater flexibility in scteduling because laHyers are more readi 
available.l2/ 
Proceedin8S conducted by telecommunication are generally more 
informal, and the participants are more relaxed. This som~times as 
commencing settlement discussions. We have settled many cases 
result of a hint dropped during law.and motion proceedings. 
From a personal standpoint, if counsel cite a case, my stud 1 
clerk goes to the bookshelves, gets the volume, turns to the pr 
anrl places it before me -- all without interruption. This cann 
on the bench. 
12/ In one instance He had a la11yer, by prior c.rrangement, argue his 
case from a tel~2hone booth outside of a courtroom in Los Angeles* 
We would have had to have waited for 45 minutes for him to drive 
to our courtroom. 
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The principal disadvantage to a court is that this procedure will 
not work in a high volume department, such as in the Central District in 
Los Angeles, where the daily calendar contains 30 to 50 matters. The 
number of telephone calls to be made is too mru1y for one clerk. 
NECESSITY FOR COOPERATION BY LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS 
- . . 
No experiment such as this can be successful without active 
participation and support by members of local bar associations. Invaluable 4 
assistance was given to us by the Los Angeles County Bar Association, 
Committee on the Economic Litigation Pilot ?reject, and by the South 
Bay Bar Association. These co~~ittees contained a good cross section 
of lawye.rs, those persons· "!ho, \~ere willing· to develop rules to make an 
idea work. Without that attitude and ass~stance new procedures or 
practices such as these are doomed to failu.re. 
The pro-:-edures described here may be outmoded before they can be 
placed into widespread use. The garicopa County Superior Court in 
Phoenix, Arizona, has been experimenting with video phone. I understand 
e results of this exper.5.~:=nt appear to be very promising. 
In conclusion, He in the legal and judicial professions owe a 
duty to the public to make our judicial system a system that is second 
to none in quality of decisions and in trying to reduce costs of arriving 
~t those decisions. One \-vay to achieve that goal is to utilize modern 
.methods af communication by lawyers and judges. 
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Introduction 
The classic model of litigation in American involves the resolution 
of cases through proceedings in which a judge, counsel for the parties, and (in 
some cases) the parties themselves and witnesses are all in 
courtroom. Although only a small percentage of cases ivil or cr actu-
result in a trial, a high proportion involves at least one, and often sev-
eral in-court appearances, even though no examination of witnesses may take 
place. In a civil case, for example, it is not unusual for in-court (or in-
chambers) proceedings to be held for arguments on motions, scheduling future 
appearances, or conducting a pretrial conference. 
Conducting most judicial business with all participants physically present 
consumes a lot of time and a lot of resources. It takes time for to 
travel to the courthouse and to wait while other cases are heard, and 
is expensive for the clients. In many judicial districts, judges, and sometimes 
court reporters, are frequently required to travel to different locations to 
hear cases also. 
The .use of telephone conferences in lieu of 
possible method for reducing the time, money, and 
participants before the court, without sacrif the 
son proceed is one 
to 
of the 
or the quality of the proceedings. In its most basic form, telephone 
enc is a three-way conversation among the j and the at for each 
side; each participant can be heard the other 
The judge is generally situated in chambers with a 
desk instead of using a standard hand receiver. 
phone on the 
s, in turn, are lo-
in their respective offices where they may have their own speaker phones 
or use a regular phone. Depending on the nature and 




er a court reporter 
• 
present in chambers, or by a tape recorder attached to the telephone. The 
judge gives instructions on ho~ the hearing is to be conducted in roughly 
the same manner as at in-person hearings. 
While ·the individual judges in some jurisdictions have introducted tele-
phone conferencing into their courtrooms on a regular basis, there has not 
yet b~en ~idespread adoption. The examination of the factors i~volved in the 
diffusion of this innovation, obviously, could constitute an entire study. One 
of the problems that we believe inhibits greater consideration of telephone 
conferencing, ho~ever, is the lack of information about the procedures associ-
ated with telephone conferencing and their consequences on the nature of court 
proceedings. 
The information presented here is structured around questions that 
judges and lawyers, who may wish to learn more about telephone conferencing, 
are likely to want answered. The are: 
o Who uses telephone conferencing? 
o What kind of court business is conducted by conference calls? 
o Ho~ are telephone conferences scheduled, initiated, and conducted? 
0 Does telephone conferencing affect the nature of the proceedings? 
0 ~~at equipment is needed and how much does it cost? 
0 What are the advantages to the court by using telephone conferencing? 
0 Ho~ has telephone conferencing been adopted? 
In this essay we present initial results from a study of telephone con-
ferencing being conducted jointly by the ABA Action Commission to Reduce Court 
Costs and Delay and the Institute for Court Management. For the past several 
months, we have. interviewed over forty judges who currently use telephone con-
ferencing. Their views are important because they provide an account of how 
conferencing is used as ~ell as their vie~s on the advantages and disadvantages 
of telephone conferencing. 
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While our answers to these questions reflect the esults of interviews 
marily with judges, we implemented a survey in December 0 to determine com-
reactions from attorneys to telephone In addition, 
projects will be designed for implementation beg ear in 1, to obtain 
ormation on conferencing's effects on clients, counsel, and the court. The 
ect includes courts in Colorado, Maine, and New Jersey and possibly other 
states. 
An obvious question may occur to many readers If 
is so good, why is further research needed? Part of the answer is that tele-
phone conferencing is not always successful. Lawyers may decide to avoid it. 
Cour staff may not want to place the calls. Judges may be reluctant to d 
long-established practices. Due to these sorts of , the innova 
has been tried without success in some courts. In other instances, the innova-
tion has not been institutionalized. While one judge may use it effectively, i 
he is appointed to another court or leaves the bench, his successor may no 
the equipment. From our perspective, the limited diffusion of 
ferencing suggests that it is not a simple acquisition of more refined 
conferencing needs to be integrated into the j 's to 
Moreover, certain environmental and factors, such as 
, adequa~e resources, flexible court rules and 
progressive bar contribute to its success. 
and a 
Whereas the pilot projects will involve both civil and criminal cases, at 
least in some of the courts, the interviews done to date with j 
cused almost exclusively on the use of tel one conferences in co -
nection with civil matters. In addition, while we structured the 
erviews to gain information about the rang of tel one confer-
encing's application, our primary focus has 
h a ings. This type of proceeding prov 
p ring traditional in-court appearanc 
- 0 
e n on civil motion 
is 
ne con n 
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Finally, it is important to recognize that the way in which telephone con-
ferencing is used reflects the diversity of practices across jurisdictions and 
the alternative approaches used by different judges in a given court. While 
the differences make it difficult to generalize about all judges, the diversity 
is important because it suggests that judges adapt conferencing to how they wish 
to conduct business rather than being confined by the constraints of the inno-
vation. 
Who Uses Telephone Conferencing? 
The variety of courts in which we found telephone conferencing is striking 
in terms of jurisdiction, size, and location. Judges in federal district courts, 
state courts of appeal, state trial courts of general jurisdiction, and state and 
local trial courts of limited jurisdiction have conducted court proceedings by 
telephone on a regular basis, as indicated below. Moreover, the variation in 
geography and population density suggests that virtually any area of the country 
is suitable for telephone conferencing. 
The reasons for telephone conferencing may be different in one area than in 
another. Judges in areas that are inaccessible due to weather conditions (e.g., 
Wisconsin or Colorado in wintertime) or geography (e.g., Hawaii) indicate that 
necessity is the mother of innovation. They find it difficult to travel an 
attorneys donot find it easy to come to court. The sheer distances, even in good 
weather, are also a consideration in many jurisdictions. In states that are 
large and sparsely populated (e.g., New Mexico, Wyoming) the savings in the at-
torney's time is a reason why judges utilize it. 
Some courts (e.g., West Palm Beach) tend to draw attorneys from other juris-
dictions (e.g., Miami). In fact, in most metropolitan areas, there is likely to 
be at least one court that draws heavily from another part of the area that is 
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to 75 miles away. Finally, even within a me 
quently are scheduled for court appearance on the 
tan area, attorneys fre-
day in different courts. 
Telephone conferencing may serve to cut down on scheduling conflicts. 
What Kind of Court Business is Conducted by Conference Calls? 
Telephone conferencing is an alternative to two traditional means of resolv-
motions. First, motions may be decided strict on the papers by the judge 
with no oral presentation by the parties. Briefs, memoranda, or s and 
authorities are evaluated by the judge in assessing the claims made by the moving 
party. Second, an in-person hearing before the court may be held. Usually 
(thou~not in every jurisdiction), the lawyers for the parties have filed papers 
iscussing the merits of the motion, so that the purpose of the hearing is for 
ounsel to present supplemental oral arguments and for the judge to have the 
opportunity to gain additional information. 
Not only do jurisdictions vary widely in terms of the patter s 
utilization of these two types of methods of resolving motions 
here is limited information available on the percentage distribu io 
different types of motions heard using the different methods. 
o der to gain some sense of the relative frequency of teleph ne 
ferences in the jurisdictions where this innovation is now 
the judges were asked how often and in what types of matte 
h y used the telephone. 
Generally, the judges interviewed said motions that may be 
spositive of the case (e.g., summary judgment) are argued less 
requent!y by telephone than those that. are procedural (e.g .• to 
o n parties) or that involve issues concerning discovery. While pro-
cedural and discovery motions are more frequent in absolute terms 
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than substantive motions, judges also claim that a higher percentage 
of these motions are resolved by telephone than ·are substantive 
motions. One of the questions to be explored in our second phase 
of research is the extent to which telephone conferences are used 
as an alternative to in-person bearings, or--equally plausible--as 
an alternative to resolution of relatively unimportant procedural 
motions that would otherwise be decided on the papers without any 
argument by counsel. 
While the initial Action Commission-ICM research focused on 
the use of telephone conferencing in civil motion hearings, prelim-
inary findings indicate that a _very wide range of court business is 
court business is conducted by telephone. In civil cases, ~or 
example, the telephone is used for scheduling conferences, pretrial 
conferences, motions hearings, and the setting of trial dates. 
Telephone conference is used less freqiently in criminal cases, but 
its functions in some courts include taking pleas of guilty as 
well as conducting motion hearings. Other uses include taking 
depositions and obtaining expert witness testimony in child 
custody hearings, commitment proeedings, and small claims trials. 
Jurisdictions Where Telephone Conferencing Is Used to Conduct 
Court Business 
Federal District 
California (San Francisco) 
Maryland (Baltimore) 
Bew Jersey (Newark) 




State Court of Appeals 
New Mexico (Santa Fe) 
Washington (Spokane) 
State Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction 
California (Fresno) (Los Angeles) 
Florida (West Palm Beach) 
Georgia (Atlanta) 
Hawaii (Maui, Hilo) 
Massachusetts (Fall River) 
Michigan (Pontiac, Big Rapids) 
New Jersey (Atlantic City) 
New Mexico (Santa Fe) 
Wisconsin (Tenth District) 
State Trial Courts of Limited Jurisdiction 




How Are Telephone Conferences Scheduled, Initiated, and Conducted? 
Whereas civil motions hearings are frequently scheduled for 
a specific day and time, judges tend to use telephone· conferencing 
more flexibly. Some judges decide motions and other matters by 
telephone during times of the day that otherwise might not be used 
fully~ For example, some judges find it profitable to conduct court 
business by phone prior to going on to the bench early in the 
morning ~r after coming off the bench in the late afternoon. 
The question of how telephone conferences are scheduled and 
initiated varies. Some motions are scheduled in advance for a 
telephone conference while other motions may be decided during a 
status call to determine the progress made by counsel in resolving 
outstanding issues. Some judges intitally suggest a telephone con-
ference in certain cases to one side. If the one attorney is 
agreeable, the court suggests that the attorney contact the other 
- 9 -
party and then make the necessary arrangements on the time and day. 
A different approach is used by other judges, especial in 
resolving strictly procedural motions. Here, they may call the 
attorneys on a non-scheduled basis. This techniques is likely to 
be used by the judge to gather information that he does not have 
in the written materials that have been submitted and that fails to 
warrant the expenditure of time and resources involved in holding 
an in-person hearing. 
A considerable degree of uniformity exists in the conferences 
themselves are conducted. Generally, the judge begins by indicating 
the purpose of the call, the issues before the court, and the 
parties involved. The judge sets forth the rules and guidelines for 
the hearing: who is to speak first, avoidance of irrelevant arg 
ments, and what to do in case of equipment malfunctions. In other 
words, the judge exercises the same care in governing the telep o 
hearing as an in-person appearance. 
The issue of whether a record is made varies from judge to jud 
and case to case. Moreover, the record may be a verbatim accoun o 
a summary of the proceedings. In addition, whereas some judges 
a reporter to be present in chambers when a record is needed, oth 
will tape record all proceedings. 
Does Telephone Conferencing Impair or Improve Court Proceedings? 
Of the judges interviewed, there is virtually unanimi on 
nature of its effects in several key areas. We asked judges who 
used telephone conferences to asse~ its impact along seven basic 
dimensions: (1) counsel's preparation; (2) relevancy of counsel's 
arguments; (3) judge's preparation; (~) judge's control over the 
proceeding; (5) judge's ability to use questions; (6) care f 
-86-
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scheduling proceedings; and (7) length of the hearings. Except for 
the last dimension, nearly all judges said that ~lephone conferencing 
did not change the proceedings, for the better or the worse. In 
terms of ~he length of the hearings, however, most judges said 
telephone conferencis were shorter than in-person hearings. 
Significantly, the judges who utilize telephone conferencing 
report no serious difficulties in conducting the conferences. 
Technical problems--e.g., disconnected parties, static on the line, 
inadequate amplification, difficulty in identifying the speaker--
were rare occurrences. In terms of arranging the hearings and 
conducting them, the judges do not experience problems serious enough 
to warrant holding counsel in contempt for failure to be present 
at the scheduled time or for inappropriate behavior during a conference. 
What Equipment is Needed and How Much Does It Cost? 
Increasingly, federal, state and local governments are upgrading 
their telephone equipment. As a result, the existing telephone 
lines and telephones in many courts have conferencing capabilities. 
In this situation, the additional equipment is a speaker phone which 
costs from $8-$12 each month to lease from a phone company. Obviously. 
if the court is cqmmitted to the use of telephone conferencing, it 
is cost-effective to purchase this single piece of equipment. 
In situations where the equipment is somewhat old, there may 
' be a need to acquire a phone with conferencing capabilities to 
replace the eXisting one. This item may cost $14-$20 to lease per 
month, plus a $80-$100 one-time installation charge. Again, there 
are potential savings from purchase of needed phones. 
The major cost of the equipment is the installation and monthly 
operating charges associated with new telephone lines. If a line 
-11-
not already present that has a conference capability, one m 
acquired. The cost of the line varies from locale to locale 
approximate amount is $20-$40 each month to lease. 
Another cost is the monthly service charge for local and 1 
stance calls. Many courts bear these costs. Some do it on g 
at this investment saves a much greater amount for counsel an 
lients. Others argue that, in criminal cases, both attorneys a 
ually public employees (i.e., district attorney and public d 
e ce, the court's expenditure produces a net gain to the stat 
However, some courts prefer to bill attorneys. How do they 
o it? One method is a flat fee based on average amount of tim 
r normal hearing. This usually is charged to the moving p 
t er courts call collect. With either method, however, the c 
ive to avoid spending more money trying to collect revenues 
e amount which they seek to recoup. 
What Are the Advantages to the Court by the Use of Telephone 
Conferencing? 
Some judges who have not tried telephone conferencing ha e 
essed the view that there are no benefits to the court. a 
sted that there is a net loss since the court provides 
pment and the lawyers save travel time and money. Yet, 
not the opinion of judges who use the innovation. 
All of the judges who use telephone conferencing rega d 
a means for reducing the time and costs of civil litigation 
t time is thought to be shortened in several ways, primar 
shortening the length of the hearing, facilitating schedul g 
d maximizing the judge's ability to use time off the bench fo 
g cases faster by status calls to all parties. This 
_QQ_ 
to conduct telephone conferences in chambers frees up courtrooms 
which may be severely limited in some jurisdictions. 
In addition, conferencing is helpful in resolving problems 
that arise in the troubled area of discovery. Some judges rule 
on problems arising during a deposition--not only a great cost and 
time saver, but they alse may constrain counsel when they know that 
the judge can rule on a contested matter in a few minutes. Finally, 
the ability of the judge to initiate telephone conferences on a 
variety of matters enhances the court's control over case flow and 
the docket. 
How Has Telephone Conferencing Been Adopted? 
Most of the judges who use telephone conferencing say that 
they thought of the idea themselves and implemented it with minimal 
discussions with other parties, such as cou~t officials and members 
of the bar. Most of them had had some experience with conference 
calls during their years in private law practice. After coming on 
the bench, they began using telephone conferencing for various 
types of court business because they thought it was a good idea 
that would save time and money. The innovation has generally been 
adopted without any specific suggestions or technical assistance 
from a state court administrator's office, independent organization,_ 
or judicial training institution. Particularly in rural areas 
where distances are great, use of the telephone {especially for 
relatively minor matters) is seen by some judges to be an essential 
aspect of sound judicial administration. Once the judges have 
initially adopted it, the extent to which they use telephone confer-
encing seems to depend of the length of time they have used it. Those 
-89-
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who have had greater time to explore various applications appear 
to use it more extensively. 
The judges who use telephone conferencEs report that the 
innovation has wide support among the bar. Although the evidence 
is fragmentary, there are indications that some judges tend to 
encourage telephone conferencing in cases where they have a high 
degree of confidence that the lawyers will like this idea. We 
hope that the systematic surveys of attorneys in C0lorado and 
New Mexico will help clarify the predispositions of the bar to 
telephone conferencing in terms of what is feasible and desirable. 
We appreciate the opportunity to talk to judges around the 
country for the past several months about the utility of telephone 
conferencing. They have enabled us, in a relatively short period of 
time, to begin bringing together information that previously was 
scattered a~d fragmentary. Their experiences have helped shape the 
pilot projects soon to be implemented. The results o~ work, both 
interim and final reports, will be shared with members of the bench 
and bar through forums such as The Judges' Journal. 
lavv and 1\.~otio~- Telepho.ne Hearngs_ 
Praised in L.A.; Questioned in Fresno 
E~ CHARLOTTE LOW. *. ·---~-·-. _·--:.:_:_·_. ______ _ 
.• ·---- -.! -. 
EXHIBIT F I I ~~1 
1--i 
C'oncuct!ng superior court law and motion hearings Goebel readily allows persons handlmg their own . 
by telepho:Je is an lnno\'atlon widely prai5-ed for sav- _cases wiL'lout lawyers to argue their cases personal·-·---------- ;~:..~~;~_:: 
~g Erne and money In Los Angeles County, where a Jy. . :· · ·· •·' .. · · · · · · 
n:-;ancejudge has experimented with the procedure "They don't understand how normal courtroom· . ~~f:~~:~ 
for almost five years, but regarded with some reser- procedures (like personal argument) can be legally.:.~' ---------f 
vations by practitioners In Fresno County, where the clrcwm·enled and we don't want them to liink · =·.::.-:-:"' 
program has !:>etn In e!fectror o:"!ly one month. they're being taken In," he s;~ld. . . . .. ·. . . . . .-....... . 
. The two j-rograms are different :n pi:~Ylse, but The judge also permits motions for summary judg-. -. ---------1 
to cv;nmunlcate with eacb other by speaker arguments on those motions may be longer and more·:'----------;_::::::::::. 
telephones during a hearing on a motion as though compllcatf'd. .:.. ::.:,.;. __ , . ' ~ ":; . .':~ ·.:; 
. each allows the judge and parties to a me... . : . .:-ar.ag t ment to be argued live In his courtroom because the. 
they were all in the courtroom . . :.. . . . BoUJ Gc~~t.el and Andreen say that their equiprrienf.. .. J 
'The Torrance program began In August, 1975,. Is so sophisticated that a court reporter taking notes , ._; ----'-----r::::::::::~: 
when Los Angeles Superior Court Judge August 1 would have no trouble dlsUr:;plshing the voices. But. I S::::~? 
· Goebel, who takes credit for inventing the .Idea, ~Givens noted ··that the qu:.lity of the telephones,.·----------1'.::: 
published a set oflocal rules permitting lawyers to ~ decline when more than two lawyers are using them 
argue motions by conference telephone in his court. at once. · ." · ... ,·"·· \ ·. -,"---:'. . · .•• . . .. ~· ~ ":.., 
Participation in Goebel's program was tJ:len com· Tv.·o Bay. Area lawyers \\·ho argued in Fresno ex~·:·:=----------1:: 
pletel)' voluntary .. · :. . ... _ ·:·. - . · prem·d pleasant surprise to learn shortly before : E?E:~ 
In January, 1978, the Torrance branch of the Los their scheduled hearings thata telephone argument. ·-·------· 
Angeles Superior Court began participating .In the system existed.· - --·- ··' ·~: · · · · : ::"··-· ·. ~'·-:-·:,,. '::::-~ 
Economical Litigation Project an experiment in Oakland attorney Judith Sundstrom learned the I E---
simpllfied court procedures set up by the state's day before her schedule-d appearance on a motion for.-t--
Judtclal CounciL Goebel began heari:.ti all motions a protective order that she might not have to spend · E?.:~~~ 
under L'le. EL~ and he has made participating in . :; :oo or a client's money to fly to Fresno to defend the:.\ - ~?:;~; 
tele;>hone mo1lon hearings almost mandato~_ln his :!latltr in person. Andreen waived the two-day notice·.: -----· 
court.~-:··- : __ .. ·' ~-· -: , . · ·" -. '! ·-~: requirement .. to allow Suf)dstrom to· argue by· ~Y~~ 
·When Goebel began the program he used a con- -telephone.· ..... _:.; :. -~·: ,: , __ .,.,. · ·. · . ,, · E~---.=.·,·,..=~_·_ ..·
. ference telephone In his office, which hooked into the. . "It was a little' confusing," Sundstrom said of the -
county's Centrex· System and vthich required calls to -experience. "You don't get the body language or your :::::::::::: 
be placed tl',rough the courthouse operator. rn 1979, . opponent." ' '.' ' -~ ' -·--- _____ .;.. -:·< -~-~_i.~:~;~_:_J.~_'.~-~-
he was able to persuade the County Communications \ Sundstrom said that she found herself ~tanding to . · 
Department to install more soph!stlcated equipr:ier:t - argue even though she -.1·as In her 0\\'Jl office, because ----- -------· 
which per ::nits him to listen to as many as four ' she ahr :is stands during arguments in court. . . . ·:.::::::::,1 . lawyers argue and his own clerk to set up the calls. Paul Siegrist of San Francisco, a staff attorney for 
In contrast, the Fresno program was set up strictly United California Bank, L:l'd the Fresno telephone :;;;;:.;::::~ 
as a co::n-c:tience Cor. out-of-town lawyers, to s;.:•e system to argue a t'emurrer he had filed only 
long trips to Fresno to make brief arguments. Unlike because he broke his glasses shortly before he was ,':··::_:_:··,:_::·.·~_.,:_ .  :,·.·'::··::,::._:_·_.-...· _ :.':: 
... ~~bel,_ who. hears arguments ":~~e- !=lttln[..!!!_. his supposed tony to Fresno and could not see bls way t.o · .. - . 
- chambers, Fresno Superior Court Judge Kenneth An· the airport. · · · · r---------~ 
dreen, to whose court the Fresno telr:phone experi- Siegrist called the p! 'tam "com•enient," but said 
mentIs confir.ed, holds the hearings in h!s courtroom. that oral aq;ument on i.i:; pleading would ha\•e made 
-like-in-person hearings. Fresno-area law::~ :-s are ex· ~ no difference anyway. · . : ·. '--------!_,_, __ _ 
peeled to appear personally in Andreen'!. -~urtroom : Attorney Wayne Witchez of Fresno, who argued ,;.::::::=::::::. 
_to argue, while out-of-town attorneys are permitted . against Siegrist's demurrer in a personal ap- · r----------; 
to use the telephone. The telephone heartngs are in· pearance In A~,dreen's court, complahed th'!t "it's 
. !erspersed with th·~ regular hearings on Andreen's hard to argue l a squawk box." 
- calendar. . .. . . . . · · .·. It's unfair to force Fresno lawyers to make a trip to -·--------r:;;:;;;;~ 
Lawyers who wish to participate In the Fresno pro" court to argue their cases while out-of-town attorneys 
_ gr<:m must write or call the court· t least two days !n. are able to argue from their offices, Witchez said, ad· 
advance, and then be ready to ar:cept a collect call , ding th::t he would have been "upset" U Siegrist had 
from Andreen's clerk the day of the hearing. · . not had a "valid excuse" like broken gl~·.•es to pre-
"We don't encourage local lawyers to use the 1· vent his person?-! appearance in court. 
------f ........ . 
system" .!.ndr· en told The Daily Journal, citing the Witchez did praise the high c, .. ,Jity of Andreen's 
_ c-·.-: ra tv or'lhree minutes it takes his clerk to set up telephone system. . · I--------t·----·---
1\ call for each telephone hearing. "It slows down Los Angc!r:s ;;.rea litigo::t.::·s v:ere more enthusiastic ......... 
_the court calendar," Andreen explained. ' · ·· about their ·:zperiences with Goebel's program. Jef· 
Since the Fresno ~:.·stem went into effect March 5, · frey Crafts of Gilbert, Kelly, Crowley & Jennett likes· 
It has been used only four Urnes. Only lawyers with. :the system because it lo: easier to get from his home 
Hen-numbere-j cases can use the Fresno system, ·to hls Wilshire Dlstric! I,w office by 9 a.m. than to the 
bec:·use motio~.s in odd-numbered cases are heard in Torrance courthouse. 
------- __ .... _. 
a:~other Fresno courtroom. •. · Goebel's system works because the judge himself 
In Torrance, (;{)ebel's clerk Jim Givens calls all is well prepared for the hearings and often walks -r---------
the lawyt:-s with motions to be heard on Goebel's over to consult nearby Jaw books In his chambers in 
regular Friday calendar. Lie Wednesday before. the middle of a teltphone hearing, something that 
Givens gi\'es the lawye~c; Goebel's tentative ruling on would be impossible to do in open court, Crafts said. 
each motion, along with a summary of Goebel's . But for "the ~ig ones" - motions for summary 
reasoning for the decision, and sets up a telephone jud~rnent, motions !or jud~UDent on the plel!dings __ ~JC .. I------- ......... . 
cor.ference for the attorneys who still wish to ;,rgue maJor demurrers- Crafts would !Ike to have the op· 1 
their cases after hearin~ Goebel's tentative ruling. Uon to appear personally In court, he told The Daily .L -------f 
Acting on Goebel's _orders, Givens discourages JournaL • , .. . · . . ;. . . : · · i ·-·· .. ···· 
lawyers from appeanng personally in Goebel's Craf~s believes t,; ; !nlang!ble factors _like per- · 
court although Goebel will allow a personal argu- · sonalliies or style of argument can make a difference --------- .:.'~~~~~-:~ 
ment'rrom an attorney It he Insists. . In a close and serious c~_s!!:_...,.,.~ _______ ~- __ . . . · ::::::::::: 
. ''This is a new sy~tem. For It to work, lawyers -------------- _ ------· ......... , 
must fet:l they're b.:::;1g given a fair shake," Goebel :'·:::j 




r I I ---· -Century City lawyer S!dne:y Tinberg of C~.u:~g & 
Thberg said he t.ad more tl::.e to argue O\'er the 
lc·lephone In the Torrance system - 20 Ininutes -
th::.n he would have hc:d in a per~onal appearance, 1 
;: 11d he ~·as able to work on ~:her cases while he ·~ :::.-::•·• 
.,, ¥~~d /~~t~~acta~.oe~el ruled against T!nberg after . ----------------t:~~={:~~: 
the tdlorney ugu£-d against a rr:otion to strike part of ________________ 
1
:;.:;:;:;.: 
his plr::cing did not change Tinberg's assessment of .. ~:· ~: 
the procedure. 
·-----------,-- ''The telephone didn't make any difference," he :..1----------------1 ........ .. 
, said, adding, "It's a waste of time to appear per- I 
~:-;;:~1·~.._, ?.\l.' an~ ~o~ion m&tter." · \ 
TOrTa.iJ~e attorney William 111cKim s::tid he would 
have no objection to handling :;.ny motion, or even a 
tri<J, o,·er the tele?hone, calling it a "step Into the ;..,_ ______ _ 
20th century. · · 
··-····· "It is at the very least unpatriotic and at the most lrail.orot.:s" in light of the cu:-rent gasoline sbort.age 
and inflation to travel to court for adversary hear-
-------------t ....... .. 
Ings, McKim declared. . . . _ .. . 
Goe!:lel sees problems with using a telephone 
system for hearing Jaw and motion matters in the 
congesttd downtown branch of Ll'Je superior court. He 
handles no more than about 10 motions and on only 
one day a week. The 20 or so teicphone calls Givens 
must place are no great burden, Goebel said. An- · 
1--------------t·-.. ·-· 
1------------'i:::::. 
dreen hear. between eight and JO moliuils ea.ch day, . 
----~--------- .. the overwhdmlng majotity of them in person ..•. ,.. --------------
But the clerks in the seven down to·.,·n law and mo-
tion departments, each handling around 30 matters 
per day, might find the burd~;n of making at least 60 
cai!y telephone calls- one to each of the lawyers on 
both sides - intolerable, Goebel said. The act of 
te:ephoning also adds a few minutes to each hearing, 
he pointed out. . · · . . . 
Superior Court Jw:ge Robert WP.il, who p:-r;s:des · 
o\·er the seven deparc::~ents, sa!d he is studying how 
telephone equipment might be used to expedite mo-
tion hearings do·,;.·ntov.-n rut has no plans now to im-
itate ~e>ebel's system there. . .· 
But the five judges who hear motions (two cour-
trooms are presided over by commissioners) no~ 
--------- .. ·----- have ~peci<:l telephone lines which they usc to dictate 
tentative nllings on tape so lh<:t lawyers can call in 
for them the day before the scheduled hearings. Bet-
ween two arHi five of the 20-40 matters scheduled in 
each court~ ·.om eP':h day go off calendar because 
Ja·,.·yers agree to~. '•mit them on the telephone ten-
tative rulings, Weil s;;id. 
·----·---------· 
The cost of inst:1lling the equipmcr;t is another ----·----·- ___ _ 
reason ~he do·~·ntO\\'n courts h,:v~ he5i!·<ed to imple- ---------- -·-
r'1ent ;; ~-:lephone hearing system. God•d said it cost 
about ~.5'..10 to pl;,ce special telephones in his Torrance 
chambers and they add about $68 per month to his 
phone bill. " - · ' 
Wi!h seven do•..,·ntown courtrooms installing the 
syste:n "becomes expensive," Wei! ~aid. . 
A grant from the American Boud of Trial Ad-:. f----------------------
vocates paid the $1,100 installation cost of the Fresno 
system. 
Go.-:bel persuaded the cnunty Communications 
De:;,c;rtment to install his special equipment last year 
on an experimental basis, In return for which Goebel 
promised to write a report on ):··w !:"'\ •.h time and 
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December 8, 1981 
William Bates, Esq. 
McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen 
Three Embarcadero Center 
San Francisco, California 94111 
Re: Court Appearance by Telephone 
Dear Bill: 
I write this letter in my capacity as Chairman 
of the Business Litigation Committee of the Bar 
Association of San Francisco, and as the person of that 
Committee primarily responsible for the current Law-
and-Motion-by-Telephone experiment in San Francisco 
Superior Court. 
TELEPHONE 
(4115) 421•6150~ ... 
As you know, this experimental project commenced 
late in August of this year and is scheduled to last six 
months. Judge Ira Brown, Jr. has indicated to me recently 
that he would recommend that the procedure be made 
permanent. While this recommendation may be viewed as 
reflective of the project's success, it should be 
emphasized that usage of the telephone as a means of 
arguing Law and Motion matters has been light. We have 
intentionally gone slowly in seeking to publicize the 
program statewide until we felt we had the system and 
the telephonic equipment under control. We have used 
the portable conference call unit provided by Pacific 
Telephone & Telegraph in this project. The unit has been 
satisfactory, and the speaker quality has posed no problem 
for the court reporter. 
We have had an occasional problem with the quality 
of voice transmission, but have now managed to minimize 
this by placing the calls through the court clerk of the 
RECEIVED 
DEC- S l~oa 
ANSD. ___ _ 
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~ 
Law and Motion Department rather than through the telephone 
company's conference call operator. Using the court clerk 
to place the calls also cuts down on the time the attorney 
is placed on hold. 
We anticipate that use of the system will increase 
once we pursue further publicizing of the program with 
other Bar Associations throughout the State. 
In general, I believe that court appearance by 
telephone can be very useful in many situations other than 
law and motion matters. Exceptions might be hearings in 
which testimony by witnesses is involved, where document 
exchange is required, or where the presence of numerous 
counsel would make a conference call cumbersome. 
I reviewed Assembly Bill 1209 shortly before its 
original submission, and remain highly supportive of its 
attempt to make court appearance by telephone more widely 
available. I believe that the key to passage of such a 
bill lies in keeping it voluntary and in giving individual 
courts some leeway in how they effectuate the program. (For 
example, the San Francisco program excludes discovery matters 
and, due to the nature of the telephone system in San 
Francisco City Hall, cannot avail itself of certain equip-
ment advantages which might be possible for other courts.) 
The enclosed Request to Appear at Hearing By Telephone is 
submitted as an example of how one court has fine-tuned its 
rules. Also enclosed is a copy of my recent article from 
the Bar Association of San Francisco's Brief/Case magazine 
entitled "Court Appearance By Telephone. 
Please excuse my inability to join you at the hearing 
before the Assembly Committee on Judiciary on December 10. 
I must attend a Board of Directors meeting on that day but 
(supportive to the end of the technology) can be made 
available by telephone. 
RCF:rec 
Enclosures 










NA.'IIIE, ADDA£SS. AND TELEPMONi HUMBER 
OF ATTOANEYISI 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF .................................. . 
Pla1nt1ff(a) 
Defendant(s) 
REQUEST TO APPEAR AT HEARING 
BY TELEPHONE 
Law & Motion Department 
Hearing Date 
.. ·~ 
Attorney requesting to be joined by telephone: 
------------(rp-r~i-n7t __ n_a_m-e')~-----------
Telephone number to be called: ( ___ ) 
(The attorney named here will be the person asked for by the Telephone Conference Co-
ordinator.) 
EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURE: 
1. Counsel for any party has the right to request to participate by telephone in a hear-
ing of any noticed motion in the Law and Motion Department (EXCEPT DISCOVERY MATTERS and 
matters in which the Court may advise counsel that appearance in person is required). 
2. Counsel not wishing to participate by telephone in such a hearing may appear and 
argue in person. 
3. The cost of any telephone call(s) involved in such a hearing will be charged to the 
telephone number of the first counsel requesting to appear by telephone. (Should coun-
sel wish to apportion charges among themselves, any such arrangements shall be made by 
such counsel independently.) 
4. Counsel requesting to appear by telephone shall be available between 9:30 a.m. and 
11:00 a.m. if their matters are on the first half of the calendar and between 10:30 a.m. 
and 12:00 noon if their matters are on the second half of the calendar (unless otherwise 
advised by the Law and Motion Department). Failure to be reachable by telephone during 
this period shall be deemed to constitute a failure to appear. 
5. Counsel electing to appear by telephone will be notified by the Judge of the tenta-
tive ruling on the motion at issue at the commencement of the conference call. 
6. COUNSEL ELECTING TO APPEAR BY TELEPONE WILL SERVE A COPY OF THIS FORM (A) ON ALL 
OTHER COUNSEL, (B) A COPY TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT, AND MUST CONCURRENTLY SERVE A COPY 
(C) IN A SEPARATE ENVELOPE TO THE TELEPHONE CONFERENCE COORDINATOR, LAW & MOTION DEPT., 
SUPERIOR COURT, CITY HALL, SAN FRANCISCO, CA. 94102. 
7. Only those attorneys who submit the printed form as directed will be called.. Any 
attorney desiring to appear by telephone may do so regardless of whether opposing coun-
sel requests to appear by telephone. 
8. Counsel wishing to ascertain whether opposing counsel has elected to appear by tele-
phone should contact opposing counsel, NOT the Law & Motion Dept. 
9. IF THIS FORM IS NOT RECEIVED BY THE LAW AND MOTION DEPARTMENT AT LEAST TWO 
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Robtrl C. Friese, ll pt~rlner in 5/ulrtsis, Friese 
& Ginsburg, is the current dulir of the 
BASF's Business Litigation Committee. 
Friese says he wrote this article fw brief/case 
because "1 llm generally llpptzlled by the costs 
and blays of litigation and the fact tht:lt the 
tli6p14fe resOlution process in this country is 
so e7:Fnsiw Rnd camplicated thtlt it does not 
serve the !mik of the people who rely on it. l 
mew telephonic law and motion as one step 
toward reducing the CDSts." 
June1981 
·~:~ 
Law and Motioil" 
Project <Continued from page 1V 
ilWtmmmmmrmrmrrrrrrrtttm?t~ttft 
and sensitivities of coun~l and the court 
in San Francisco. Commt!lts on the pro-
ject and the court form proposed are still 
arriving, but the experiitent itself will 
obviously be the final proof. 
Why do we need telephonic law and 
motion? 
Most litigating attorneys know that 
various experiments with court ap-
pearance by telephone are underway 
elsewhere. Judge Charles Egan Goff, who 
tried law and motion by telephone while 
serving as Presiding Judge of the San 
Francisco Municipal Court, is an 
enthusiastic supporter of the concept. 
Superior Courts in Fresno, Torrance, and 
· certain courts in Los Angeles are experi-
The primary motive of this project, 
believe it or not, is to save money for the 
client. Time is money, from the vi~w­
points of both payor and payee, and the 
client who must purchase a full morning 
of his lawyer's time for a mere five-
minute motion to be argued may right-
fully ask if there is not a better way. 
Because the average law and motion mat-
ter lasts, according to Judge Brown, about 
six minutes, a courtroom full of lawyers 
clearly reflects considerable time and 
money that might be better spent else-
where. 
In a busy department such as Law and 
Motion, Judge Brown may hear 35 or 
more matters in a single morning (not 
counting discovery matters, an of which. 
magistrates handle. Calling the calendar 
in 9:30 am and 10:30 am segments may 
save time for San Francisco-based 
counsel but is less beneficial to counsel 
-who are obliged to travel from substan-
. tial distances. But even the brief trip from 
· downtown San Francisco, when added to 
the wait in. the courtroom, may require 
one and one-half hours or more of 
counsel's time .. 
Other experiments in appearance-by-
telephone · . 
menting with such projects, and several 
judges in the United States· District Court 
-. -he most notable 
exclusion is the 
·discovery motion -
. awholenew 
level of complexity 
best/eft 
for later .. 
U brief/case 
here often resort to the telephone to join 
distant counsel in law and motion andre-
lated matters. 
But the most expansive approach to 
date was submitted to the California 
Legislature as Assembly Bill No. 1209, 
part of the State Bar's legislative package 
_.this Although this bill (submitted 
As:sennblvrraan Elihu has 
fine-tuning, its key ele-
ments suggest other potential areas for 
appearance by telephone. For example, it 
would have permitted the Judicial Coun-
cil to promulgate rules governing pre-
trial, trial setting, and arbitration con- · 
ferences in which counsel could appear 
by telephone unless the conference 
included a settlement conference. It also 
would have allowed appearance by 
at on demurrers, 
to show cause or motions heard 
before trial (except for hearings in 
domestic relations matters or where oral 
testimony is involved). The Courts Com-
mittee of the State Bar helped prepare 
and support Assembly Bill No. 1209. 
Other states - including Colorado, 
New Jersey, Maine, and Hawaii - are 
introducing the telephone conference for 
motions and other pretrial matters such 
as scheduling and status hearings. They 
are being monitored by the American Bar 
Association's Action Commission - a 
five-year project designed to work with 
bench and bar on programs to reduce the 
cost and delays of litigation. 
costs and delays of litigation. [Editor's 
note: For additional information, see The 
Wall Street Journal (June 1, 1981) p. 31.] 
In sum, there is a lot of activity in this 
and we think our program may be 
vf.,,...,..,,if as state-of-the-art. Meeting the 
special challenges of a t:ourt as complex 
and busy as Judge Brown's requires 
special effort and imagination. 
· Here is how the BASF program will 
work, from proposed court 
form: 
. "1. Counsel for any party has the right 
to request to participate by telephone in a 
hearing of any noticed motion in the Law 
and Motion Department (EXCEPT DIS-
COVERY MATTERS and matters on 
which the court may advise counsel that 
appearance in person is required). 
"2. Counsel not wishing to participate 
by telephone in such a hearing may ap-
pear and argue in person. 
"3. The cost of any telephone call(s) 
involved in such a hearing will be· 
dU!fRE!d to the telephone number of the 
counsel requesting to appear by 
telle'Pi1tone. (Should counsel wish . to ap-
nn1m.,,.,. dilar!les among themselves, any · 
arra~~err\ents shall be made such 
- 8 
a better break. 
10:30 a.m. and 12:00 noon if their matters 
are on the second half of the calendar 
otherwise the Law 
and Motion to be 
reachable by telephone during this 
period shall be deemed to constitute a 
failure to "'"'U'€0"'" 
"5. 
telephone wm be 
the tentative on motion at 




opposing counsel elected to appear 
by telephone should contact opposing 
counsel, NOT the Law and Motion De-
partment. 
"7. If rourt form 
the Law and Motion rw,,,..,.'*""""''t 
two court before 
counsel will not be called . 
exdusions and 
The most notable exclusion from 
program is the motion. Includ-
ing such motions have n.-• ..-nt~'<'~ 
substantial and tecnrutcal 
lems because of such factors as the time 
limits on the in-court 
ference coordinator 
nate the flow of 
company's COJn.te,rellce 
the limits of current 




(Continued from page 11) 
The primary limitatiol\ howevft, is 
personpower. The time ofJudge Brown's 
staff has been held as in\riolate, on the 
theory that it would be tinacceptable to 
place the additional duties associated 
with this project upon them. Instead, for 
the duration of this six-month ·test, a 
telephone company employee will assist 
to the extent necessary to act as telephone 
conference coordinator. Beyond this six-
month period, an alternative source of 
funding will probably be required. The 
coordinator's essential functions are to: 
• (1) gather, by civil number and calendar 
position, the forms from counsel re-
questing to appear by telephone; (2) 
transfer this information to the con-
ference call operator; and (3) work with 
that operator to facilitate the flow of calls 
as one matter ends and another begins. 
Obviously, the flow of calls must run 
smoothly, or this program would soon be 
of historic interest only. 
The project might also exclude matters 
in which the presence of numerous 
counsel makes the telephonic approach 
unwieldy, and matters requiring docu-
ment review and/or live testimony. In 
such instances, the coordinator would 
simply advise counsel requesting to ap-
pear by telephone that their personal ap-
pearance will be required. . 
Paragraph 4 of the court form indicates 
that counsel whose matter appears on the 
first half of the calendar will be expected 
to be available to receive the call from the 
conference call operator between 9:30am 
and 11:00 am or, if on the second half of 
the calendar, from 10:30 am till noon. Al-
though it is expected that the average 
wait for the call will be substantially less 
· ·than one hour (especially if counsel has 
' : one of the earlier matters to be called), it 
~' ~ · is important to note that counsel's un-
~' · availability to take a call will be deemed a 
':,::;~ failure to appear. Thus, counSel who use 
... · this system must keep clear of involve- , 
ments that might prevent them from 
being reachable, and should advise ap-
propriate staff that they are expecting the 
call. 
lmpad on tentative rulings 
Paragraph 5 deals with tentative rul-
ings and, although peripheraL may prove 
useful to the program. Under current 
:. Law and Motion Department procedures, 
. -tentative rulings are· posted outside the 
·· --courtroom door at about 9 am on the 
morning the matters are set to be heard. 
· "' ··Thus counsel must either be present per-
Sonally or send someone to the court to 
learn the result of the tentative ruling. 
Under the proposed system, Judge Brown . 
·-> 18 brief/case .-: 
would inform counsel at the commence-
ment of the conference call of the tenta-
tive ruling and, if counsel wants to argue 
the matter, simply proceed with the hear-_ 
ing. Some of those who commented Oil-
this aspect believe that it may encomage 
unnecessary oral argument, but others 
think it will discourage it, on the theory 
that a lawyer is less likely to argue if not 
present. · 
Legend has it - though I have been 
unable to confirm this from primary 
sources - that Judge Brown has changed 
his mind on a tentative ruling twice since 





bench and bar 
recalls who 
foots the bill 







Paragraph 6 requires that the lawyer 
who wants to appear by telephone must 
give notice of this fact to other counsel by 
serving them with a copy of the court 
form. Some of those commenting on the 
project suggest that such notice mailed 
only two days before the scheduled hear-
ing might riot reach opposing counsel 
until after the hearing. However, the al-
ternative of establishing an earlier filing 
requirement for such notices was deemed 
unacceptable because it might create 
added confusion in the filing require-
ments. Instead, the Committee thought 
· that lawyers ~ho cared whether oppos-
ing counsel w~d be physically present 
or appear telephone could easily find 
out by contacting opposing counsel in 
advance. .,. 
that most counsel will have 
confidence in the content of 
oooo!>ed to the thes-
pian not to 
'be from appearing· by 
telephone because their opposi-
tion may be""'"'""'"' in the courtroom. 
eQIUiJ:tmE~nt its~f 
to the pr<tram's 
be the telephone 
conference call 
enables counsel to be 
heard through a microphone at the 
counsel's table, the judge to be heard 
through a microphone at the bench, and 
· counsel appearing by telephone to be 
heard via a speaker which appears to 
produce sufficient volume and clarity for 
the court and all others in the 
courtroom to the proceedings. 
Another key is the telephone com-
pany's conference call center, which has 
the capacity to hold a number of con-
ference calls at the ready, to be trans-
ferred as required to the court's available 
line(s) as one matter is finished and the 
next is called. 
Ultimately, if the telephone system 
within City Hall is modified to accept it, 
equipment the telephone call 
coordinator to direct-dial all counsel who 
want to by telephone is possi-
ble, thus bypassing the conference call 
operator entirely. 
Conclusion 
It should be stressed that the Law and 
Motion Department of San Francisco 
Superior Court has certain special prob-
lems which make the approach out-
lined here wholly) inap-
propriate for courts For exam-
ple, in many courts (even busy ones), 
there is no single law and motion judge 
or law and motion department. Instead, 
individual judges handle their own law 
and motion matters, and ht or might 
·not find it j ie to con-
secrate any 
equipment or staff 
process. 
conference call 
to coordinate the 
· The m#><::~urF here is that there may be 
no single system, although we hope 
the one we are can be a useful, 
basic model 
courts who 
cept modified meet their own specific 
conditions and needs. 
But in the final we hope that 
bench and bar will who foots the 
bill for some of the niceties we take for 
granted but that undermine the efficiency 
of the • 
Anyone who to cotnment 
on the or on the court form itself 
may contact the author 
writing), now· or 
Shartsis, Friese &: Gilr~Sbur~:~ 
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8. 
PART 3.5 
Of Alternative Procedures 
[Added by Stats 1976 ch 960 § J.) 
TITLE 1 
PILOT PROJECfS 
§ 1823. Legislative findings and declarations. 
§ 1823.1. Co~:-:s selected by Judicial Council. 
§ 1823.2. Jurisdiction municipal courts. 
§ 1823.3. Jurisdiction superior courts. 
~ 1823.4. Adoption of rules by Judicial CounciL 
§ 1823.5. Laws applicable. 
§ 1823.6. Collection and evaluation of data. 
§ 1823.7. Advisory committee. 
§ 1824. Pleadings and motions. 
§ 1824.1. Contents and construction of pleadings. 
§ 1825. Discovery. 
§ 1825.1. Statement of witnesses and physical evidence. 
§ 1825.2. Procedure regarding statements. 
§ 1825.3. Limitation of evidence. 
§ 1825.4. Pretrial conferences. 
§ 1825.5. Demurrers and pretrial motions. 
§ 1826. Trial date. 
§ 1826.1. Jury trials. 
§ 1826.2. Opening statement. 
§ 1826.3. Trial briefs. 
§ 1826.4. Interrogation of witnesses; Narrative testimony. 
§ 1826.5. Order of proceeding. 
§ 1826.6. Written submission of testimony. 
§ 1826.7. Record of proceedings. 
§ 1826.8. Admissibility and weight of evidence. 
§ 1826.9. Amendment of pleadings. 
§ 1826.10. Closing arguments. 
§ 1826.11. Findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
§ 1826.!2. Post-trial motions. 
§ 1826. I 3. Conclusiveness of judgment or final order. 
§ 1826. 14. Appeal. 
§§ 1827-1832. [No sections of these numbers.] 
§ 1833. Study of project: Annual report. 
§ 1833.1. Implementation of title. 
§ 1833.2. Operative date. 
§ 1823. [Legislative 
tions.] The Legislature 
that the costs of civil 
and dedara-
finds and declares 
have risen 
claim is valid or makes 
disadvantageous to defend 
claim. 
EXHIBIT I 
sharply in recent increase in 
litigation costs it more difficult to 
enforce smaller claims even the 
The Legislature further finds 
that the development of 
dures to reduce the expense 
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inhibited by the absence from present law of 
methods for experimentation with proce-
?ural innovations to reduce expense. Hence, 
It has not been possible to adopt the usual 
management technique of a trial pilot pro-
gram on a small scale of changed methods 
o_f operation with the expectation that expe-
nence with the pilot program will permit its 
permanent adoption in its designed form or 
With modification as experience dictates. 
The Legislature further finds and declares 
that there is a compelling state interest in 
th.e development of pleading, pretrial and 
tnal procedures which will reduce the ex-
pense of litigation to the litigants and there 
is likewise a compelling state interest in 
experimentation on a small scale with new 
procedures to acco•ni1lish that result before 
those procedures are adopted statewide. 
Therefore, the provisions of this part are 
added to this code to provide a means of 
experimentation with procedural innovations 
to reduce the cost of civil litigation. [1976 ch 
960 § 1.) 
§ 1823.1. [Courts selected by Judicial 
Council.] The Judicial Council shall conduct 
in two superior courts, or branches thereof 
in any county in which the population ex~ 
ceeds 260,000, as determined by the 1970 
federal census, and two municipal courts, or 
branches thereof, in any county in which the 
population exceeds 260,000, as determined 
by the 1970 federal census, selected by the 
Judicial Council with the approval of a 
majority of the judges of the selected courts, 
a pilot project for a period of five years. 
[1976 ch 960 § 1; 1980 ch 71 § 1.] 
§ 1823.2. [Jurisdiction municipal courts.] 
Within the pilot project municipal courts, all 
civil actions other than small claims actions 
shall ~e fil~d, heard and determined as pro-
vided m this chapter, except that any action 
may be withdrawn from the provisions of 
th1~ chapter by order of the court for good 
cause, e1ther upon motion by any party or 
upon the court's own motion. [ 1976 ch 960 
§ 1.] 
§ 1823.3. [Jurisdiction superior courts.] 
W!thm the pilot project superior courts, all 
civil actions in which the amount in contro-
versy does not exceed $25,000, except emi-
nent domain actions, shall be filed, heard 
and determmed as provided in this chapter, 
except that any action irrespective of the 
amount in controversy may be withdrawn 
from the provisions of this chapter by order 
of the court for good cause, either upon 
motion of any party or upon the court's own 
motion. The Judicial Council shali ;)fovide 
by rule for determining the amount in con-
troversy for the purposes of this section. 
[1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1823.4. [Adoption of rules by Judicial 
Council.] Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, including this chapter, the Judi 
cia! Council shall provide by rule for tne 
procedures to be followed in the pilot proj~ct 
courts and the rules of procedure for oik1t 
project superior courts shall provide for ~uch 
methods of pretrial discovery as are consist-
ent with the objectives of this part. Unless 
otherwise prescribed by Judicial Council 
rules, Sections 1824 to 1826.14, in:::iusive, 
s~1all not be applicable to pilot project sup:> 
nor courts. Initially the Judicial Council 
rules in the pilot project municipal courts 
shall ~ot be inconsistent with the provisions 
of this chapter. Thereafter, the Judiclal 
Cour:cil may adopt rules which change or 
~odtfy the provisions of this chapter :o 
Implement new or modified procedures for 
the conduct of the pilot project. [1976 ch 
960 § 1.) 
§ 1823.5. [Laws applicable.] Excepc 
where changed or modified by the provisions 
of this chapter, including rules adopted by 
the Judicial Council pursuant to this chau-
ter, all provtsions of law applicable to ci~il 
actions generally shall apply to the process-
ing of civil actions in the pilot project 
courts. [ 197 6 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1823.6. [Collection and evaluation of 
data.] The Judicial Council shall develon 
procedures for the collection and evaiuat1o;1 
of data to determine the cost effect of simoii-
fied procedures conducted pursuant to i\i;, 
chapter. (1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1823.7. [Advisory committee.] Pursu-
ant to Section 68501 of the Govcrcme;,, 
Code, the Chairman of the Judicial Counc;i 
may appoint an advisory committee w :iJ-
vise the Judicial Council regarding the cc .. 
duct of the pilot projects. Staff assistance to 
the advisory committee shall be provided by 
the Judicial Council. [ 197 6 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1824. [Pleadings and motions.] (a) The 
pleadings shall consist of a complaint filed 
by the plaintiff, an answer filed by the defen-
dant, and a cross-claim filed by the defer:-
dant at his election. 
(b) Motions shall be in the form generally 
provided in this code. [1976 ch 960 § 1; 1977 
ch 579 § 37.] 
§ 1824.1. [Contents and construction of 
-102- .d 
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pleadings.] (a) No technical forms of a 
"'oding are reqmred. Each allegation of a 
~kJdtng shall be simple, concise and direct. 
\b) A pleading which sets fonh a claim 
for rellef. whether as a complaint or cross-
cl.iim. shall contain a short and plain state-
ment of the occurrence or transaction upon 
"hich it is based showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief and a demand for judgment 
for the relief to ..yhich he deems himself 
entitled. Claims may be pleaded alternatively 
or inconsistently. 
(c) An answer shall state in short and 
piJ.in terms defenses to each claim asserted 
:~nd shall admit or deny the allegations upon 
"'hich the adverse party relies. A denial may 
tx: for lack of information or belief. Affirma-
tive defenses must be affirmatively pleaded in 
~hort and plain terms in an answer. 
(d) Allegations in a pleading to which a 
responsive pleading is required are deemed 
Jdmitted if not denied. 
(e) All pleadings shall be construed to do 
substantial justice. If fraud or mistake is 
alleged as the basis of a claim or defense, the 
mcumstances of the fraud or mistake shall 
be stared with particularity. [ 1976 ch 960 
§ 1.] 
§ 1825. [Discovery.] No discovery shall 
be permitted. (1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1825.1. [Statement of witnesses and 
physical evidence.} (a) Each party shall file 
with the coun a statement of witnesses and 
physical evidence within 45 days after the 
date the case is at issue. 
(b) The statement shall include the names 
and addresses of witnesses the party intends 
to call and a description of the physical and 
documentary evidence the pany intends to 
produce witt copies of the documents the 
party intends to rely upon at trial. A party 
I> not required to identify witnesses, physical 
endence, or documents which he will use 
only for impeachment. [1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1825.2. [Procedure regarding state-
ments.] The court shall hold statements filed 
with it under seal until it has received the 
statements of all parties to the action or the 
time lor filing statements has expired. The 
court then shall contemporaneously transmit 
cop1es of the statements to the adverse par-
ties. [1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1825.3. [Limitation of evidence.] At 
tnal a party may call as witnesses only those 
persons disclosed by him and introduce only 
rnysical evidence and documents identified 
m the statement, except where relief is 
granted for any of the causes specified in 
Section 4 7 3. If relief from a statement is 
granted, the adverse party shall be entitled 
to a continuance to meet the new eviden..:e. 
Production of evidence for impeachment is 
not limited. [1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1825.4. [Pretrial conferences.] Pretrial 
conferences are not required; however, coun-
sel shall be encourage to communicate per-
sonally or by telephone in an effort to nar-
row the issues prior to trial or to resolve the 
disputes. [1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1825.5. [Demurrers and pretrial mo-
tions.] No demurrer or pretrial motion shall 
be used or permitted, except as follows: 
(a) One motion may be made by the 
defendant- to dismiss the action on the 
ground of a jurisdictional defect or on the 
ground that the complaint does not give 
notice of a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
(b) Motions may be made for a continu-
ance of the action for good cause. 
(c) A motion may be made to withdraw 
the action from the controls of the proce-
dure under this title for good cause. 
(d) One motion may be made by each 
party for summary judgment or partial sum-
mary judgment. 
(e) Motions for change of venue. [1976 ch 
960 § 1.] 
§ 1826. [Trial date.] If possible, the date 
for trial shall be set within 20 days from the 
date the court distributes the statement of 
witnesses and physical evidence in accor-
dance with Section 1825.2. [1976 ch 960 
§ 1.] 
§ 1826.1. [Jury trials.] Where a jury is 
demanded, and the case is tried to a jury, 
the trial shall not be conducted in accor-
dance with this part, but shall be conducted 
in accordance with the procedures estab-
lished in this code other than in this part. 
Where a jury is waived, the trial shall be 
conducted as set forth in Section 1826.2 to 
1826.14, inclusive. [1976 ch 960 § 1) 
§ 1826.2. [Opening statement.] An open-
ing statement to the court by counsel for the 
parties shall be permitted in the manner and 
for the duration determined in the discretion 
of the court. [1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1826.3. [Trial briefs.] Trial briefs shall 
be permitted, but shall not be required. 
[1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1826.4. [Interrogation of witnesses; 
Narrative testimony.] The counsel for the 
-103-
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parties and the trial judge may interrogate 
the parties and witnesses. Narrative testi-
mony shall be permitted. [1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1826.5. [Order of proceeding.] The 
trial judge shall have the discretion to deter-
mine the order in which the evidence is 
introduced and the trial is conducted. [1976 
ch 960 § l.} 
§ 1826.6. [Written submission of testi· 
mony.] Written submissions of direct testi-
mony shall be permitted if the court deter-
mines that such submissions will result in a 
saving of time for the court and counsel. 
[1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1826.7. [Record of proceedings.] Upon 
agreement of the parties and with consent of 
the court, proceedmgs under this title may 
be recorded by video tape, electronic record-
ing, or court reporters. [1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1826.8. [Admissibility and weight of 
evidence.] No privileged information shall be 
admissible, except as provided in Division 8 
(commencing with Section 900) of the Evi-
dence Code. Subject to the provisions of 
Section 352 of the Evidence Code, all other 
evidence relevant to the action shall be 
admissible. The trial judge shall determine 
the weight to be accorded any admissible 
evidence. [ 197 6 ch 960 § l.] 
§ 1826.9. [Amendment of pleadings.] The 
trial judge, in his discretion, may permit a 
pleading to be amended to conform to proof. 
[1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
_ § 1826.10. [Closing arguments.] Closing 
arguments by counsel shall be permitted in 
the manner and for the duration determined 
in the discretion of the court. [1976 ch 960 
§ 1.] 
§ 1826.11. [Findings of fact and conclu· 
sions of law.] Findings of fact or conclusions 
of law shall not be required or made. Upon 
request of any party to the action, the court 
shall issue a brief explanation of its decision 
either orally or in writing. [1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1826.12. [Post-trial motions.] Any mo-
tion which may be made after trial in the 
court pursuant to law may be made in any 
action tried pursuant to this title. [1976 ch 
960 § 1.] 
§ 1826.13. [Conclusiveness of judgment 
or final order.] The effect of a judgment or 
final order, in respect to the matter or 
matters directly adjudged, is conclusive be-
tween the parties and their successors in 
interest but shall not operate as collateral 
estoppel of a party in other litigation with a 
person who was not a party to the action in 
which the judgment or order is rendered. 
[1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1826.14. [Appeal.] Any party shall 
have the right to appeal any judgment or 
final order consistent with the law governing 
such appeals. [1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1833. [Study of project: Annual re· 
port.] The Judicial Council shall conduct a 
study of the effects of the pilot project and 
shall make an annual report of its findings to 
the Legislature. [1976 ch 960 § 1.} 
§ 1833.1. [Implementation of title.] The 
provisions of this title shall be implemented 
by the Judicial Council only when and to 
the extend that funds are made available to 
implement the pilot project and the study set 
forth in Section 1833. [1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
§ 1833.2. [Operative date.] The provi-
sions of this part shall become operative no 
later than January 1, 1978, and shall apply 
to cases filed on or after the operative date. 
[1976 ch 960 § 1.] 
-104-
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RULE 1701 CAL RULES OF COURT 172 
DIVISION IV 
Special Rules for Trial Courts in Pilot Project for Economical Litigation 
Adopted by the Judicial Council of California, effective January I, 1978 
Chapter 
1. Rules for Municipal Courts. Rules 1701-1751 
2. Rules for Superior Courts. Rules 1801-1859 
CHAPTER 1 




1703. Applicability of general rules 
1705. Rules of construction 
1707. Construction of terms 
1709. Collateral estoppel 
1711. Applicability of special rules; withdrawal for 
cause 
1713. Pleadings; Enumerations 
1715. Pleadings; Contents 
1717. Pretrial motions 
1718. Notice of order 
1719. Discovery limited 
1721. Statement listing witnesses and evidence 
1722. Transitional provisions 
1723. [Repealed) 
1725. Calling witnesses; introducing evidence 
1727. Pretrial conference 
1729. Trial setting 
1731. Jury trial 
1733. Opening statement 
1735. Briefs 
1737. Examination of witnesses 
1739. Order of evidence and trial 
1741. Written testimony and documents 
1743. Record of proceedings 
17 45. Privileged information 
1747. Amended pleading 
1749. Closing arguments 
1751. Findings of fact-conclusions of law 
Rule 1701. Authority 
The rules in this chapter are adopted pursuant to 
section 1823.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 
pursuant to the authority granted to the Judicial Coun-
cil by the Constitution, article VI, section 6, to adopt 
rules for court administration, practice and procedure. 
Rule 1702. Severability 
If a rule in this chapter is invalid, all valid parts that 
are severable from the invalid part remain in effect. If a 
rule in this chapter is invalid in one or more of its 
applications, the rule remains in effect in all valid 
applications that are severable from the invalid applica-
tions. 
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Rule 1703. Applicability of general rules 
Except where changed by these rules and Part 3.5 
(commencing with section 1823) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, all provisions of law applicable :o civil 
actions generally apply to actions subject to these rules. 
Rule 1705. Rules of construction 
These rules are intended to and shall be construed so as 
to implement Part 3.5 (commencing with section 1823) 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 1707. Construction of terms 
As used in these rules, unless the context or subject 
matter otherwise requires: 
(a) "Shall" is mandatory, and "may" is permissive. 
(b) The past, present and future tense each includes the 
other. 
(c) The singular and plural number each includes the 
other. 
Rule 1709. Collateral estoppel 
A judgment or final order, in respect to the matter 
directly adjudged, is conclusive between the parties and 
their successors in interest but does not operate as 
collateral estoppel of a party or a successor in interest 
to a party in other litigation with a person who was not 
a party or a successor in interest to a party to the 
action in which the judgment or order is rendered. 
~ Rule 1711. Applicability of special rules; withdrawal for 
cause 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this rule, the rules 
in this chapter apply to every civil action filed and 
heard between January I, 1978, and December 31, 
1980, in the Fresno Municipal Court and in those 
branch courts of the Los Angeles Municipal Court 
designated by the presiding judge of the Los Angeles 
Municipal Court. These rules also apply to any action 
transferred to any such court by reason of improper 
venue or lack of jurisdiction in the court in which it 
was filed, if the action would have been subject to these 
rules if originally filed in the court to which it is 
transferred. [As amended effective July I, 1979.] 
(b) The rules in this chapter do not apply to any action 
under chapter 5A (commencing with ~ection 116) or 
chapter 5B (commencing with section 118) of Title I of 
Part I or any proceeding under Part 3 (commencing 
with section 1063) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
(c) Any action may be withdrawn from the provisions 
of this chapter by order of the court for good cause. 
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either upon motion by any party on not less than five 
days's written notice or upon the court's own motion. 
The motion shall be heard and determined not less than 
10 days before trial of the action. No limited or partial 
withdrawal shall be permitted. 
Rule 1713. Pleadings; enumeration 
The pleadings allowed are complaints, answers, cross-
complaints and answers to cross-complaints. The de-
murrer is not allowed. 
Rule 1715. Pleadings; contents 
(a) No technical forms of pleading are required. Each 
allegation of a pleading shall be simple, concise and 
direct. 
(b) A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether as a complaint or cross-complaint, shall con-
tain: 
( 1) A short, , l2in statement specifying the date, place 
and nature of the occurrence or transaction upon which 
the claim is based and showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief; and 
(2) A demand for judgment for the relief to which he 
deems himself entitled. 
Claims may be pleaded alternatively or inconsistently. 
A complaint or cross-complaint need not be verified. 
(c) An answer shall admit or deny the allegations upon 
which the adverse party relies and shall contain a brief 
stats:ment of any new matter constituting a defense. The 
answer need not be verified, even if the complaint or 
cross-complaint is verified. Allegations in a pleading to 
which a responsive pleading is required are deemed 
admitted if not denied. 
(d) All pleadings shall be construed to do substantial 
justice. If fraud or mistake is alleged as the basis of a 
claim or defense, the circumstances of the fraud or 
mistake shall be stated with particularity. 
Rule 1717. Pretrial motions 
Pretrial motions are permitted subject to the following 
limitations and exceptions: 
(a) A motion to dismiss may be made on the ground 
that the complaint or cross-complaint does not give 
notice of a claim on which relief can be granted. 
(b) A motion to strike a cause of action of a complaint 
or cross-complaint pursuant to section 435 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure is permitted only on the ground that 
the cause of action fails to give notice of a claim on 
which relief can be granted. Motions to strike a prayer 
for relief in a complaint or cross-complaint pursuant to 
section 435 of the Code of Civil Procedure are permit-
ted only on the ground that the prayer is not supported 
by allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint. 
(c) A motion to strike an affirmative defense in a 
answer pursuant to section 453 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure is permitted only on the ground that it does 
not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. 
(d) A motion for a further account pursuant to section 
454 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not permitted. 
[As amended effective July I, 1979.] 
Rule 1718. Notice of order 
When the court rules upon a motion or makes an order 
with all parties or their counsel present, no additional 
notice to the parties is required. However, nothing in 
this rule affects the duty of the clerk to mail notice of 
entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.5 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 1719. Discovery limited 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this rule and rules 
1721 and 1723, no discovery is permitted. 
(b) Nothing in this rule prohibits written requests for 
admissions of fact and of the genuineness of documents 
pursuant to section 2030 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. 
(c) The provisions of section 2031 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure are applicable. A description of an item of 
evidence in terms essentially similar to the description 
given in the statement served pursuant to rule 1721 by 
a party in possession or control of the evidence shall be 
considered a sufficient description of the item for pur-
poses of a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 
section 2031. 
(d) The provisions of section 2032 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure are applicable. 
(e) The court may, on motion and subject to such terms 
and conditions as are just: 
(1) Require statements containing information as speci-
fied in subparagraphs (4) and (6) of rule l825(b). If a 
party fails to disclose the information after a court 
order requiring disclosure, the court shall, if any other 
party is prejudiced by the failure, impose such sanction 
provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 2034 as is 
appropriate to the circumstances, and, if the default is 
in bad faith or negligent, may require the defaulting 
party to pay all of the prejudiced party's expenses of 
preparation to the date of imposition of the sanction, 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(2) Authorize depositions to the extent depositions are 
permitted in subdivision (a) of rule 1831, when it 
appears that they are necessary because of the complex-
ity of the case or the extent of damages; and to the 
extent permitted in subdivision (b) of rule 1831. 
(f) Any party may take the deposition of any person on 
stipulation of all the parties. 
(g) Any party may serve on any person a subpena duces 
tecum requiring the person served to mail copies of 
documents, books or records to the party's counsel at a 
specified address, along with an affidavit complying 
with section 1561 of the Evidence Code. 
The law pertaining to depositions on oral examination 
governs what may be sought, notice to other parties, 
and orders for the protection of parties and of the 
person served. 
The party who issued the subpena shall mail a copy of 
the response to any other party who tenders the reason-
able cost of copying it. [As amended effective May I, 
1980; previously amended effective July l, 1979.] 
Rule 1721. Statement listing witnesses and evidence 
(a) A party may serve on any adverse party a request in 
substantially the following form: 
TO: , Attorney for -----
you are requested to serve on the undersigned, within 
20 days, a statement of: the names and addresses of 
witnesses you intend to call at trial; a description of 
physical evidence you intend to offer; and a description 
and copies of documentary evidence you intend to offer 
or, if the documents are not available to you, a descrip-
tion of them. YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO 
CALL ANY WITNESS, OR INTRODUCE ANY 
EVIDENCE, NOT INCLUDED IN THE STATE-
MENT SERVED IN RESPONSE TO THIS RE-
QUEST, EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY 
LAW. SEE RULES 1721 AND 1725, RULES FOR 
THE ECONOMIC LITIGATION PILOT PROJECT. 
(b) The request shall be served no more than 45 days 
nor less than 30 days prior to the date first set for trial, 
unless otherwise ordered. 
(c) A statement responding to the request shall be 
served within 20 days from the service of the request. 
Witnesses and evidence that will be used only for 
impeachment need not be included. 
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(d) No additional, amended or late statement is permit-
ted except by written stipulation or unless ordered for 
good cause on noticed motion. 
(e) Except as provided in rule 1725, a party upon whom 
a request was served may not call, as a witness against 
the party who served the request, a person whose name 
and address were not listed in the statement nor 
introduce into evidence against that party any physical 
or documentary eVIdence not described in the statement 
or, in. the case of documents that were available, copies 
of which were not attached to it. 
(f) No request or statement served under this rule shall 
be filed, unless otherwise ordered. 
{g) The court shall furnish forms for requests under this 
rule. 
(h) The time for performing acts required under this 
rule shall be_ computed as provided by law, including 
Code of CIVIl Procedure section 1013. [Repealed and 
adopted effective May I, 1980.] 
Rule 1722. Transitional provisions 
Any party who filed a statement pursuant to former 
rule 1721 prior to May I, 1980, that remains under seal 
may direct the clerk either (I) to mail copies to all 
other parties or (2) to return all copies of the statement 
to the party who filed it. 
A party who directs the clerk to mail the statement to 
the other parties and is later served with a request 
under new rule 1721 is deemed to have complied with 
the request to the extent the witnesses and evidence 
were disclosed in the statement. 
Statements remaining on file under seal shall be dis-
carded by the clerk on dismissal of the action or 
rendition of judgment. [Adopted effective May 1, 1980.] 
Rule 1723. [Repealed effective May 1, 1980.) 
Rule 1725. Calling witnesses; introducing evidence 
(a) A party upon whom a request under rule 1721 was 
served may call not witness, and introduce no evidence 
a&ainst the party. who served the request, except fo; 
Witnesses and evtdence dtsclosed as required in rule 
1721, or as provided in this rule. 
<:b) Witnesses and evidence used solely for purposes of 
Impeachment may be called or offered without having 
been disclosed. 
(c) An adverse party may be called as a witness without 
an intention to do so having been disclosed. 
(d) Evidence obtained by discovery authorized by this 
chapter may be offered. 
(e) The court may, upon such terms as may be just, for 
any cause specified in section 473 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, permit a party to introduce evidence not 
otherwise permitted by this rule. If such relief is 
granted, the adverse party is entitled to a continuance 
to meet the new evidence and is entitled to meet the 
new evidence by evidence not disclosed in its statement. 
(f) Nothing in this chapter limits the introduction of 
evidence in any hearing pursuant to section 585 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. [Repealed and adopted effec-
tive May I, 1980.] 
Rule 1727. Pretrial conference 
(a) Counsel shall confer personally or by telephone in 
an effort to narrow the issues or to resolve the dispute 
prior to trial. 
(b) The court may require a pretrial conference in those 
cases or classes of cases in which it appears that the 
conference may be economical to the parties by narrow-
ing the issues or resolving the dispute prior to trial. 
Except as otherwise provided by local rule or by order, 
if a pretrial conference is required, the procedures set 
out in rules 210 through 218 of the California Rules of 
Court shall apply to the extent they are not inconsistent 
with this chapter. [As amended effective May 1, 1980.] 
Rule 1729. Trial setting 
If possible, actions shall be assigned a date for trial that 
is no later than 50 days from the date a memorandum 
to set for trial is filed and served pursuant to rule 507 
or, if another party files and serves opposition to the 
memorandum, from the date the court determines that 
the case is at issue as to all essential parties. [As 
amended effective May I, 1980.] 
Rule 1731. Jury trial 
If the case is tried to a jury, the trial shall be conducted 
in accordance with the law applicable to the trial of 
civil actions generally. Where a jury is waived, the trial 
shall be conducted as set forth in rules 1733 to 1751, 
inclusive. 
Rule 1733. Opening statement 
An opening statement to the court by counsel for the 
parties shall be permitted in the manner and for the 
duration determined in the discretion of the court. 
Rule 1735. Briefs 
Trial briefs shall be permitted but not required. 
Rule 1737. Examination of witnesses 
Counsel for the parties and the trial judge may interro-
gate the parties and witnesses. Narrative teStimony shall 
be permitted. 
Rule 1739. Order of evidence and trial 
The trial judge may determine the order in which the 
evidence is introduced and the trial is conducted. 
Rule 1741. Written testimony and documents 
(a) If the requirements of subdivision (c) are met, a 
party may introduce into evidence the affidavit of any 
witness, including reports of expert witnesses and state-
ments of opinion that the witness would be qualified to 
express if testifying in person, if the affidavit is made on 
personal knowledge, sets forth evidence that would be 
admissible but for the hearsay rule, and affirmatively 
shows that the affiant would be competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. 
"Affidavit" includes declarations under penalty of per-
jury and "affiant" includes "declarant." 
(b) Any party may call as a witness, for direct or cross-
examination, the author of any such affidavit. Calling 
the affiant as a witness for direct examination is subject 
to the restrictions of rule 1725; calling the affiant as a 
witness for cross-examination within the scope of the 
affidavit is deemed "impeachment" under that rule. 
(c) Such an affidavit shall be received in evidence if: 
( 1) The court determines admitting it will result in a 
saving of time for the court and counsel; and 
(2) it is admissible pursuant to rule 1745; and 
(3) a copy, together with the current address of the 
affiant, has been received by the party against whom it 
is otfered at least I 5 days prior to the trial, and the 
affiant is subject to subpena for the trial. 
( 4) If a party offering such affidavit was required to 
serve a statement pursuant to rule 1721, the affiant was 
listed in the statement. 
(d) Documentary evidence other than affidavits de-
scribed in subdivision (a) of this rule is admissible, 
subject to the provisions of rules 1711, 1725 and 1745. 
[Repealed and adopted effective May I, 1980.] 
Rule 1743. Record of Proceedings 
Upon agreement of the parties, the court may ?rder 
proceedings under this chapter to be electronicallY 
recorded in accordance with procedures approved by 
the Judicial Council. -10 7 _ 
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Rule 1745. Privileged information 
No privileged information shall be admitted, except as 
provided in Division 8 (commencing with section 900) 
of the Evidence Code. Subject to the provisions of 
section 352 of the Evidence Code and rule 1741, all 
other evidence relevant to the issues in the action shall 
be admissible. The trial judge shall determine the 
weight to be accorded any admissible evidence. 
Rule 1747. Amended pleading 
The trial judge may permit a pleading to be amended to 
conform to proof. 
Rule 1749. Oosing arguments 
Closing arguments by counsel shall be permitted in the 
manner and for the duration determined in the discre-
tion of the court. 
Rule 1751. Findings of fac:t~onclusions of law 
Findings of fact or conclusions of law shall not be 
required or made. Upon request of any party to the 
action made not later than the time of submission of the 
case for decision, the court shall issue a brief explana-
tion of its decision either orally or in writing. 
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184 7. Order of evidence and trial 
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1859. Findings of fact-conclusions of law 
Rule 1801. Authority 
The rules in this chapter are adopted pursuant to 
section 1823.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 
pursuant to the authority granted to the Judicial Coun-
cil by the Constitution, article VI, section 6, to adopt 
rules for court administration, practice and procedure. 
Rule 1802. Severability 
lf a rule in this chapter is invalid, all valid parts that 
are severable from the invalid part remain in effect. If a 
rule in this chapter is invalid in one or more of its 
applications, the rule remains in effect in all valid 
applications that are severable from the invalid applica-
tiOns. 
Rule 1803. Applicability of general rules 
Except where changed by these rules and Part 3.5 
{commencmg with section 1823) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, all provisions of law applicable to civil 
actions generally apply to actions subject to these rules. 
Rule 1805. Rules of construction 
These rules are intended to and shall be construed so as 
to implement Part 3.5 (commencing with section 1823) 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 1807. Construction of terms 
As used in these rules, unless the context or subject 
matter otherwise requires: 
(a) "Shall" is mandatory, and "may" is permissive. 
(b) The past, present and future tense each includes the 
others. 
(c) The singular and plural number each includes the 
other. 
Rule 1809. Collateral estoppel 
A judgment or final order, in respect to the matter 
directly adjudged, is conclusive between the parties and 
their successors in interest but does not operate as 
collateral estoppel of a party or a successor in interest 
to a party in other litigation with·a person who was not 
a party or a successor in interest to a party to the 
action in which the judgment or order is rendered. 
Rule 1811. Applieability of special rules; withdrawal for 
cause 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this rule, the rules 
in this chapter apply to every civil action in which the 
amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000 filed 
and heard between January I, 1978, and December 31, 
1980, in the Fresno Superior Court and in those branch 
courts of the Los Angeles Superior Court designated by 
the presiding judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court. 
These rules also apply to any action transferred to any 
such court by reason of improper venue or lack of 
jurisdiction in the court in which it was filed, if the 
action would have been subject to these rules if origi-
nally filed in the court to which it is transferred. [As 
amended effective July 1, 1979.] 
(b) The rules in this chapter do not apply to any special 
proceeding, including any proceeding under Part 3 
(commencing with section 1063) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, any proceeding under Part 5 (commencing 
with section 4000) or Part 7 (commencing with section 
7000) of Division IV of the Civil Code, any proceeding 
under the Probate Code, or any commitment proceed-
ing under the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
(c) Any action may be withdrawn from the provisions 
of this chapter by order of the court for good cause, 
either upon motion by any party on not less than five 
days written notice or upon the court's own motion. 
The motions shall be heard and determined not less 
than 30 days before trial of the action. No limited or 
partial withdrawal shall be permitted. 
Rule 1813. Pleadings; enumeration 
The pleadings allowed are complaints, answers, cross-
complaints and answers to cross-complaints. The de-
murrer is not allowed. 
Rule 1815. Pleadings; contents 
(a) No technical forms of pleading are required. Each 
allegation of a pleading shall be simple, concise and 
direct. 
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(b) A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether as a complaint or cross-complaint, shall con-
tam: 
(I) A short, plain statement specifying the date, place 
and nature of the occurrence or transaction upon which 
the cla1m IS based and showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief; and 
(2) A demand for judgment for the relief to which he 
deems himself entitled. Claims may be pleaded alterna- · 
tlvely or mcons1stently. A complaint or cross-complaint 
need not be verified. 
(c) An answer shall either contain a general written 
demal or adm1t or deny the allegations upon which the 
adverse party relies and shall contain a brief statement 
of any new matter constituting a defense. The answer 
need not be verified, even if the complaint or cross-
complam~ IS venfied. Allegations in a pleading to which 
a responsive pleading is required are deemed admitted if 
not denied. 
(d) All pleadings shall be construed to do substantial 
justice. If fraud or mistake is alleged as the basis of a 
claim or defense, the circumstances of the fraud or 
mistake shall be stated with particularity. 
Rule 1817. Jurisdictional statement 
A jurisdictional statement shall be filed by the plaintiff 
with every complamt and by the cross-complainant with 
every cross-complaint. The statement shall state 
whether the action is a civil action subject to the rules 
of this chapter and shall disclose whether the amount in 
controversy exceeds $25,000 exclusive of attorney's fees, 
tnterest and costs. By filing a jurisdictional statement 
that states that the amount in controversy does not 
exceed $25,000, the plaintiff or cross-complainant ex-
pressly consents that any judgment in his favor entered 
in an action subject to the rules of this chapter may not 
exceed $25,000 including punitive damages but exclu-
sive of attorney's fees, interest and costs. The statement 
of every plaintiff or cross-complainant represented by an 
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of 
record in his individual name, whose address shall be 
stated. A p~rty who is not represented by an attorney 
shall s1gn 1ts statement and state its address. The 
signature of the person signing the statement constitutes 
a certificate by him that he has read the statement and 
that to the . best of his knowledge, information, and 
behef, there IS good ground to support it. If a complaint 
or cross-complamt IS filed without a jurisdictional state-
ment, 1t shall be presumed that the amount in contro-
versy does not exceed $25,000, but only after reasonable 
notice and an opportunity to file the jurisdictional 
statement has been given to the complainant or cross-
complamant. If the jurisdictional statement states that 
the amount in controversy exceeds $25,000, the action 
IS not subject to the rules of this chapter. 
Rule 1819. Pretrial motions 
Pretrial motions are permitted subject to the following 
limitations and exceptions: 
(a) A motion to. dismiss may be made on the ground 
that the complamt or cross-complaint does not give 
notice of a daim on which relief can be granted. 
(b) A motion to strike a cause of action of a complaint 
or cross-complaint pursuant to section 435 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure is permitted only on the ground that 
the cause of action fails to give notice of a claim on 
which relief can be granted. Motions to strike a prayer 
for rehef m a complaint or cross-complaint pursuant to 
secllon 435 of the Code of Civil Procedure are permit-
ted only on the ground that the prayer is not supported 
by allegatiOns of the complaint or cross-complaint. 
(c) A motion to strike an affirmative defense in an 
answer pursuant to section 453 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure is permitted only on the ground that it does 
not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. 
(d) A motion for a further account pursuant to section 
454 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not permitted. 
[As amended effective July 1, 1979.] 
Rule 1821. Notice of order 
When the court rules upon a motion or makes an order 
with all parties or their counsel present, no additional 
notice to the parties is required. However, nothing in 
th1s rule affects the duty of the clerk to mail notice of 
entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.5 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 1823. Discovery limited 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by the rules of this 
chapter, no discovery is permitted. 
(b) Nothing in this rule prohibits written requests for 
admissions of fact or of the genuineness of documents 
pursuant to section 2030 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. 
Rule 1825. Statement of contentions, witnesses and 
evidence 
(a) A party may serve on any adverse party a request in 
substantially the following form: 
TO: Attorney for -----
you are requested to serve on the undersigned, within 
20 days, a statement of: (1) your client's contentions in 
support of any claim or defense you will present at 
tnal; (2) the facts on which you base such contentions· 
(3) the name and address of any witness you intend t~ 
call to testify; (4) the name, address and the office or 
position of every person with knowledge of facts rele-
vant to the issues raised by the pleadings or by the 
contentions in your statement who at the time of the 
occurrence or transaction upon which the claim is 
based or at the time of the statement is an officer 
director, superintendent, member, agent, employee, o; 
managing agent of your client; (5) a description of the 
physical evidence, and a description and copy of any 
documents, you intend to produce in support of a 
contention; and (6) a description or copy of all docu-
ments, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, 
ohjects or tangible things, not privileged, that are rele-
vant to the issues raised by the pleadings or by the 
contentions. in your statement and are in the possession, 
custody, or control of your client. Attach to the state-
ment copies of documents in the possession or control 
of or available to your client that you intend to rely 
upon at trial. Except as required by items (4) and (6) 
above, you are not required to identify witnesses, physi-
cal evidence, or documents that v.ill be used only for 
impeachment. 
Where inconsistent with the pleadings, the statement of 
contentions controls the subsequent course of the case 
unless at or before trial, on noticed motion, it is 
modified to prevent manifest injustice. 
YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO CALL ANY 
WITNESS, OR INTRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE, 
NOT INCLUDED IN THE STATEMENT SERVED 
IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST, EXCEPT AS 
OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW. SEE RULES 
1825 and 1829, RULES FOR THE ECONOMIC LITI-
GATION PILOT PROGRAM. 
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE MAY ALSO BE A BASIS 
FOR SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 1829.1. 
(b) The request shall be served no more than 45 days 
nor less than 30 days prior to the date first set for trial, 
unless otherwise ordered. 
(c) A statement responding to the request shall be 
served within 20 days from the service of the request. 
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Witnesses and evidence that will be used only for 
impeachment need not be included. 
(d) No adduional, amended or late statement is permit-
ted e.~cept by written stipulation or unless ordered for 
good cause on noticed motion. 
(e) No request or statement served under this rule shall 
be filed, unless otherwise ordered. 
(f) Except as provided in rule 1829 a party upon whom 
a request was served may not call, as a witness against 
the party who served the request, a person whose name 
and address were not listed in the statement, nor 
introduce into evidence against that party physical or 
documentarY evidence not described in the statement 
or, in the c~se of documents that were available, copies 
of which were not attached to it. 
(g) The court shall furnish forms for requests under this 
rule. 
(h) The time for performing acts required under this 
rule shall be computed as provided by laY., including 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1013. [f<.epealed and 
adopted effective May l, 1980.) 
Rule 1826. Transitional provisions 
Any party who filed a statement pursuant to former 
rule 1825 prior to May 1, 1980, that remains under seal 
may direct the clerk either (I) to mail copies to all 
other parties or (2) to return all copies of the statement 
to the party who filed it. 
A party who directs the clerk to mail the statement to 
the other parties and is later served with a request 
under new rule 1825 is deemed to have complied with 
the request to the extent the witnesses and evidence 
were disclosed in the statement. 
Statements remaining on file under seal shall be dis-
carded by the clerk on dismissal of the action or 
rendition of judgment. [Adopted effective May l, 1980.) 
Rule 1827. [Repealed effective May I, 1980.) 
Rule 1829. Calling witnesses; introducing evidence 
(a) A party upon whom a request under rule 1825 was 
served may call no witnesses, and introduce no evi-
dence, against the party who served the request, except 
for witnesses and evidence disclosed as required in rule 
1825. or as provided in this rule. 
(b) Witnesses and evidence used solely for purposes of 
impeachment may be called or offered without having 
been disclosed. 
(c) An adverse party to the action may be called as a 
witness without an intention to do so having been 
disclosed. 
(d) Evidence obtained by discovery authorized by this 
chapter may be offered. 
(e) The court may, upon such terms as may be just, for 
any cause specified in section 473 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, permit a party to introduce evidence not 
otherwise permitted by this rule. If such relief is 
granted, the adverse party is entitled to a continuance 
to meet the new evidence and is entitled to meet the 
new evidence by evidence not disclosed in its statement. 
If) !'o'othing in this chapter limits the introduction of 
e\ldence in any hearing pursuant to section 585 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. [Repealed and adopted effec-
tive May I, 1980.) 
Rule 1829.1. Sanctions for failure to disclose real 
e\·idence or identity of witnesses 
If a party upon whom a request under rule 1825 was 
served fails to disclose the information required by 
subparagraph (4) or subparagraph (6) of the request 
form set out in subdivision (a) of rule 1825 the court 
shall, if any other party is prejudiced by the failure, 
impose such sanction provided in Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 2034 as is appropriate to the circumstances 
and, if the default is in bad faith or negligent, require 
the defaulting party to pay all of the prejudiced party's 
expenses of preparation to the date of imposition of the 
sanction including reasonable attorney fees. (As 
amended effective May I, 1980; adopted effective Febru-
ary 4, 1978.) 
Rule 1831. Depositions 
(a) Any party may obtain and use the deposition of any 
other party or of any person for whose immediate 
benefit the action is prosecuted or defended, or anyone 
who either at the time of the occurrence or transaction 
upon which the claim is based or at the time of taking 
the deposition was or is an officer, director, superintend-
ent, member, agent, employee, or managing agent of 
another party, in the manner and for the purposes 
provided by sections 20 16 and 20 18 through 2024 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
(b) Any party may take the testimony of any person by 
deposition upon court order if the court finds that it is 
more probable than not that the person will be unavail-
able at trial as a witness within the meaning of section 
240 of the Evidence Code. The order may be made only 
on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the 
person to be deposed and to all parties. If a deposition 
is ordered to be taken pursuant to this subdivision, such 
deposition may be used for any purpose authorized by 
section 2016 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
(c) Any party may take the deposition of any person on 
stipulation of all the parties. 
(d) Any party may serve on any person a subpena 
duces tecum requiring the person served to mail copies 
of documents, books or records to the party's counsel at 
a specified address, along with an affidavit complying 
with section 1561 of the Evidence Code. 
The Jaw pertaining to depositions on oral examination 
governs what may be sought, notice to other parties, 
and orders for the protection of parties and of the 
person served. 
The party who issued the subpena shall mail a copy of 
the response to any other party who tenders the reason-
able cost of copying it. [As amended effective May I, 
1980] 
Rule 1833. Request for inspection and reproduction of 
records and other tangible property 
The provisions of section 2031 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure are applicable in any action subject to the 
rules of this chapter. A description of an item of 
evidence in terms essentially similar to the description 
given the item in a statement filed pursuant to rule 1825 
by a party in possession, custody or control of the 
evidence shall be considered a sufficient description of 
the item for the purposes of a motion pursuant to Code 
of Civil Procedure section 2031. 
Rule 1835. Order for examination by physician 
The provisions of section 2032 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure are applicable in any action subject to the 
rules of this chapter. 
Rule 1837. Trial setting 
If possible, actions shall be assigned a date for triai that 
is no later than 120 days from the date an at-tssue 
memorandum is filed and served pursuant to rule 206 
or, if another party files and serves a counter-memoran-
dum, from the date the court determines that the case 
is at issue as to all essential parties. [As amended 
effective May I, 1980.] 
Rule 1839. Jury trial 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this rule,. where a 
jury is demanded and the case is tried to. a JUfY, th~ 
trial shall be conducted in accordance wtth the Jaw 
applicable to the trial of civil actions generally. Where a 
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jury is waived, the trial shall be conducted as set forth 
in rules 1841 to !859, inclusive. 
(b) The trial judge shall examine the prospective jurors 
to select a fair and impartial jury. However, upon 
completion of his initial examination, the trial judge 
shall permit counsel for each party who so requests to 
submit additional questions which the judge may put to 
the jurors. The scope of such additional questions shall 
be within reasonable limits prescribed by the trial judge 
in his sound discretion. 
(c) Each party is entitled to challenges for cause. If 
there are only two parties, each party is entitled to 
three peremptory challenges. If there are more than two 
parties, the court shall, for the purpose of allotting 
peremptory challenges, divide the parties into two or 
more sides according to their respective interests in the 
issues. Each side is entitled to four peremptory chal-
lenges. If there are several parties on a side, the court 
shall divide the challenges among them as nearly 
equally as possible. If there are more than two sides, 
the court shall grant s~ch additional peremptory chal-
lenges to a side as the interests of justice may require, 
provided that the peremptory challenges of one side to 
not exceed the aggregate number of peremptory chal-
lenges of all other sides. If any party on a side does not 
use his full share of peremptory challenges, the unused 
challenges may be used by the other party or parties on 
the same side. 
Rule 1S41. Opening statement 
An opening statement to the court by counsel for the 
parties shall be permitted in the manner and for the 
duration determined in the discretion of the court. 
Rule 1843. Briefs 
Trial briefs shall be permitted, but not required. 
Rule 1S45. Examination of witnesses 
Counsel for the parties and the trial judge may interro-
gate the parties and witnesses. Narrative testimony shall 
be permitted. 
Rule 1S47. Order of evidence and trial 
The trial judge may determine the order in which the 
evidence is introduced and the trial is conducted. 
Rule 1S49. Written testimony and documents 
(a) If the requirements of subdivision (c) are met, a 
party may introduce into evidence the affidavit of any 
witness, including reports of expert witnesses and state-
ments of opinion that the witness would be qualified to 
express if testifying in person, if the affidavit is made on 
personal knowledge, sets forth evidence that would be 
admissible but for the hearsay rule, and affirmatively 
shows that the affiant would be competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. 
"Affidavit" includes declarations under penalty of per-
jury and "affiant" includes "declarant." 
(b) Any party may call as a witness, for direct or cross-
examination, the author of any such affidavit. Calling 
the affiant as a witness for direct examination is subject 
to the restrictions of rule 1829; calling the affiant as a 
witness for cross examination within the scope of the 
affidavit is deemed "impeachment" under that rule. 
(c) Such an affidavit shall be received in evidence if: 
(I) The court determines admitting it will result in' a 
saving of time for the court and counsel; and 
(2) it is admissible pursuant to rule 1853; and 
(3) a copy, together with the current address of the 
affiant, has been received by the party against whom it 
is offered at least 15 days prior to the trial, and the 
affiant is subject to subpena for the trial. 
(4) If a party offering such affidavit was required to 
sene a statement pursuant to rule 1825, the affiant was 
listed in the statement. 
(d) Documentary evidence other than affidavits de-
scribed in subdivision (a) of this rule is admissible, 
subject to the provisions of rules 1811, 1829 and 1853. 
[Repealed and adopted effective May I, 1980.] 
Rule 1851. Record of proceedings 
Upon agreement of the parties, the court may order 
proceedings under this chapter to be electronically 
recorded in accordance with procedures approved by 
the Judicial Council. 
Rule 1853. Privileged information 
No privileged information shall be admitted, except as 
provided in Division 8 (commencing with section 900) 
of the Evidence Code. Subject to the provisions of 
section 352 of the Evidence Code and rule 1849, all 
other evidence relevant to the issues in the action shall 
be admissible. The trial judge shall determine the 
weight to be accorded any admissible evidence. 
Rule 1855. Amended pleading 
The trial judge may permit a pleading to be amended to 
conform to proof. 
Rule 1857. Closing arguments 
Closing arguments by counsel shall be permitted in the 
manner and for the duration determined in the discre-
tion of the COl'rt. 
Rule 1859. Findings of fact-conclusions of law 
Findings of fact or conclusions of law shall not be 
required or made. Upon request of any party to the 
action made not later than the time of submission of the 
case for decision, the court shall issue a brief explana-
tion of its decision either orally or in writing. 
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RULES FOR TRIAL COURTS IN PILOT PROJECT FOR 
ECONOMICAL LITIGATION 
CHAPTER 1. RULES FOR MUNICIPAL COURTS 
Rule 1711. Applicability of special rules; 
withdrawal for cause 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this rule, the 
rules in this chapter apply to every civil action filed 
and heard between January 1, 1978, and December 
31, 1982, in the Fresno Municipal Court and in those 
branch courts of the Los Angeles Municipal Court 
designated by the presiding judge of the Los Ange-
les Municipal Court. These rules also apply to any 
action transferred to any such court by reason of 
improper venue or lack of jurisdiction in the court in 
which it was filed, if the action would have been 
subject to these rules if originally filed in the court 
to which it is transferred. 
(As amended, effective July 1, 1981.) 
• • • • • • • 
CHAPTER 2. RULES FOR SUPERIOR COURTS 
Rule 1811. Applicability of special rules; 
withdrawal for cause 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this rule, the 
rules in this chapter apply to every civil action in 
which the amount in controversy does not exceed 
$25,000 filed and heard between January 1, 1978, 
and December 31, 1982, in the Fresno Superior Court 
and in those branch courts of the Los Angeles Supe-
rior Court designated by the presiding judge of the 
Los Angeles Superior Court. These rules also apply 
to any action transferred to any such court by rea-
son of improper venue or lack of jurisdiction in the 
court in which it was filed, if the action would have 
been subject to these rules if originally filed in the 
court to which it is transferred. 
(As amended effective July 1, 1981.) 
• • • • • • • 
SMALL CLAIMS RULES FOR DESIGNATED RECORDKEEPING 
AND EXPERIMENTAL COURTS 
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In 1976, the Cal1fornia legislature autho~ized an experi-
mental court project designed to reduce the cost of civil 
litiga~ion, especially in cases where the amount in contro-
versy was small. The proponents of the project were concerned 
that the high cost litigation tended to discourage litigants 
from using the judicial process when the potential recovery was 
relatively small.l By makin~ such litiga~ion more "cost effec-
tive", litigants would not be forced to abandon meritorious 
claims or defenses. 
~ The Judicial Council of California was empowered to select 
two superior courts and two municipal courts for a three-year 
experiment.2 The courts chosen were located in Fresno3 and in 
Los Angeles. Because of the size of the Los Angeles Superior 
Court, only one of the branch courts -- the Southwest Branch 
located in Torrance, California -- was selected fo~ the pro-
ject. Except for certain ex parte and other summary proceedings, 
all cases filed in the Fresno and Los Angeles municipal courts 
and all cases filed in the Fresno and Torrance superior courts 
1. The project was to take place in municipal court where 
claims would reach $5,000 and in superior court where the 
claims would range between $5,000 and $25,000. 
2. The project has subsequently been extended through 1982. 
3. Fresno, a city of nearly 200,000, is located in the San 
Joaquin Valley, a major agricultural center approximately 
equi-distant from San Francisco and Los Angeles. 
l 
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where the amount in controversy did not exceed $25,000 were 
to be subject to the experimental rules. Litigation costs 
wer~ to be reduced by four procedural changes: simplifica-
tion of pleadings, elimination of demurrers and certain 
other motions, res·trictions on discovery, and modi:ications 
of procedures used in court trials. 
Since discovery has been thought to be a significant cost 
of.litigation in federal courts as well as state courts, the 
United States Department of Justice, Office for the Improve-
ments in the Administration of Justice conmdssioned a study 
to determine the effectiveness of the ELP discovery changes 
in reducing litigation costs and the potential. applicability 
of such changes to federal civil litigation.4 
B. The EmPirical Studv 
Data were collected from court files and records in both 
superior courts -- Fresno and Torrance and, for comparison, 
in the United States District Court for the Central District 
of California. Data collection was divided into several phases. 
First, data were abstracted from t~e files of approxi~~tely 100 
randomly selected cases filed in 1978 in each of the two state 
courts. These data were evaluated to determine the ~ypes of 
cases being filed in the two project courts. Since many of 
these cases were not even at issue, a second group of nearly 
4. The study did not evaluate the other ELP improvements 
primarily because they tracked existing federal practice. 
Only ca:ses from superior courts w~re examined as municipal 
court cases would not have provided~ basis for comparison 




200 cases was examined to determine how much discovery had 
taken place. sumably these cases were ready for trial 
as mandatory settlement conferences had been scheduled. 
The next s~ep involved developing similar cases 
with unrestricted discovery for comparison with the ELP cases. 
Data were collected from similar cases which had been filed 
in the same two state courts prior to the effective date of 
the ELP project.S 
The next phase involved a parallel effort in the federal 
court. First, data were collected from a random s~~pling of 
all cases filed 1977 to determine to what extent federal 
cases were simi to those being processed in the state 
courts. Then data were collected from those federal cases 
which seemed similar to the state cases and which appeared 
ready for trial. 
The the distribution of a question-
naire to counsel for the parties in the 200 ELP cases from 
Fresr.o and Torrance. Their responses were then tabulated 
to determine attorney reaction to the ELP project. 
1. The •Typical" ELP Case 
The data reveal many similarities betweeD the Torrance 
and Fresno cases. In both courts, a high percentage of cases 
(nearly two-thi Fresno and more than SC percent in 
Torrance) were tort cases -- more than half resulted from 
S. Finding "comparable cases" presented a problem as the 
amount in controversy does not generally appear in personal 
injury suits. researchers were required to make a sub-
~ective j as to cases would have been subject to 
the ELP rules (i.e., claims under $2S,00Gl had they been 
filed after the ect became effective. 
3 
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motor vehicle accidents. The remaining cases were contract 
cases -- most sought to recover a fixed sum of money 
either based on a loan or promissory note or for goods or 
services received. Most were brought by a single plaintiff · 
a9ainst a single defendant although a substantial percentage 
involved two defendants. Over 90 percent of the cases were 
relatively straightforward; very few involved multiple claims 
or complex issues.6 Although the plaintiffs commonly sought 
$10,000 or more -- ~any sought the $25,000 ~im~ viewed 
realistically, most claims were for much less. Of those that 
settled, the majority settled for approximately $5,000. 
The second most common category was the contract cases . . 
Here there were bona fide claims of $10,000 or more. But in 
most there was no real factual dispute and little need for 
discovery. Many resulted in default judgments. 
Thus, a "typical~ ELP case could be described as follows: 
a personal injury and property damage suit resulting from a 
two car motor vehicle accident with su~stantial property 
damage but relatively minor personal injuries; brought by 
a single plaintiff against either one or two defendants; 
simple and straightforward claims with trial estimated to 
last two days or less; and a settlement value of approximately 
$5,000. 
6. The relative simplicity of these cases was shown by 
counsels' estimate of trial length: nearly 90 percent of 








excess of the $10 
dissimilarity 
was not poss 

















8. There were 
with respect to 




case undercut one 
ject -- an evaluation of the potential 
court. Needless to say, 
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took place in 
interrogatories and 
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were less than one pe~ 
to the extent that 
Data were collected 
was not 1 as is 
As mentioned previously, data were 
cases filed prior 
As expected, more 
cases" 
can conducted wi court 
between the two courts and 
discovery by plaintiffs and defendants. 
Fresno Torrance: the de-
use than did the 
s 
interrogatories and non-party depositions were permitted. 
Interestingly, the use of discovery in the two courts was 
surprisingly similar. 
; 
There was a substantial decrease in the use of discovery 
in ELP cases. The use of interrogatories decreased from 1.5 
per control case to zero per ELP case. Similarly, the use 
of non-party depositions was reduced from 0.7 per control 
case to zero per ELP case. Surprisingly, in both courts 
the use of party depositions unrestricted by the £LP 
rules -- was ~lso reduced 30 to 45 percent. Combined, the 
result was an~ percent reduction in discovery! The cost 
of discovery was reduced 70 percent.9 
3. Effect On Trial Preparation 
There are at least three other factors that must be con-
sidered in evaluating the success of the ELP project. First 
there is a question as to whether the absence of some formal 
discovery devices has made it more difficult, or possibly 
even impossible, for counsel to properly pre?are their cases 
for trial. Second, there is the possibility that counsel was 
required to utilize other less formal methods of obtaining 
the same information at equal or even greater expense. And 
finally, if the ELP project does actually reduce litigation 
costs, have these savings been passed on to the litigant? 
To obtain information concerning counsel's ap-
praisal of the ELP rules, a questionnaire was distributed 
9. The added cost of the discovery statement or contention 




to the 300 attorneys who appeared in the cases that had been 
sampled in the data collection effort. Usable responses were 
received from mor~ than half of the attorneys. The reac~ion 
of counsel to the project varied substantially depending on 
locatioh and on whether they t;~ically represented plaintiffs 
or defendants. For examp~e, 43.6 percent of Fresno plaintiffs' 
attorneys thought the project should be totally abolished, while 
only 21.6 percent of Torrance plaintiffs' attorneys favored 
abolition. The defendants' attorneys were less supporti7e. 
While 34.5 percent of the Torrance defendants' at~orneys favored 
abolition, the great majority of the Fresno defendants' attorneys 
76.9 percent-- favored total abolition of the project. 10 
Approximately half of counsel indicated that the rules 
did, in fact affect their case preparation; most indicated 
that they would have used interrogatories had they been per-
mitted. Similarly, most counsel strongly f~red modifying 
the program to permit limited use of interro~tories. Re-
sponses to questions dealing with the methods used to obtain 
information which would normally have been a~i~able through 
discovery were not conclusive. Most plaintiifs' attorneys 
indicated that they obtained the information either from their 
10. The difference in attitude vis-a-vis th~ parties may be 
explained by defendants' typical use of more discovery; they 
are therefore more significantly affected by the ELP rules. 
It is more difficult to explain the differe~s between Fresno 
and Torrance. One reason may be that the i~ for the ELP 
project originated with two Los Angeles att~ys. Fresno 
counsel frequently expressed the feeling th~ this experiment 
was being forced on them by the Governor's cfffice. 
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clients, from voluntary disclosures by the opponent or, less 
frequently, through the use of a private investigator.L Le~s 
than 25 percent indicated that they were unable to get the 
needed information. Defense counsel generally were ~le to 
get the needed information from the plair.tiff's deposition, 
although about 25 percent indicated that they used a private 
investigator. Approximately 20 percent indicated that they 
were unable to get the information. 
Responses to questions designed to reveal the effect on 
ELP cases resulting from counsel's inability to "discover" needed 
information produced no real pattern. Almost the same number 
of attorneys indicated that they were unable to try their case 
because of lack of information and therefore had to settle as 
indicated that they were unable to settle the case because of 
the lack of information and therefore had to try it. By far 
' 
the most common response was that the inability to get the 
missing information had "no significant effect" on case.pre-
paration. 
When asked to comment about the effect that the ELP rules 
had on the outcome of the case, very few provided specific or 
definitive examples. Some did indicate it was •more difficult" 
to prepare or to settle the case, but except for a few examples 
where one part¥ was prevented from presenting its evidence be-
cause it has failed to file the required contention statement, 
there was virtually no indication that the outcome of the ease 
had actually been affected by the ELP rules. 
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4. Passing on the Reduction in Discovery Costs 
am: 
Although data showed a significant re-
duction in costs, counsels' 
responses did not reduction in case 
preparation ti~e or costs. For example, the same percentage 
substantial 
the rules had substantially increased preparation t±me. 
Almost 40 ~~e rules had ~ significant 
effect on case preparation time. More than twice as many 
Fresno defendants' counsel concluded that the ELP rules 
had substantially 
it had substantially decreased preparation time; again, 







the plaintiffs' attorneys in both cities 
rules had no effect on the attorney fees 
the majority saw the rules as 
reduction on the costs, other than 
their clients.ll Most defendants' 
11. This apparent inconsistency undoubtedly results from 
the percentage or gent fee arrangement of the personal 
injury/property which comprise the majority 
of these cases. 
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cou.~sel indicated they have not reduced fees charged their 
clients. Approximately the same percentage indicated they 
had raised fees as indicated they had decreased fees. With 
respect to costs not includi.r..g attorney fees, defendants' 
general view was t~at there was either a slight increase 
.. 
or decrease, with the majority indicating •no effect." These 
data. seem to indicate that, at least from the defendants• 
point of view, the reductions resulting from reduced dis-
covery are nearly eCi\~alled, if :n.ot slightly surpassed, by 
the cost of obtaining the same information from other 
sources. 
One factor tending to increase preparation time and 
costs may have been counsels' unfamiliarity with the new 
ELP rules. A major source of irritation to all concerned 
has been the contention statement.l2 Although questions 
concerning the contention statement were not distributed 
to a statistically significant sample of attorneys, there 
was a general feeling that they were time consuming and 
not of great value. The contention statement has been 
substantially modified so that its preparation will no 
longer be a burden to counsel. 
C. Conclusions 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. The 
first is that the typical small personal inju:y or breach of· 
12. Although the rules applicable to municipal courts merely 
required a list of witnesses, the superior court ELP rules 
require the filing of a document similar to the "final pre-
trial stipulation" required by many federal district courts 
and generally disfavored by attorneys. The Torrance court 
added its own more detailed requirements. 
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contract/promissory note ca~e involves relatively little dis-
covery and, at two courts, a very incidence 
of serious abuse. However, the ELP study shows that even in 
this type of case more ciscovery takes place than is actually 
needed. The E~P rules have significantly reduced ~~e amount 
of dizcovery taking 
Although the 
case is not great, 
to ~~e typical I 
in the cases subject to these rules. 
in the &verage 
potential cost savings, in relation 
quite significar.t. 
Although many counsel found the rules ~~oying and in-
convenient or prefer a program that permitted some limited 
use of interrogatories, few have reported any significant 
affect on t~e outcome of the lawsuit. The one discouraging 
note, however, is the indication that little if any of the 
savings have been or will be passed on to the clients. In 
fact, defendants' counsel indicated that the cost of obtaining 
information through other devices, as well as the preparation 
of the contention statement, may cause them to raise their 
fees. 
This does not necessarily mean that the project has 
failed. While the goal of the ELP project vas to reduce 
the cost of litigation, and there was an implicit assump-
tion that that reduction would be passed on to the litigants, 
there was also a concern that in many small cases ~~e cost 
of preparing the case for litigation was so great, in rela-
tion to the amount 
11 
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would be unable 
to brinq meritorious suits and defendants unable to present 
meritorious defenses. By reducinq the cest of discovery by 
up to 70 percent, these meritorious claims and defenses may 
no lonqer have to be ab~~doned • 
• 
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Evaluation of Telephone Conferencing EXHIBIT L 
to Conduct Motion Hearings in 
Civil Lit1gation: Preliminary Findings 
Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay 
and the Institute for Court Management 
October, 1980 
Summary of Preliminarv Findin~s from Initial Phase I Research 
During the initial stage of the Phase I research, the primary focus has 
been upon developing an understanding of current utilization patterns, using 
both site visits and telephone interviews. Although the Phase I research has 
e only been underway for three months, it is possible to report some preliminary 
findings that are directly relevant to the proposed Phase II research. These 
may be summarized as follows: 
(a) Current utilization patterns. Prior to the start of the Ph~se I project, 
telephone conferencing had been viewed as a novel idea that had been adopted in a 
few jurisdiction~ by pioneering judges. The Phase I research indicates 
that, although telephone conferencing is used in only a relatively small pe~centage 
of courts, the number of courts in which it is used by at least one judge is larger 
than initially realized. These courts vary widely in terms of their jurisdiction, 
geographic location,u=ban/rural setting, and caseload size. For example, Phase I 
resea=ch has produced information on the use of telephone confere~ces to conduct 
civil motion hearings and other types of proceedings in civil cases in four federal 
district courts, two state courts of appeal, twelve state trial courts of general 
jurisdiciton, and two state trial courts of limited jurisdiction. This fact that 
the range of courts is so broad (see Figure 1) suggests that, civil motions are 
amenable to telephone conferencing in a variety of judicial contexts. 
Yet, while telephone conferencing is used in more courts and by more judges 
th~~ originally believed, the picture is not one of widespread diffusion. Ev~, 
within a given state, telephone conferencing may be used in trial courts of general 
jurisdiction in some judicial districts but not in others. Within a single judi-
cial-district where it is used, not all of the judges utilize telephone co~ferenci~g. 
In Wisconsin's lOth Judicial District, for example, four of the sixteen ju8ges use 
it frequently, six use it occasionally, three use it rarely, and three never use 
at all for civil motion hearings. A tentative explanation for this varia~le-use 
pattern is that telephone conferencing has been adopted on an ad hoc basis, wit~ 
limited coordinated effort among judges or by other court officials, and each 
judge who has utilized the innovation has adapted it to his own case manag~~~,t 
approach. To the extent that the judges share a s~ilar decision-~aking style, 
they use the telephone in a similar manner. 
. ~~ile the Phase I study is focused on the use of telephone conferencing in 
civil motion hearings, preliminary findings indicate that a very wide range of 
court business is conducted by telephone. In civil cases, the telephone is used 
for scheduling conferences, pretrial conferences, motion hearings,and the setting 
of trial dates. Telephone conference is used less frequently in criminal cases, 
but its functions in some courts include taking pleas as well as conducting notion 
hearings. Other uses include taking depositions and obtaining expert witness 
·testimony in child custody cases, co~itment proceedipgs,3nd small claim cases. 
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Figure 1 
Jurisdictions Where Telephone Conferencing 
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Telephone conferencing is an alternative to two means of 
motions. First, motions may be oecided strict on the papers by the jucge 
no oral presentation by the parties. Briefs, memoranda, points and authorities 
are evaluated by the judge in assessL~g the claims made by the moving party. 
an in-person hearing before the court may be held. Usually (though not in every 
jurisdiction) , the lawyers for the parties have papers the 
of the motion, so that the purpose of the hearing is for counsel to present oral 
arguments and for the judge to have the opportunity to additional information. 
Jurisdictions vary widely in te_~s of the of utilization of these 
two types of methods of resolving motions, and there is virtually 
available in any jurisdiction on the percentage distribution of 
of motions heard using the different methods available. In order to gain some 
sense-of the relative frequency of telephone conferences in the jurisdictions 
where this innovation is now used, the juoges were asked how often and what 
of matters they used the telephone. While s estimates are 
because of selective perception and fading memories,the preliminary·results are 
useful in two respects. First, they convey the judge's perception and that itself 
is an important factor. Second, they can be corroborated by more ORjective mea-
sures in the future. Hence, for the present, they provide a useful indicator of 
utilization patterns. 
One relationship that emerges is that tel conferences are more 
for certain kinds of motions than others. Generally, motions that may be 
of the case (i.e., substantive) are argued less frequently by telephone ~an those 
that are procedural or are matters of discovery. ·of the motions decided tele-
phone, substantive motions appear to be the most , as seen in Table 
While procedural and discovery motions are more in absolute terms 
substantive motions, judges also claim that a of these 
are resolved by telephone than are substantive motions One of the 
be explored in this proposal research is the extent to which 
are used as an alternative to in-person hearings 
alternative to resolution of relatively 
otherwise be decided on the papers without counsel. 
(b) Attitudes toward use of the teleohone for motion hearings. The 
pr9ject will ultimately gather information from both judges ~~d la~yers 
·attituoes toward telephone conferencing. At this stage, interviews have 
conducted only with judges, since they were most accessible and since 
especially relevant sources of information on other cs such as utilization 
patterns and the innovation process. A current the jud 
intervie'-7ed is found in Figure 2. Not surpris all of 
telephone conferencing have a favorable opinion of its use in motion 
They explain their assessments in terms of time 
the court, counsel, and clients, and tend to 
little or no impact--either positive or negative--on 
1 Areas covered in the interviews with judges who use the tel 
conferencing have included the general li of the phone con 
possible problems with control of the proceedings, procedures of 









Frequency of Civil Motions in 
Trial Courts Decided 
Telephone Conference 
To compel discovery 
To consolidate cases 
To intervene 
To join parties 
For leave to amend pleadings 
To sever parties 
To dismiss for: 
failure to join a party 
failure to state a claim 
improper venue 
lack of personal jurisdiction 
For definite statement 
To strike the pleadings 
Summary judgment 








New Jersey (Newark) 
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) 
Wyoming (Cheyenne) 
State Court of Appeals: 
New Hexico (Santa Fe) 
Washington (Spokane) 
State Trial Courts 
of General Jurisdiction: 
Arizona (Phoenix) 
California (Los Angeles) 
California (Fresno) 
Florida (W. Palm Beach) 
Georgia (Atlanta) 
Massachusetts (Cambridge) 
Massachusetts (Fall River) 
Michigan (Pontiac) 
Michigan (Big Rapids) 
New Jersey (Atlantic City) 




U.S. District Court for MD 
U.S. District Court for MD 
u.s. District Court for MD 
U.S. District Court for NJ 
u.s. District Court for PA, Eastern District 
U.S. District Court for WY 
New Mexico Court of Appeals 
Washington Court of Appeals, Div. III/Dist, II 
Washington Court of Appeals, Div. III/Dist, III 
Washington Court of Appeals, Div. III/ 
Superior Court of AZ, Maricopa Cty., Phoenix 
Superior Court of CA, LA Cty., Torrance 
Superior Court of CA, LA Cty., Fresno 
Florida Circuit Court, XV Judicial Circuit 
Florida Circuit Court, XV Judicial Circuit 
Florida Circuit Court, XV Judicial Circuit 
Georgia Superior Court, Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
Superior Court of MA 
District Court of MA, Briston Cty./2nd Dist. 
Michigan Circuit Court, VI Judicial Circuit 
Michigan Circ~it Court, 48th Judicial Circuit 
New Jersey Superior Court, Vicinage I 
New Mexico District Court--
First Judicial Dist./Div. I 
Firat Judicial Dist./Div. III 
First Judicia) Dist./Div. IV 
Superior Court of Washington, Lincoln City, 
Davenport 
JUDGE 
Judge Joseph Young 
Judge Alexander Harvey, II 
Judge Frank Kaufman' 
Judge Frederick B. Lacey 
Judge Alfred L. Luongo 
Judge Clarence A. Brimmer 
Judge William R. Hendley 
Chief Judge Dale M. Green 
Judge Ray E. Munson 
Commissioner Michael F. Keyes 
Judge Thomas c. Kleinschmidt 
Judge Kenneth Andreen 
Judge August J. Goebel 
Judge John Beranek 
Judge Daniel T.K. Hurley 
Judge Timothy Poulton 
Judge Charles L. Weltner 
Judge Thomas R. Morse, Jr. 
Chief Judge Milton R. Silva 
Judge Gene Schnelz 
Judge Lawrence Root 
Judge Philip A. Gruccio 
Judge Thomas A. Connelly 
Judge Lorenzo Garcia 
Judge Bruce E. Kaufman 









Eau Claire County 
Eau Claire County 





State Trial Courts of Limited Jurisdiction 
California (Los Angeles) 
Ohio (Columbus) 
Loa Angeles Municipal Court 
• Franklin County Municipal Court 
JUDGE 
Judge Robert Pfiffner . 
Judge Richard Stafford 
Judge Arthur A. Cirilli 
Judge Donna J. Huza 
Judge Thomas II. Bnrland 
Judge William D. O'Brien 
Judge Karl F. Peplau 
Jud~e William E. McEwen 
Judge Robert Weisel 
Judge Donald J. Sterlinske 
Judge Alvin L. Kelsey 
Judge Leon Emerson 




All of the juages interviewed to date conferen as 
reducing the time ana costs of civil litigation. The time of the court 
to be saved in several ways, primarily by s~ortening the length of the 
facilitating scheduling, and moving cases faster. In geographically large 
districts, telephone conferencing is said to result in less need for 
the judge and court staff to outlying areas. The j also eve that 
save time, especially in travel to the court, by conferences. Most of 
the judges assume that the lawyers pass these savings on to their clia~ts but 
they have no evidence on this point. 
Significantly, the judges who utilize telephone conferencing report no ser~ 
ious diff£culties in conducting the conferences. Technical problems--e.g., 
disconnected parties, static on the line, £nadequate cation, 
identifying the speaker--seem to be rare occurrences In terms of 
hearings and conducting them, none of the judges experienced prob serious 
enough to warrant holding counsel in contempt for failure to be present at the 
scheduled time or for inappropriate behavior during a conference. 
(c) Economic costs and ootential savinos. Few of the j in 
the Phase I stuay have been familiar with the costs of telephone 
equipment. Data on how much it costs to operate a 
court settings must still be developed, but should be as:::er 
the financial records of courts that use the system and from L,e tariffs of the 
respective regional operating units of the American Telephone and Telegraph 
which generally provide the telephone equipment used by courts. 
In most of the jurisdictions that utilize telephone 
bears the costs of the conference calls for several reasons. First, the 
telephone equipment is generally connected to a WATS line. Wnile L1e j 
not certa£n about the exact cost of the calls, they that the WATS 
service makes the calls relatively inexpensive. Second, the judges view 
of calls as a reasonable expenditure of public resources, because of 
to counsel and clients. Third;. :they view the confere..'1ce call as benefit 
court by reducing the length of hearL'1gs, 
mo~ing cases through the system more quickly. 
The savings resulting from telephone conferen 
L'1volve a wide range of different kinds of tial 
participants in the process, including judges, court 




terms of reduced expenditures for time spent at several different 
scheduling future appearances, travelling to and from the court site, 
the case to be called, and participating in the 
may be ga~s to the justice system in terms of reduced overall case 
time. 
(d} The innovation Process. Virtually all of the judges who use 
conferencing say that they thought of the idea themselves and 
minL~al discussions with other parties such as court officials and 
bar. Most·of them had had some experience with conference calls 
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in private law practice. After coming on the bench, they began using tele:hone 
conferencing for various types of court business because they thought it was a 
good idea that would save time and money. The innovation has been adopted with 
limited suggestions or technical assistance from a state court administrator's 
office, independent organization, or judicial training institution. To some extent. 
especially in rural areas, necessity may be the mother of this innovation--~hen 
distances are very long, use of the telephone (especially for relatively minor 
matters) is seen by some judges to be an essential aspect of sound judicial admin-
istration. Once the judges have initially adopted it, the extent to which they 
use telephone conferencing seems to depend on the length of time they have used 
it. Those who have had greater opportunity to explore various applications appear 
to use it more extensively. 
The judges who use telephone conferences report that the innovation has wide 
.support among the bar. It is not clear, however, to what extent any type of 
mandatory telephone conferencing procedure, substituted for in-person hearings, 
would be acceptable to lawyers. Although the evidence is fragmentary, there are 
indications that some judges tend to encourage telephone conferencing in cases 
where they have a high degree of confidence that the lawyers will like this idea. 
. ' t •• 
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Bv S"ft:PiiLN .t ffif.EDMA.'i 
Washln~on U.. weH~kno<w~ as a d~ or 
lawyef5,, but It ib also a city or ecooomJsts 
W.1;!e therf" Drf' surprismg .mni;a.'itles bet~ 
ween tM;<,e profcsslonl> tr.tlt Jre often too llt· 
Ue apprec1attd, thPre ts: also a fr!endly 
rlvairy _ In part1cular, my eroOOLJlst tnends 
are sometimes heard to mul:ter, ·•T':-lere are 
too many lawyers - and too much lltiga-
Uon. '' That is a not uncorrunon cornplamt. 
and It has some basis. As of !he !'!ld of 1900, 
!here were574,8!0 lawyers ill tile U.S., 31 per 
12,000 people I o Japan there Is only "-"" 
lawyer per12,000 people. 
But, in an unaccountable lapse, those 
.. me ec<l!lOmlsts forget that lawyers, like 
. ~~3,"'"" ~~. r:~;:glya..:d ~~"::·.: 
that the flood of young me:1 and women irtto 
~~~ga~ro.:.,~~n ,!'.;"' ;•~;~;:~I"t,~:; 
counsel, however, for econom!cs has a useful 
perspective to otf(·r ln :ts rocus on tie overall 
effecl<; or certain kinds of activity and m the 
trade-<>ffs that at!ena !he plll'SUI! of l!ny 
single set of values to the exc_lusior: of others. 
In that context, I would Hk.e to Share 1A1th 
you some thoughts about our common 
responslb!Hty to assure that tne ie-gal system 
eontinues ~ perform Jts vtta:l SOCial hmc· 
hons- to help order human affturs., m both 
private and publlt law, and to provide a 
method lor resolving disputes and Oreial'!ng 
rlgbls. 
While the petrification of the 
,. ed much attention in the context 
implications for the ciyil system are at 
tant. 
Stf"!Jhen Friedman is a rommJS-i>JO!ler with 
the Securities and Exchange Co.rnmtsswn 
These remarks were madf! before the 1981 < 




~\ r I 
Pd~~r it::O 'utz.csl" (tuNTitvv>l·-'-o~) __ 
Litigatiofl in America 
. : • materiality In securlt~ law; . I 
• fiduciary obligations In corporatle law; 
• negligence in the law of civil wrongs. 
These two attributes - a commitment to 
the impor<ance of factual differences In ap-
plying the coercive force of the law, and a set 
of legal concepts that accommodates the dif· 
ferences, have broUght us many benefits. In 
, the securities laws, for example, we have 
avoided a rigid set of rules divorced from an 
ever-shifting reality. · 
But we have also paid a price. Out of a 
desire for flexible rules, we have adopted 
concepts that are sometimes so uncertain 
that the possibly relevant facts often seem 
endless. Out of a desire to seek out all the 
facts In a search for truth, we have produced 
a ctvU dlstovery system that many believe Is· 
out of controL 
One can see a microcosm of this develOj>-
ment In the Freedom of Information Act. 
Adopted In 1974, It was Intended to provide 
forcement alone·has $20,000 in its budget for 
overtlmeworkonthlsoncmatter. . 
That development, Uke the luxuriant 
growth of discovery In private lltlgation, is 
the result of single-minded attention to the 
benefits of "truth seeking" without recogniz· 
ing the costs, burdens and potential for 
abuse on the other side. Moreover, in giving 
paramount weight to the desire to ascertain 
all of the facts and to administer flexible 
rules, we have neglected other values. The 
result has been a judicial system that grows 
more ponderous every year, in which the 
pressure for settlement, and the expense and 
burden of liti!j:atlon all combine to Impede 
the search for JUStice and exactitude. 
The other leg of this analysis, the flexible 
st-mdard, also deserves attention. Flexible 
standards, like materiality and fraud, serve 
an Important purpose In the securities laws. 
They FUbstltute for a far more rl!!:ld 
regulatory approach. They permit an en-
If judges are to control the discovery process more 
tightly, the standards of permissible inquiry must be 
narrowed somewhat and they must .be given the power 
to impose discipline on the discovery process. 
more access for citizens to Information held 
, by the government. Instead it has become a 
substitute for investigative efforts by the 
private sector and a way of obtaining In-
formation about competitors that was first 
secured by governmental compulsion, for-
mal or Informal. Moreover, it Is probably the 
best example of the costs and burdens of 
overregulating the government. In 1975, the 
SEC processed 638 FOIA requests; In 1980 
the number jumped to 1,317. In 1980 our 
estimated cost of compliance was $451,900. 
One of the best examples of the ad-
ministrative problems created by the FOIA 
Involves a request by reporters for the Wall 
Street Journal and the Washington Post for 
access to the Commission's flies on approx-
Imate!~ 550 corporations that made volun-
tary diSClosure of questionable payments. 
The first request was filed late in 1976. The 
commission released a limited number of . 
files before the Justice Department re-
quested that we not turn over anv more 
records until Justice had completed its In-
vestigations. Nevertheless, between 1976 and 
1979, we estimate that the SEC spent approx-
Imately 5,000 persons hours processing this 
one request. In 1979, the SEC was sued by 
Dow Jones - the owner of the Wall Street 
Journal - under the F,OI A. The court 
ordered us to process the request In an ex-
pedited fashion. Since mid-1980, the SEC has 
spent approximately 5,000 additional hours 
on this matter - committing the l"'!SOUrces 
of a substantial number of personnel In the 
Divisions of Corporation Finance, Enforce-
ment and the General Counsel's Office, in-
cluding 5 full-time paralegals, 2lawyers, and 
2 part-lime law students. The Division of En-
forcement program to adopt to the Inven-
tiveness of the markets. And they leave 
room In the law for an element of "I can't 
define It, but we all know It when we see it." · 
On the other hand, there are positive 
values In drawing tighter lines. When the law 
Is clear, self-regulation Is more meaningful, 
and the bar assumes a greater part of the 
policing function. When lines are drawn with 
clarity, the litigation process is simplified. a 
narrower range of facts is relevant, and the 
fact-finding proceoss is less burdensome. 
There are many Indications of 
developments In response to this concern In 
various areas of the law, The appearance of 
no-fault automobile Insurance and 11(}-fault 
dlvorees represent a jud~ment that the 
· system was not ~rving Its ends In an elfec· 
tive way. They were both designed, among 
other things, to reduce the cost, delays and 
burdens of litigation. Note that they do so at 
some cost in the exploration of the "justice"· 
of the claims. Indeed, the whole concept of 
"insurance" Is somewhat at odds with ques-
tions of fault. 
In antitrust, the development of merger 
guidelines Is playing an important role in 
permitting firms to structure their affairs, 
althou!ib the guidelines probably have little 
direct Impact on litigation. . . 
Similar responses are discernible in the 
evaluation of the securities laws. The 
elaborate folklore of the private placement 
exemption gave way, first to the regulatory 
latlcework of Rule 146, and then to the far 
more simple - and limited - approaches of. 
Rule 242 and new See. 4(6) of the Securities. 
Please turn to Page 6 
Petrified Forest 
Continued from Page 4 
Act of 1933. For resales of restricted 
securities the arcane lore about when a pur-
chaser h~d proved his "investment intent" 
or had a "change in circumstances" was 
largely replaced by Rule 144. As our ex-
perience with Rule 144 grew, the regulatory 
aspects of that rule have been reshaped Into 
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However, we are concerned that the design of a statewide system 
could become so detailed and cumbersome that any potential 
savings would merely be replaced by new systems maintenance cost. 
We were concerned that detailed rules designed to perpetuate 
traditional procedural controls, to provide for the tactical 
needs of lawyers, and to cover every acoustical contingency 
would detract from and possibly destroy the practical cost-
effectiveness of the technology. 
Therefore, we stress the issue of state constraints. We would 
urge the legislature in considering the enabling law and the 
Judicial Council in promulgating rules to maximize the degree to 
which the system can be designed locally, by the bench and bar, 
to deal with the protection issues in the framework of local 
conditions. 
We support AB 1209, provided that its implementation provides 
primarily for 1oca1 design, with minimum impact of state-wide 
detail. 
2. Economical Litigation Project. The statement of our recom-
mendation is the following: 
We recommend that the Board of Supervisors and the Judiciary 
continue to evaluate and support the Economical Litigation 
Project. 
We based our conclusion on testimony and discussions which 
convinced us of the need for the design and evaluation of 
experiments -- pilot projects -- to determine to what extent 
simplified procedures can relieve pressure on the system within 
constraints imposed by the local legal community. We did not 
conduct an extensive analysis of the effectiveness of the 
project. The Judicial Council is conducting an evaluation. You 
are hearing today from Judge Norman Epstein and from Professor 
McDermott, who can supply you with current information on 
substantive questions of project performance. 
We were impressed at the willingness of bench and bar to experi-
ment. Accomplishing change in our large, complex public 
bureaucratic systems will require experimentation. We do not 
know in advance enough about how these systems actually operate, 
or about the details of measuring their performance, to design 
and implement replacements with any assurance that they will 
produce more benefits than problems. In the courts, we have the 
further complications of the potential impact on people's rights, 
the need for historical continuity in decisions, the requirements 
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In March, 1981, the Board of Supervisors directed our commission to 
undertake an analysis of court congestion and delay. In accordance with our 
usual practice, we appointed a task force to establish project objectives, 
direct the work and formulate recommendations. This report contains the task 
force conclusions and recommendations. 
EXHIBIT 0 
Congestion of the court system means this: the system has insufficient 
resources to produce the work required of it according to standards of per-
formance acceptable to those demanding the work. rncreased response time, 
delay, and other service reductions are the consequences of that situation. 
In the absence of realistic means to increase system resources, we can antici-
pate a breakdown of the system. According to legal professionals, signs and 
symptoms of breakdown are already appearing, since some civil suits in the 
Superior Court are facing the five year dismissal deadline and backlogs 
continue to increase. 
What, then, are realistic means to increase court system resources in 
a period of declining tax revenues? T:he task force cor.sidered first the 
litigiousness of our community. Court caseloads continue to increase; workload 
reductions could effect economies. However, we prefer a litigious society, 
where individuals seek resolution of their disputes under law in the courts, 
to a society which is alienated and frustrated by the inability to find non-
violent means of dispute resolution. A litigious society results from a 



































o increased support and encouragement of private 
adjudication options; 
o local administrative consolidation; 
o increased caseload diversion through neighborhood 
justice centers. 
The task force also concluded, however, that local initiatives will 
not be enough to release significant resources in the court system. State 
laws, rules and regulations dominate system operations. Since Propostion 13, 
the State finances a major share of the system•s cost. Yet it is at the State, 
rather than the local level, where many of the obstacles to court improvements 
have persisted for over twenty years. The task force recommends that the 
Board of Supervisors and the Judiciary cooperate on legislative programs to 
enable local action on the following: 
o full cost recovery for excess public costs imposed by 
those electing arbitration, private adjudication, and 
County-supplied legal process-serving when available 
from private firms; 
o a new fee-for-service policy specifying proportionality 
of fees to the costs they finance, permitting full cost 
recovery when lower cost alternatives are available, 
and indexing fees to costs or inflation; 
o a new State subsidy policy indexing the subsidy to costs 
and featuring judicial-impact financing for all new laws; 
o a new policy on the interest rates affecting judgments. 
o authority to negotiate improved courtroom technology with 
affected groups; 
o authority to elect smaller juries in civil cases based 
on quantifiable assessments of risk; 
o authority to implement or expand such experimental pro-
grams as the Economic Litigation Project, the El Cajon 
Project and probate reforms. 
v 
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We have no illusion 
ment. Many are not new· 
that they will, if i 
system. 
t a 
Part of any realis c a 
incorporate additional j icial positi 
of the solution. That is not issue. 
financing for the increased resources. 
strategies, revenue increasing strategies, i 
and process efficiency impro 
adopt these objectives and implement 
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BACKLOG ELIMINATION PROJECT 
October 30, 1981 Progress Report 
Lag 
At-Issue Awaiting Trial At-Issue to Trial in Months 
Start Judicial 
of TOtal Per Jud. Position Over One Year Short Cause Long Cause 
County Project Positions Start Now Start Now Start Now Start Now Start Now 
Butte 1-77 3 580 180 193 60 241 2 24 1~ 39 5 
Sonoma 1-79 7 1575 576 225 75 565 22 14 1~ 36 6 
Marin 4-80 7 1014 565 148 80 242 3 13 1~ 21 4 
Kern 5-80 10 1185 835 118 83 243 85 9 1~ 22 6 
Placer 6-80 4 573 429 143 107 6 0 5 1~ 13 6 
Sacramento 4-80 25 3325 1860 133 74 71 9 1~ 13 7 
Humboldt 11-80 3 472 314 157 105 162 106 14 1~ 48 6 
Alameda 3-81 33 3835 3753 117 113 480 473 14 8 15 21 
Ventura 6-81 10 1785 1361 178 136 386 392 9 2 25 18 
San Bernardino 6-81 25 4134 3329 165 133 1093 1357 8 2 25 30 
L.A. Family Law 6-81 
Pomona 6-81 15 3385 1650 225 110 967 0 22 2 33 12 
Long Beach 10-81 10 2954 295 436 22 39 . 
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